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JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1972

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

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Problems of Communism

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Indian Communism and the Peasantry

By Bhabani Sen Gupta

Communist mobilization of poorer sections of the peasantry has been perhaps the most significant development in Indian politics in recent years. The level of mobilization is still relatively low, except in the state of West Bengal. However, support by the rural proletariat has already enabled the Communists to reduce the ruling Indian National Congress to a secondary position in two states, West Bengal and Kerala.[1] More important, the Communists have discovered—to the surprise of their own leaders—that rural-support bases built through the encouragement of grassroots initiative and the advocacy of even modest programs of land reform tend to be more solid and stable than urban bases founded on industrial workers and the middle classes.

This discovery has led to new tactical thinking in the strongest of the three Communist factions, the Communist Party of India (Marxist).[2] In a recent interview with the author, Harekrishna Konar, member of the party's Politbureau and General-Secretary of its national peasant front (All-India Kisan Sabha),[3] claimed:

We have found the way in West Bengal to build a militant peasant movement; we know how this is to be done, and we also know that this is the only way the Indian revolution can win. Our task now is to

[1] We shall discuss the situation in West Bengal a bit later. In Kerala, the Communist Party of India, one faction of the Communists (see footnote 2), has headed the coalition government since early 1970—a government in which Congress elements have participated since the autumn of 1971. From the standpoint of popular vote, however, the Communist Party of India (Marxist), or CPI(M)—another Communist faction, which is in opposition—constitutes the strongest party with national pretensions in the state. In the mid-term election of 1970, for example, the CPI(M) polled 22.55 percent of the total popular vote, while the CPI's share was only 9.22 percent. The ruling Congress received 18.70 percent, and the "syndicate" Congress got 3.15 percent. (In 1969, tensions within the Congress had finally led to a party split. A right-wing group—known as the "syndicate" Congress because it contained many old-line party functionaries—had broken with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and had begun to field its own list of candidates in elections.) But the CPI-led alliance obtained 36 seats in the state legislature; the ruling Congress, 32; and the CPI(M), 27. In the 1971 parliamentary election, the CPI(M) increased its percentage of the popular vote, though it lost some of its parliamentary seats.

[2] The other two factions are the Communist Party of India, or CPI, and the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), or CPI(M-L). In 1964, a large body of the more radical elements in the old Communist Party of India deserted it and formed the CPI(M). The CPI(M-L) was born in 1969 after internal wrangling within the CPI(M) had caused a fair number of Maoist revolutionaries to leave—or get tossed out of—that party. We shall go into some of the major differences in the viewpoints of the factions subsequently.

[3] Konar comes from a landlord family in Burdwan District of West Bengal. He was attracted to the Communist movement during his college days, and he later refused his share of family land. He has spent the greater part of his political life with the peasant front. His brother, Benoy Konar, is now probably the most effective peasant leader in Burdwan. A district magistrate told the writer that Benoy Konar's hold on the poor peasantry was "remarkable"—in fact, during his own tenure as magistrate, he had found it difficult to control peasant-landlord clashes and interparty peasant clashes without Benoy Konar's helpful intervention. Harekrishna Konar seems to be emerging as the main theoretician of the CPI(M)'s peasant tactics.

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further strengthen the movement in Bengal and to carry it forward to the other states, especially Orissa, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh.

Konar, to whom goes much of the credit for the CPI (M)'s substantial penetration of the West Bengal countryside and who has contributed many of the party's present concepts for peasant mobilization, was not unaware of the current weakness of the peasant movement or of the tremendous problems of mobilizing the Indian peasantry. Each state, he admitted, has its own social structure and political culture, and caste alignments still prevail in much of the Indian countryside; moverover, India has "the most centralized government in Asia and Africa," with the federal authorities wielding a "mighty apparatus of force." Nevertheless, Konar expressed certainty that in the next five years or so the CPI(M) would succeed in mobilizing the rural proletariat in several states and "this will entirely change the face and the soul of Indian politics."

Konar declared that the "red" district of Burdwan in West Bengal was the "model" for peasant mobilization—not merely because the party had won 24 of the district's 25 seats in the West Bengal legislature and all of its 10 seats in the national parliament in the 1971 mid-term election, but mainly because the district had become "impregnable" to other political elements. He also contended that in West Bengal the CPI(M) had managed to evolve "revolutionary tactics using the parliamentary method for waging the class struggle." That is, it had learned to make "simultaneous use" of legal and extralegal means of struggle.

And in this, we realize that we can learn very little from the experience of the Soviet and the Chinese revolutions. In the peculiar objective realities in India, we have to rely on ourselves to formulate the strategies and tactics of our revolution. The Indian peasant struggle must necessarily take a different form from that of the CCP-led peasant struggle in China.[4]

In short, the CPI(M) now gives priority to the organization of the rural rather than the industrial proletariat; and it attempts to mobilize the peasantry through a combination of militant parliamentarianism and the encouragement of struggles of controlled militancy in the countryside. The party high command describes this tactical line as "Leninist" —implying that the leadership of the alliance of the working class and the peasantry still belongs to the working class—but in actuality the party appears to be veering toward a concept of "equal partnership" between the industrial proletariat and the peasantry, like that which the Italian Communist Party embraced under Palmiro Togliatti in the 1950's. For example, the CPi(M) is rapidly abandoning theoretical distinctions between the urban and the rural proletariat and adopting the kind of concentration on the land-hungry and landless peasants that Antonio Gramsci advocated for the Italian Communists in the early interwar years. Moreover, instead of neutralizing the middle peasants (an aspect of Leninist tactics which aims at preventing this social group from joining with more conservative forces in the political spectrum), it has been trying to bring them into the worker-peasant alliance. In fact, one reason why Konar labeled Burdwan District as the "model" for Communist mobilization of the peasantry is that he and his fellow party leaders believe they have succeeded in enlisting the support of the middle peasants against the *jotedars* (big landowners).

This general approach distinguishes the CPI(M) from the other two Communist factions. The Communist Party of India remains firmly wedded to the fundamentals of the Soviet revolutionary model—it believes that the Indian revolution can come about only under the leadership of the working class. Moreover, the CPI, in keeping with current Soviet prescriptions for enhancing Communist influence in India through the formation of a "national-democratic" front as a prelude to eventual participation in the national government, collaborates with the ruling Congress party of Mrs. Indira Gandhi; and it seeks incremental social change through legal, parliamentary mass pressures on the government.[5] Such a course does include efforts to win adherents in the rural areas. For example, the CPI sponsored a "land-grab" propaganda campaign in 1970 which helped to focus national attention on the growing polarization in the countryside. However, its undertakings of this kind have concentrated on "reformist" agitation for the redress of specific local griev-

[4] It should be noted here that the CPI(M) classifies itself as one of the most independent Communist parties in the world, for it has no organizational links with either the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or the Chinese Communist Party. Nonetheless, the Communist Party of India, which has ties with the CPSU, regards its rival as pro-Chinese.

[5] Regarding the differences between the CPI and the CPI(M) on this point, see C. Achutha Menon, *What Happened in Kerala*, New Delhi, People's Publishing House, 1969, pp. 2-3.

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ances rather than on appeals to broad class militancy.[6]

The Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), or CPI(M-L), like the CPI(M), lays primary stress on mobilizing the peasantry, but it rejects parliamentary activities as a means of conducting revolution. In accordance with Maoist doctrine, it urges the institution of protracted guerrilla warfare from rural base areas. During 1967—*i.e.*, even before the inauguration of the CPI(M-L) in 1969—individual groups of Indian Maoists began trying to organize peasant insurrections and guerrilla operations in widely separated parts of the country; and this so-called "Naxalite" movement, which enjoyed the formal blessing of the Chinese Communists for some two-and-a-half years, ultimately clashed violently with the CPI(M). Indeed, in West Bengal the conflict resulted in the murder of more than 400 cadres of the CPI(M) and the disruption of its once-strong base in the Calcutta area.[7] But now the police, sometimes with the aid of the army, have more or less quelled the various insurgencies, and since the first months of 1970, the "revolutionism" of the CPI (M-L) has dwindled to little more than urban terrorism in West Bengal.

This article will examine the recent efforts of the Communists to mobilize the peasantry and the factors that have contributed to their success. It will devote special attention to the activities of the CPI (M), which has to date registered the greatest gains in the countryside.

Agrarian Crisis

Underlying Communist advances in rural areas has been growing agrarian unrest in India. The Indian village, Gunnar Myrdal has observed, "is like a complex molecule among whose parts extreme tensions have been built up." [8] These tensions crisscross in a manner that maintains (or has thus far maintained) equilibrium, but, as Myrdal points out, "they may reorganize in a way that would explode the molecule." The molecule may perhaps have commenced to explode—at least in parts of the country. In several states, the traditional balance of social forces in the countryside has begun to give way to a realignment in which the two extremes of affluence and poverty are becoming increasingly polarized.

As is now widely recognized, the "land reforms" of the 1950's and 1960's did not bring about a structural change in agrarian relations but merely abolished the numerous semi-feudal "intermediary" tenures. Though the reforms deprived some "intermediaries" (landowners who did not cultivate or supervise the cultivation of their holdings but "sold" their rights to collect rent to others) of at least portions of their land and brought all "intermediaries" under government regulation, they left 20 million of the former "intermediaries" as big and middle landlords.[9] It is these landlords—the great bulk of whom belong to the higher castes and exercise economic and commercial power in the country—who have benefited most from the inputs that have gone into

[6] On the CPI's agrarian tactics, see K. T. Jacob, *Tiller Gets Land in Kerala*, New Delhi, People's Publishing House, July 1970.

[7] Rival parties of the CPI(M) in West Bengal have generally blamed it for initiating the "politics of murder and violence" that occurred there in 1969-70 during the second United Front government (to be discussed later); however, the CPI(M) maintains that it has suffered more than any other group, and assigns responsibility for the violence and terror to the Naxalites, members of the ruling Congress, and others, in collusion with a section of the police.

[8] *Asian Drama*, New York, Pantheon, 1968, Vol. II, pp. 1063-64.

[9] V. M. Dandekar, "Poverty in India," *Economic and Political Weekly* (Bombay), Jan. 2, 1971, p. 109. Prof. Dandekar's study was sponsored by the Ford Foundation.

Since the subjects of land and land revenue fall within the purview of the state governments rather than the central government, the "land-reform" laws passed were far from uniform. However, all states placed a ceiling on landholdings, with the individual, not the family, as the applicable unit. The ceiling varied from state to state—between 27 and 324 acres for Andhra Pradesh, 132 acres for Gujurat, 50 acres for Assam, between 27 and 126 acres for Maharashtra, 27 acres for Mysore, 25 acres for West Bengal, etc. Differentiations were made between dry and wet land and between seasonally and permanently irrigated land, and liberal exemptions were granted for orchards, fisheries, and the like. Under the terms of the enactments, the states were to assume title to all lands in excess of the ceilings and to pay compensation to the former owners.

These laws and their implementation left much to be desired. For example, while they regulated and protected tenancy rights of landowning cultivators, they did almost nothing to protect the rights of sharecroppers. Indeed, they permitted owners to resume land from sharecroppers in certain circumstances. Similarly, though abolition of "intermediaries" enabled the states to secure a major share of the rent for land, the enactments contained enough loopholes for wide-scale violations of the supposed ceilings on holdings. Moreover, in few states were the "reforms" rigorously enforced. Thus, what Daniel Thorner (see citation below) concluded with regard to Uttar Pradesh—namely, that "the intermediaries were transferred by the Act into a class of specially privileged agriculturists"—was true for the entire country with the exception of Kerala, where the Communist government elected in 1957 did subsequently seek to introduce a number of radical reforms.

For further discussion, see Bhowani Sen, *Evolution of Agrarian Relations in India*, New Delhi, People's Publishing House, 1962; Myrdal, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, Chapter 26; H. D. Malaviya, *Land Reforms in India*, 2nd ed., New Delhi, All-India Congress Committee, 1955; Planning Commission, Government of India, *Progress of Land Reforms*, New Delhi, 1955; Karuna Mukerji, *Land Reforms*, Calcutta, H. Chatterji & Co., 1952; Daniel Thorner, *The Agrarian Prospect in India*, London, Oxford University Press, 1958.

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Indian agriculture since independence. Moreover, they have been the instrumentality through which the ruling Congress party, by means of manifold linkages forged by distribution of patronage, have preserved an equilibrium in the countryside, and they have mobilized the mass of the rural vote for the Congress. Pitted against these landlords are 185 million dwarf holders owning five acres of land or less, and 120 million landless cultivators, one-third of whom belong to tribal groups, which do not adhere to the caste system.[10] Agricultural laborers comprise 25-40 percent of the population of most of the states,[11] and many of these laborers are sharecroppers with no security of tenure even with respect to land that they have homesteaded. In the rice-growing areas of eastern and southern India, furthermore, the land-man ratio indicates an enormous pressure on the land.[12]

The reasons for the absence to date of any structural agrarian reforms are fairly complex. For centuries prior to India's acquisition of its independence from Great Britain in 1947, the Indian countryside had on the whole been quiescent; and while the revolutionary environment of the immediate post-independence years might have permitted sweeping agrarian changes,[13] there was no great pressure for them. Hence, the ruling Indian National Congress felt no compulsion to introduce anything more than modest reforms. Indeed, the Congress enjoyed widespread support among the rural masses without propounding or carrying out radical measures. During ensuing years, the slow pace of urbanization, the persistence of traditional agriculture, and the tenurial reforms—which diffused traditional rural leadership, though they did not modify its basic structure in any significant manner—made it possible for the rural rich to continue to exploit the rural poor without political upheaval in the countryside.[14] The Congress retained its hold on the electoral loyalties of the rural masses; and the leftist parties, because they (including the undivided CPI after 1951) operated more or less within the parliamentary system, did not seek to take advantage of the objective factors in the countryside for radical or revolutionary social change.[15]

As the years passed, moreover, the interests of the Congress and of the landholders in the country tended to become more and more interdependent. On the one hand, the piecemeal agrarian reforms that the Congress implemented "bolstered up the political, social and economic positions of the upper rural strata."[16] Consequently, they strengthened this group's desire to perpetuate the status quo. That desire is shared by the middle and upper strata of the urban population, whose members often own land.[17] On the other hand, the Congress grew to rely on the big and middle landowners "for crucial support" in trying to preserve its dominance in rural areas.[18] Such a reliance inevitably enhanced the political influence of the group within the party.

Today, the majority of Congress legislators (of all factions) at both the national and state levels are either landholders themselves or are professionally or occupationally linked with landed interests. Furthermore, as far back as 1959, the Planning Commission reported that even among "politicians of liberal view" there was hardly any recognition of the rights and privileges of actual cultivators.[19] This situation explains why, in addition to eschewing structural land reforms, the states have failed to distribute among the landless peasants more than a fraction of the land that was supposed to go to these farmers after the tenurial reforms. According to surveys undertaken to locate such land, the state governments obtained title to 1.2 million acres in blocks of more than 250 acres each, and 4.6 million acres in smaller blocks. While all this land was to have been distributed, and distributed primarily to landless workers, it is "doubtful whether any considerable number of landless families have been settled in viable agriculture."[20]

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[10] Wolf Ladejinsky, "Green Revolution in Bihar," "Review of Agriculture," *Economic and Political Weekly*, September 1969.

[11] C. Rajeshawara Rao, Bhowani Sen, and Y. V. Krishna Rao, *Problems of India's Agrarian Sector*, New Delhi, People's Publishing House, 1960, p. 12.

[12] Let us take Bihar as an example. The state has, on the average, more than one person for every acre of land within its boundaries, but the ratio of man to tillable land runs vastly higher. For further discussion, see Jayaprakash Narayan, "Politics of Violence: The Roots," *Amrita Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta), Nov. 28, 1970.

[13] Myrdal, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 1367.

[14] Rajani Kothari, "Congress System in India," in Center for the Study of Developing Societies, *Party System and Election Studies*, Occasional Papers, No. 1, Delhi, Allied Publishers, 1967, p. 6.

[15] Rajani Kothari, *Politics in India*, Delhi, Orient Longman, 1970, pp. 215-30.

[16] Myrdal, *loc. cit.*

[17] Agrarian relations in India are in some ways comparable to those existing in southern Italy. See Sidney G. Tarrow, *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1967, pp. 259-60.

[18] Myrdal, *loc. cit.*

[19] *Report of the Panel on Land Problems*, New Delhi, 1959, p. 38.

[20] Dandekar, p. 109. See also, *Fourth Five Year Plan*, New Delhi, Planning Commission, 1969, pp. 179-80, and CPI(M), *Millions Fighting for Land and Wages*, Calcutta, 1970.

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At any rate, a rural equilibrium based on such pronounced social stratification was inherently unstable. In the late 1950's, the parts of the village "molecule" began to be disturbed. A recent inquiry conducted by the Indian Institute of Public Opinion indicates that the poor contributed heavily to the decline of the Congress's electoral support from the second general election in 1957 on—a decline which sharpened after 1962.[21] "Of the erosion of the Congress popular vote of 3 percentage points between 1957 and 1962," the IIPO says, "practically all could be accounted for by the vote of the really poor and destitute." (According to the report, the incomes of about one-third of the Indian population fall below the poverty line; and those of a little more than one-fifth, below the destitute line.) During this period, then, the poor and the destitute seem to have moved farther away from the Congress, while the higher income groups moved closer to it.[22]

Over the next few years, three major developments put the "molecule" under considerable pressure. One was an acute food shortage—with Bihar experiencing famine conditions—in the mid-1960's. This resulted from two successive years of severe drought in vast expanses of the country. The second was the split of the old CPI in 1964. Since the rump body remained strong among India's relatively sparse industrial workers, the breakaway CPI(M) felt compelled to turn to the peasantry as an alternate base of support. The third was the so-called "green revolution" and the birth of capitalist farming. This "green revolution" stems from a combination of things—scientific development of high-yield varieties of grain, greater use of fertilizer, efforts to increase the amount of ground water, the availability of better seeds, and the expanding employment of tractors. It has now enabled India to harvest three successive "record" crops. Thus, it holds forth the promise of a major breakthrough in agricultural production. Yet, paradoxically, it has also created conditions which have worsened the lot of the poor.

The prospect that farming could turn into a highly profitable commercial enterprise has spurred a flow of capital as well as entrepreneurship into agriculture. Indeed, the central government itself has at least indirectly given impetus to such a flow, for the Planning Commission, in drafting the Fourth Five-Year Plan, adopted the new technology as the principal means of achieving an annual growth rate of five percent in agricultural production.[23] The outcome of this influx, however, has been additional polarization of the situation in the countryside. Wolf Ladejinsky, of the World Bank, has shown in several studies that sharecroppers have become "worse off than before because as ownership of improved land is priced very highly, there is mounting determination among owners not to permit tenants to share in the rights of land they cultivate. Their preference is to get rid of them." [24] In effect, the "green revolution" is producing conditions in India somewhat similar to those which "enclosures" brought about in Britain—but in a very different domestic and international milieu. It has, in the words of Harekrishna Konar, "helped to further strengthen the position of the big landowners and rich peasants in the rural economy, causing further intensification of the social and class contradictions." [25] The danger inherent in such circumstances was stressed by the Indian Finance (then, Home) Minister, Y. V. Chavan, in early 1970. He declared: "Unless the Green Revolution is accompanied by a revolution based on social justice, I am afraid the Green Revolution may not remain green." [26]

The Maoist Peasant Movement

What began to drive home to all Indian Communists the growing importance of the agrarian question was the response of sections of the peasantry to the efforts of Indian Maoists to launch guerrilla warfare activities in scattered portions of the nation during 1967. If the Indian countryside was "littered

[21] In the fourth general election in 1967, the Congress's electoral backing fell so drastically that the number of its seats in the Lok Sabha (the Indian lower house of parliament) shrank to a bare majority, and it lost control of eight state governments. The ruling Congress party of Mrs. Indira Gandhi did recover a lot of this lost ground in the March 1971 national election, but while the party captured more than two-thirds of the seats in the Lok Sabha, its share of the popular vote (43 percent) still did not rise even to the 1962 level (45 percent). (In 1971, it should be mentioned, state elections were conducted only in the few states under central rule.)

[22] Indian Institute of Public Opinion, *The Anatomy of Indian Poverty*, New Delhi 1968, p. 28.

[23] *Fourth Five-Year Plan*, pp. 113-15.

[24] Ladejinsky, *loc. cit.* On August 25, 1971, *The Statesman* (Calcutta) reported: "The Punjab Government has made a startling confession to the Agriculture Commission. . . . The state has admitted that the 'wheat revolution has neither improved the economic conditions of the small and marginal farmers nor benefited agricultural labor. They still continue to live below the subsistence standard of living.' This is evidently a depressing admission to make by the country's most prosperous state whose per capita income is almost twice the national average, but it is true. Benefits of the green revolution have tended to concentrate in the pockets of the rich few."

[25] *Millions Fighting for Land and Wages*, p. 10.

[26] *Link* (Delhi), Jan. 18, 1970.

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with dry faggots," as a Peking commentator contended in March of that year,[27] then a Maoist group in the Naxalbari area of the Darjeeling District of West Bengal lit the first spark to set them off. Here, in what was traditionally a stronghold of the Congress, a relatively small peasant rebellion broke out in the spring—that is, just after a leftist United Front, dominated though not headed by the CPI(M), had taken over the government in West Bengal in the wake of the fourth general election. The rebellion was directed by a radical group of CPI(M) cadres who had opposed the party leadership's decisions first to contest the election and then to join in the leftist coalition because they held that this course was nothing but a continuation of the revisionist line of the old, united CPI. Had not the Chinese media hastened to hail the uprising as the "spring thunder" of the oncoming Indian revolution,[28] it would probably have remained a local incident. (Certainly, the police stamped it out fairly easily.) But Chinese endorsement of the Naxalbari insurrection and of its leaders as the true Communist revolutionaries in India changed the situation qualitatively and encouraged radical elements in several other states—notably Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, and Kerala—to organize local peasant uprisings.

By August 1967, the rebellion of the Girijan tribals in the Srikakulam region of Andhra Pradesh had taken on aspects of armed guerrilla resistance, and several other "Naxalbaris" had sprouted in Bengal, Orissa, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Kerala, and Punjab. There was thus substantial evidence that at least some rural elements, particularly the tribals with their traditional militancy and their disdain for the caste system, were willing to answer a summons to armed struggle. Since the CPI(M) had already set itself firmly against peasant insurgencies of this kind, Peking called for the formation of a Maoist Communist party in India which would exploit the "revolutionary" opportunities.[29]

The birth of the new party was a long, drawn-out process.[30] Shortly after Peking commenced to urge the foundation of such a party, the Bengal revolutionaries who had been expelled from the CPI(M) established a coordinating committee to mobilize the radical elements within and outside that party; similar bodies sprang up in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, and other states. In May 1968, the Maoist dissidents within the CPI(M) demanded abandonment of parliamentary policies at the party's Burdwan plenum. When the plenum rejected their demand, 7,000-odd CPI(M) members left the organization in anger and frustration. Then the All-India Coordinating Committee of Bengal changed its name to the All-India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR). This body, after reviewing the year since the Naxalbari uprising, called for the building of a "true" party through Naxalbari-type struggles, "for the revolution cannot be victorious without a revolutionary party." [31] But it took the Maoist revolutionaries still another year to announce the emergence of a new party.

The political resolution that the CPI(M-L) adopted on its formation—a summary of which appeared in *Peking Review* in July 1969—essentially applied to the Indian context the analysis and conclusions that Mao had set forth with respect to the Chinese revolution in the late 1930's.[32] This resolution identified the "contradiction" between feudalism and the peasant masses as the "principal contradiction" in Indian society; and it defined "the main content" of the "people's democratic revolution," the party's strategic goal, as "the agrarian revolution, the abolition of feudalism in the countryside." To accomplish a "people's democratic revolution," it went on, the working class must forge an alliance with not only the poor and landless peasants but also the middle peasants, under proletarian leadership; hence, the party's main task was to rally all these revolutionary classes around it on the basis of a program of agrarian reforms. In seeking power, the alliance under working-class guidance would have to employ armed revolution as its fundamental tactic. The party, therefore, would firmly reject parliamentarianism and pursue guerrilla warfare. It would operate chiefly in rural areas so that it could encourage the peasantry to engage in guerrilla activities, could build liberated rural bases, implement the agrarian revolution, and use the countryside to encircle the cities and ultimately capture them. While it would take advantage of any legal means of

[27] "After the Indian Elections: A Still More Reactionary Government," *Peking Review*, March 24, 1967, pp. 29-30.

[28] See the writer's "A Maoist Line for India," *The China Quarterly* (London), No. 33, January-March, 1968, pp. 3-16.

[29] Commentator, "Historical Lessons of Telengana Uprising," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily), Aug. 3, 1967, in *Peking Review*, Aug. 11, 1967, pp. 22-23.

[30] For fuller studies of Maoist manifestations in Indian communism, see Mohan Ram, *Maoism in India*, New Delhi, Vikas Publications, 1971, and the writer's *Communism in Indian Politics*, New York, Columbia University Press, forthcoming.

[31] *Liberation* (Calcutta), June 1968. This journal, now banned, became an organ of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist). At present, it is published irregularly and clandestinely.

[32] See *Peking Review*, July 11, 1969, pp. 18-22.

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Top photo by Raghubir Singh from Nancy Palmer Agency

(Top) An Indian farmer plowing a field parched by drought. The bullocks and crude wooden plow reflect the primitive conditions that still prevail in much of the Indian countryside. (Bottom) A peasant girl picking stalks of ripened rice. The grain shown here is of an improved variety introduced as a result of India's drive to achieve a "green revolution."

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waging struggles that existed, it would function by and large as a secret organization, keeping its main cadre underground.

It should be noted, however, that some members of the new party's leadership had doubts about certain aspects of the tactical line laid down in the resolution. According to Charu Mazumdar, one of the founders as well as the chairman of the body, these doubts had largely to do with the merits of secret as opposed to mass activity. Such misgivings provoked a "debate" which centered on three questions: Was guerrilla warfare the only form of struggle? Was there any need for mass organization? Should the party function as a clandestine institution? Mazumdar's views, which finally prevailed, were that guerrilla warfare alone could mobilize the poor peasants and establish their leadership of the party; that a mass organization would inevitably be dominated by middle and rich peasants and would thus be revisionist; and that only an underground party could organize an agrarian revolution.[33]

While the party was taking shape, the "Naxalite" movement continued to gather momentum.[34] By 1969, peasant guerrilla warfare was going on not only in Srikakulam but also on a limited scale along the Bengal-Orissa-Bihar border (Debra-Gopiballavpur), in parts of southern Bihar, and along Uttar Pradesh's border with Nepal in the *terai* region (foothills of the Himalayas). Moreover, there had been smaller, isolated incidents in Punjab, Assam, Madras, and Kerala.

Peking media claimed the following "major successes" for the struggle in 1969: In West Bengal, "the peasant revolutionary armed struggle has spread from the *terai* region . . . in the northern part of the state to Midnapore and other coastal regions in the south." In Andhra Pradesh, "the peasant guerrillas turned 300 villages [of Srikakulam District] into red areas for launching struggle, and more than 100 guerrillas were active in an area of about 500 square miles in the Srikakulam mountains. One hundred square miles of mountain area deep in the interior of Parvathipuram Agency came under the control of the peasant forces. The current peasant armed struggle in Andhra Pradesh has spread from the remote mountain area of Srikakulam district to more than 19 rural areas in 10 districts on the spacious plains of Telengana in the northern part of Andhra Pradesh." In Bihar, peasant masses took up arms and organized "small guerrilla squads" to conduct operations at Mushahari, in Muzzaffarnagar District. Similar armed struggle was also "developing unabatedly in the jungle areas of Gunupur in Koraput District, Orissa State, in areas close to Kalhimpu [Lakhimpur] in Uttar Pradesh, in Bhatinda and some other districts of Punjab State, and in Kerala State." [35]

These "revolutionary peasant bases" had certain features in common. They were all in "remote" areas—either in the mountains or in deep jungles, along interstate borders (Bengal-Orissa and Orissa-Andhra Pradesh, where coordination between the individual state police forces is generally poor), or along international borders (between India and East Pakistan, India and Nepal, India and West Pakistan, and India and Tibet). Some—such as the region bordering Azad Kashmir and the five districts of Assam linked by road with Bhutan and Sikkim (Kamrup, Cachar, Golpara, Lakhimpur, and Chiier)—were politically "soft," *i.e.*, areas where the writ of official authority had never run strong. Most contained substantial groups of tribal people—for example, the Girijans in Srikakulam, the Santhals in Chhotanagpur, and the hill tribes in Uttar Pradesh. All were inhabited by large numbers of landless farm workers and poor peasants.

Reports in what eventually became the journals of the CPI(M-L) stressed the insurgencies along the India-Nepal border and in Srikakulam. For instance, the Hindi weekly *Lok Yudh* (People's War) carried 124.25 columns of information about "peasant guerrilla war" in the 35 issues that it published between August 8, 1968, and May 8, 1969. Out of this total, 82 columns dealt with activities in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Bengal. The bulk of these activities occurred in areas close to the India-Nepal border:

State	Border area (cols.)	Other areas (cols.)
Uttar Pradesh	17.50	4.00
Bihar	21.50	17.50
West Bengal	20.00	11.00

In 11 of the 14 issues that it put out between March 1968 and April 1969, the English-language monthly *Liberation* devoted 88.50 columns to the same broad subject. Of this total, 31.50 columns concerned the armed struggle in Srikakulam; 9.75, that in Bihar;

[33] Ram, *op. cit.*

[34] After the various uprisings sputtered out in 1970, Majumdar upgraded the movement posthumously to a struggle for revolutionary seizure of power.

[35] *Peking Review*, Feb. 13, 1970.

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14.00, that in Uttar Pradesh; and 10.50, that in West Bengal.[36]

At Srikakulam in particular, the armed struggle acquired a fair degree of organization and depth, as the situation summaries that appeared in *Peking Review* attest. In August 1969, the journal observed:

Since the beginning of 1969, the revolutionary peasants of Srikakulam District have scored many victories in countering the "combing" operations of the reactionary landlord armed bands and the reactionary police. The people's forces have been growing stronger day by day. Adopting flexible strategy and tactics, they skillfully pounded the enemy out on "combing" operations. They fought heroically and skillfully and armed themselves with weapons seized from the enemy. According to the Indian bourgeois press, the Girijan armed forces in Srikakulam District have in their possession large quantities of explosives and many guns in addition to spears, bows and arrows, and axes.

It was reported that recently the guerrilla units in Srikakulam District made frequent, successful attacks on the reactionary police. Within two days in early June, the guerrillas in Sompeta and Paravathipuram areas of the district launched four comparatively large-scale attacks on the reactionary police, dealing them telling blows. On June 5, using home-made weapons, a guerrilla unit in Parvathipuram made a surprise attack on the reactionary police sent there on "combing" operations.[37]

The ensuing month, it recounted:

A phenomenal expansion of the red area of revolutionary armed struggle is taking place in Srikakulam and various other districts of Andhra, according to a report in the July (1969) issue of the Indian monthly Liberation. *Despite vicious enemy suppression campaigns, more than 300 villages have been turned into red areas. Panic-stricken landlords have fled for their lives, it adds.*

The report says: "Here no machinery of the reactionary government operates. Here no forest or revenue official of the reactionary government, no panchayat samiti *(village council) man can enter. The guerrillas and members of the village self-defense squads try their best to protect the villages from police marauders. The administration is run, production is looked after, and disputes are settled by the* ryotanga sangrama samithi*—the revolutionary mass organization of the peasants." It goes on to say that this organization has 8,000 members in the special area alone. Here the* ryotanga sangrama samithi*—the new power structure—is carrying on investigations of the land whose owners have escaped or have been wiped out by the guerrillas, and investigations of the land handed over by the landlords. The* samithi *is expected soon to distribute all this land among the poor and landless peasants. Here, in every village, justice is meted out to the enemies of the people by people's courts.*[38]

At the beginning of the new year, it noted:

Members of the Srikakulam District Committee of the CPI(M-L) went deep into the countryside, established guerrilla units, and propagated the truth pointed out by Chairman Mao that political power grows out of the barrel of the gun. The CPI(M-L) has now more than 100 guerrilla squads under its leadership, and the areas of armed struggle have rapidly extended from the mountains to the plains and coasts. . . .

Srikakulam's revolutionary peasants scorn the ferocious enemy. Fighting with home-made guns, hand-grenades, swords, spears, and bows and arrows, they have badly battered the "Central Reserve Corps" and the state police forces equipped with modern weapons. In 1969, they fought 65 engagements with the police and smashed the reactionaries' armed "encirclement and suppression" operations one after another. The peasant masses and the guerrilla squads fought side by side, raiding landlords' estates, seizing enemy weapons, suppressing local despots, burning land and loan contracts and distributing the landlords' grain and land.[39]

Guerrilla Warfare Withers Away

After late 1969, however, the underlying weaknesses of the "Naxalite" movement commenced to manifest themselves. By this time, the West Bengal United Front government had already snuffed out the original peasant rebellion at Naxalbari with comparative ease—as we mentioned earlier—though not

[36] For further details, see this writer's *Communism in Indian Politics, supra.*

[37] *Peking Review*, Aug. 6, 1969, p. 29.

[38] *Ibid.*, Sept. 19, 1969, p. 25.

[39] *Ibid.*, Jan. 2, 1970, p. 31.

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without considerable political furor, created by both the non-Communists within the Front and the central government. While the national authorities downplayed the Srikakulam rebellion and merely urged the state to adopt measures to suppress the uprising,[40] this insurrection was in fact a much bigger affair than that at Naxalbari. Nonetheless, it too was all but defeated by January 1970, and the other pockets of armed guerrilla action began to disintegrate rapidly.

Such conditions caused the differences within the leadership of the CPI(M-L) to widen. The Andhra revolutionaries blamed the dominant faction from Bengal for their debacle. When the Maoist party met in the Bihar countryside in January 1970 for its first congress, there was much opposition to Mazumdar's new tactical line of "annihilation of the class enemy" —which boiled down to the killing of individuals and the abandonment of mass struggle.[41] Nevertheless, the gathering adopted a political resolution generally upholding the tactic of annihilation and reiterating the need for the party to function clandestinely.

During the next few months, however, the annihilation campaign of the Bengal faction petered out in West Bengal's rural areas—partly because of police action and the growing disenchantment of the cadres with the tactic of murdering individuals, but mainly because of the CPI(M)'s successful penetration of the countryside (a topic to which we shall return in a moment).[42] By mid-1970, the annihilation program had come to be concentrated in the Calcutta urban complex, and it soon got enmeshed with interparty conflicts.

In the meantime, the "Naxalite" movement in Andhra Pradesh was collapsing entirely. By June, 1970, the police had built up a massive "anti-Naxalite" operation in the depths of the hilly Srikakulam area.[43] Across the whole of the state, they had arrested a total of 1,400 revolutionaries. Such accomplishments prompted an official spokesman to claim on June 18 that police efforts had broken the mass base of the "Naxalites" and had brought the movement under control.[44]

What finally doomed the movement was the decimation of its leadership. From the very outset, the "Naxalites" in the state had consisted of two factions —the Maoists at the state level under the command of T. Nagi Reddy, and the Maoists of the Srikakulam District or the "locals." [45] In June 1969, Nagi Reddy and his followers had assembled in a secret conclave in Madras to formulate plans for a campaign "to liberate villages, encircle towns and gradually the urban areas" starting in the Warangal, Khammam, East Godavari, Godavari, Nalgonda, and Mehboobnagar districts; but the police had surprised the conclave and taken Reddy and 43 of his close associates into custody.[46] During the first half of 1970, the police also killed a prominent leader of the Srikakulam Maoists, M. F. Ramanamurthy, who was said to have been the second in command of the "annihilation" campaign.[47] July brought the biggest disaster yet. In an encounter with the police on July 10, two top leaders of the tribal rebellion, Vempatapu Satyanarayana and Adibhatla Kailasam, lost their lives. Satyanarayana, a former school teacher who had identified himself with the tribals and married a tribal woman, had been a charismatic figure whose word was said to be law for the tribals, and he had functioned as the "brain" of the revolutionary movement.

The death of these two men was so important that the state's home minister himself announced the news to the press, asserting that the uprising had been "almost liquidated." [48] Police sources at about the same juncture disclosed that of the 60-odd *dalams* (bands) of rebels that had once operated in

[40] It should be pointed out here that, in contrast to the situation in West Bengal, the Congress ruled Andhra Pradesh. Moreover, the base of the Congress's support in the latter state lay among the rural well-to-do.

[41] See Ram, *op. cit.*, Chapter 3. Elsewhere (Chapter 4), Ram draws a distinction between the Bengal and Andhra Maoists, and he argues that T. Nagi Reddy, head of the Andhra CPI(M-L), has a better grasp of how to apply Maoist principles to Indian realities than Charu Majumdar does. J. Mohan, writing in *Economic and Political Weekly*, 1971 annual number, holds that some of the smaller Maoist groups in Bengal have always differed sharply with Majumdar.

[42] Toward the end of 1970, the CPI(M) claimed that the "Naxalites" had become "almost extinct" in the Naxalbari area and that "they are seen nowhere in rural West Bengal." *People's Democracy* (Calcutta), Dec. 27, 1970. In the summer of 1971, "Naxalism" did flare up again in Birbhum District, but this time the movement was led by a breakaway group of Maoists under Ashim Chatterji. See Sunanda K. Dutta-Ray, "Steeplechase in Birbhum," *The Statesman*, Aug. 24, 1971. During a visit to the district in July 1971, the writer got the impression that there was a measure of collaboration between CPI(M) peasant cadres and the local Maoists.

[43] *The Times of India* (New Delhi), June 23, 1970.

[44] *Ibid.*, June 18, 1970.

[45] Reddy had originally opposed the tactic of armed guerrilla warfare, favored by the Girijans of Srikakulam, without construction of a mass base first; however, the revolutionary zeal of the "locals" had forced him to embrace similar tactics without the adequate preparation that he advocated. In 1968, he had been expelled from the CPI(M) for left adventurism. Thereupon, he had denounced parliamentarianism, and the following year he had resigned from the Andhra legislature.

[46] *Ibid.*, June 23, 1970.

[47] *Ibid.*

[48] *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), July 22, 1970.

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the state, only two remained, and both were headed by tribals. Moreover, these two *dalams* had sent feelers to the police about surrender.[49] Shortly afterward, the tribal commanders still at large gave themselves up, while the rank-and-file revolutionaries returned to their normal existences.[50] In an editorial obituary, *The Times of India* remarked:

Only textbook revolutionaries and romantics believe that the [*Srikakulam*] *area could be converted into a kind of Yenan from where the revolution could spread to neighboring areas to cover the whole of Andhra and the adjoining Orissa. The region is easily accessible to the forces of law and order. The state police has in fact been able to clean it up without any help from the army.*[51]

The Hindu expressed hope that the collapse of the Andhra campaign would teach the Maoists how difficult it is to organize the poor peasant and the landless in India for a violent revolution.[52] Peking no doubt regarded these comments as excessive, but the setback in Andhra Pradesh did impress the Chinese sufficiently to cause their media to cease patronage of not only the CPI(M-L) but also the various Maoist revolutionaries during the ensuing autumn.[53]

The CPI (M)'s Movement

Though the fires of Maoist peasant insurrections by and large flickered out in 1970, the rebellions had already exerted a good deal of influence on the two main Communist parties.[54] They had persuaded the CPI to pay greater heed to the rural poor. Its "land-grab" propaganda campaign of 1970, to which we referred previously, offers a good illustration. But the uprisings had had by far the more profound effect on the CPI(M). Indeed, they had led the CPI(M) to devise a peasant movement of its own.

When the Chinese Communist Party precipitately endorsed the Naxalbari uprising in 1967, the CPI(M) rejected the Chinese interpretation of the Indian political situation and declared its ideological independence of Peking as well as Moscow.[55] Subsequently, it decided on its own that in prevailing Indian circumstances the rural proletariat should get priority attention over the urban working class, and it formulated a new tactical line mixing militant parliamentarianism with peasant struggles of controlled militancy. This line was worked out toward the end of 1968—during the months between the central government's dismissal of the first United Front government in West Bengal in the autumn of 1967 and the installation of the second after the mid-term poll of February 1969. The West Bengal unit of the party appears to have made the largest contribution to its development; therefore, it is necessary to review the evolving conditions in the state in order to gain an understanding of how the new line emerged and what its nature was.

Upon assuming power in early 1967, the first West Bengal United Front regime, in which the CPI(M) formed the largest unit, initially pursued a course distinctly biased in favor of the working and middle classes rather than the peasantry.[56] For instance, the Chief Minister—Ajoy K. Mukherji, head of Bangla Congress (a local group which had broken with the national Congress)—endorsed the position of Labor Minister Subodh Bannerji that the police must not intervene in the "legitimate" activities of the working class to secure redress of its grievances,[57] and a circular to this effect went out to all district officials over Mukherji's signature. But nothing comparable was done in support of the "legitimate" demands of the poorer section of the peasantry—despite the fact that within three months of the government's installation there were reports of several clashes between landlords and peasants.[58]

[49] *Indian Express* (Delhi), July 14, 1970.

[50] *Ibid.*

[51] *The Times of India*, July 14, 1970.

[52] *The Hindu* (Madras), July 14, 1970.

[53] At this time, the Peking press and radio also stopped their attacks on the CPI(M).

[54] Their impact, of course, was not confined to the Communist parties *per se*. On the contrary, they have left a distinct imprint on the general fabric of Indian politics. They demonstrated that at least portions of the peasantry can be mobilized for guerrilla war, and in that sense they have tended to legitimize armed peasant struggle as a political means. Furthermore, they have substantially reduced peasant fears of the state's apparatus of force.

[55] CPI(M), *Central Committee's Draft for the Ideological Discussion*, Calcutta, 1967; CPI(M), *Letter to Andhra Comrades*, Calcutta, 1968.

[56] West Bengal was one of eight states in which the CPI(M) and/or the CPI cooperated with other non-Congress parties to set up United Front governments after the 1967 election.

[57] Bannerji is a leader of the Socialist Unity Center, a leftist organization of significance only in West Bengal politics. In the 1971 state election, it should be mentioned, the Socialist United Center joined with the CPI and the ruling Congress party in coalition against the CPI(M).

[58] For accounts of clashes in the countryside, see *The Statesman*, May 20, 1967. These clashes generated a lot more tension within the United Front than did the unrest of industrial workers, for the party system within West Bengal rests on the agrarian status quo. Hence, any major upheaval in existing agrarian relations inevitably tends to disrupt the entire political system.

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Behind this situation lay deep divisions within the United Front government about how to handle the three problems that affected the life of the rural poor —food, land, and labor. As Minister of Land and Land Revenue, however, Harekrishna Konar could not simply sweep these problems under the rug, for during the spring and summer of 1967 he was confronted with the task of trying to control the militancy of peasants in areas where the CPI(M)'s propaganda campaign for distribution of food to the poor the previous year had politicized sizable sections of the rural proletariat, and where radical elements in the party were now urging the peasantry to rebel. When the Naxalbari uprising began, he was deeply engaged, with the aid of some officials of the Revenue Department,[59] in attempting to determine how much and what land the state's landlords had retained over and above the 25-acre ceiling that the "reforms" of the mid-1950's had set.

That widespread violations of both the letter and the spirit of the legislation had occurred was generally known.[60] The fact that the ceiling had been imposed on the individual, registered as a single unit, instead of on the family had facilitated circumventions of the law. Many landowners had simply registered their excess holdings in the names of individual members of their families and often in the names of fictitious persons as well. Since each document filed with revenue officials had the appearance of legality, it had been no mean job to track down this *benami* land (*i.e.*, land registered under false names). Thus, many landowners had managed to keep the entire acreage that they possessed before the "reforms," because the profusion of fraudulent registrations made it hard to identify all the *khas* land (*i.e.*, land held in excess of the established limit) that belonged to the state. Up to the beginning of 1959, the state government had "obtained" 125,000 acres of *khas* land as a result of the agrarian "reforms." (It ought to be underscored, however, that this land had not been distributed but had been allowed to remain in the hands of the former owners.) Three or four years later, investigations had revealed that while the state should have received 600,000 acres from a strict enforcement of the 25-acre ceiling, most of this total had just "disappeared." Among those responsible for that "disappearance" had been tea-plantation owners in the northern part of the state and members of some big-landlord families who had held ministerial posts in the Congress-run government.[61]

By the end of July, Konar apparently had conceptualized the broad outline of a land policy in which the land-hungry peasantry would play an active role. "The primary task," he wrote in a brief article, was "abolition of large-scale holdings and distribution of land to the landless," but the governmental machinery alone "cannot carry out land reforms even though there are honest officers in the administration." Therefore, the efforts of the government had "to be strengthened and supplemented by the conscious and organized participation of the peasants and the people at large."[62] In August, the West Bengal State Committee of the CPI(M) called for radical land re-

[59] According to a senior official of the Planning Commission, a section of West Bengal's revenue officers not only helped Konar locate land registered under false names but also suggested to him the tactical line that he later employed to organize the poor peasants for land-seizure struggles. There were reports, too, that revenue officials in the districts resisted the food and land policies that the United Front regime ultimately adopted. See *ibid.*, July 27, 1967.



The Indian State of West Bengal and its Districts

[60] *The Statesman*, April 5, 1968.
[61] Sen, *op. cit.*, p. 202.
[62] H. K. Konar, "Our Land Problem," *Mainstream* (New Delhi), July 29, 1967.

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forms and resolved to focus the labors of its *kisan sabha* (peasant front) organizations on a struggle for distribution of land to the landless and against eviction of sharecroppers. Before Konar could translate his land policy into an action program, however, the central government dismissed the Bengal United Front regime from office.

More than a year of central rule in West Bengal brought about a sharpening of the CPI(M)'s ideological and tactical tools as the impact of Maoist peasant struggles tended to radicalize its rural cadres. In late 1967, for example, Konar maintained that the United Front government had been ousted by a coup of the *jotedars* (landowners) and food-grain hoarders. This "game," he asserted, had been "nakedly exposed" by the "unusual haste with which the UF government had been dismissed before the harvesting." If the UF regime had survived until after the harvesting, "the *jotedars* would have got no opportunity to rob the peasants and sharecroppers." Since the ouster of the government, "the police have intensified their attack on the peasants, thus proving their class loyalty to the *jotedars.*" Under such circumstances, *"the most important task of the democratic movement"* was "to strengthen the resistance movement of the peasants and wholeheartedly support their legitimate demands." In concrete terms, this meant helping the peasants to defend their crops and lands "even with their own blood." It was no longer enough to organize peasant resistance along reformist lines.

It is necessary for the toiling people and the democratic forces to understand that their struggle has reached a new phase. The struggle for defense of democracy will have to be intensified and spread to wider areas and should be linked with day-to-day struggles of workers and peasants. Just now the peasants are faced with direct attack. Hence the democratic forces will have to stand by the peasants, and the struggle for democracy will have to be taken deep into the villages.[63]

During 1968, the National Council of the CPI(M) accepted Konar's contention that it ought to devote primary attention to the peasantry, and it adopted a "revolutionary" tactic of parliamentary politics designed to "wreck the system from within." This involved several tactical actions: the CPI(M)-dominated leftist coalitions in the states would wage a relentless "class struggle" against the Center; the masses of land-hungry poor peasantry would be permitted to take the initiative to seize *benami* and *khas* land in an organized way through the *kisan sabha* units in the villages; and the sharecroppers would be allowed to defend their crops against the "illegal" attempts of landowners to "misappropriate" them. This tactical line was hammered out during the period from the Burdwan plenum of the Central Committee in May 1968 through the Madurai party congress in December 1968.[64]

When the second United Front government took office in West Bengal after the mid-term election of February 1969, the CPI(M) exercised *de facto* leadership by virtue of its dominant position in the state assembly, though it did not hold the Chief Ministership. Perhaps more important for our concerns, Harekrishna Konar returned to the post of Minister for Land and Land Revenue, and Joyti Basu, as Deputy Chief Minister, assumed control of the police. This combination of responsibilities enabled the CPI(M) to put into action its newly-devised program of peasant mobilization. As soon as the new government was installed, the party directed its district committees "to simultaneously launch struggles of workers and middle-class employees . . . [and] to conduct immediately the struggles of *kisans* against hoarders, profiteers and *mahajans* [moneylenders]." It likewise proclaimed that the "class struggles of the landless and poor peasants, agricultural workers and workers have to be organized in rural and industrial areas with a view to helping the UF government to implement its 32-point program." [65]

Within 90 days after the second United Front government began functioning, Konar publicly circulated draft legislation to eliminate the land tax on three acres or less in single possession and increase the tax on holdings of more than seven acres. False declarations of holdings would be made cognizable offenses punishable by imprisonment for three months or a fine of up to 1,000 rupees ($140). Armed with a list of holders of *benami* land prepared by revenue officials, he apprised the legislature that the biggest culprits included stalwarts of the Congress party.

However, Konar was in no hurry to carry out his land policy through legislation. As he explained to this writer in July 1971, such an approach would have been time-consuming and would have given

[63] *People's Democracy*, Dec. 24, 1967. Italics added.

[64] *The Statesman*, Aug. 5, 1968.

[65] *People's Democracy*, March 23, 1969.

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the landlords an opportunity "to evade the new laws as they had evaded the old ones." He added:

The crucial point in our program was to allow the peasant masses to do things on their own initiative. They must feel that they have fought and won on their own strength. Lenin said if the bourgeoisie gave land to the peasants, they won the loyalty of the peasants. We do not wish to give land to the peasants; we wish to make the peasants get land from the landowners by their own organized class strength. This is what the party could not *achieve in Kerala. And this is what we were able to achieve in West Bengal.*[66]

The CPI(M)'s program of land seizure and crop protection was implemented with great zeal over the next 12 months (after which the central government once again imposed its rule on the state). Landless peasants and peasants with dwarf holdings were employed to locate *benami* land, and then they were encouraged to seize this land "stolen by the landowners." Whereas sharecroppers had traditionally had to transport all their harvestings to the homes of the landowners—where the cultivators often found themselves deprived of their portions because the landowners, who were normally the moneylenders too, would insist on immediate payment of loan interest or repayment of loan capital once the peasants were in possession of the fruits of their labors—sharecroppers were now encouraged to demand division of the harvestings in the fields. Whenever landowners resisted peasant occupation of the land or peasant defense of crops, the police refused to assist them. In fact, in most instances police officers enabled the peasants to keep not only the crops but also the land.

As the land-seizure drive spread rapidly from district to district,[67] it created an agrarian conflict of unprecedented dimensions. Once activated by the party, the rural poor sometimes got out of control—especially where *kisan sabha* organizations were new or did not exist. In certain areas, "excesses" were committed, and legitimate holdings of the middle peasants were taken over.[68]

After the campaign had acquired substantial momentum, Konar proceeded to confer "legality" on it. In the spring of 1969, the government issued an ordinance according sharecroppers the right to farm for three years lands "left idle" by their owners. This had the effect of giving sharecroppers tentative tenure of such lands, a right which the "reforms" of the 1950's had overlooked. It also provided that 20 percent of the crops from these lands would go to the owners, 10 percent to the government, and the rest to the actual tillers.

Results of the Movement

By the drastic means described, the state government—and more specifically Konar's Ministry of Land and Land Revenue—managed to recover some 300,000 acres of land held fraudulently by *jotedars* and to distribute them to the landless poor. This distribution, the first major one of its kind since Indian independence, captured the imagination of the rural poor in West Bengal and rallied them to the support of the CPI(M) despite—or possibly because of—the move's questionable legality. The party, in turn, sought to capitalize on their good will to expand and strengthen its organizational base, among the peasants in the state. To that effort, Konar contributed another new tactical concept: the building of an intensive peasant movement in "large, contiguous areas," so that the party could construct, in given instances, some sort of a parallel government.[69]

To appreciate the rapidity with which the CPI(M) succeeded in rooting itself firmly in the Bengal countryside, one need look only briefly at the changing situation from mid-1968 to mid-1971. The conference of the West Bengal Kisan Sabha in June 1968 showed that the recent politicization of the rural poor was beginning to have an impact on the fortunes of the party. Konar, in his presidential address, reported "significant progress" for the peasant movement, which had now spread to "new areas in each district." According to figures released at the gathering, primary membership in the

[66] The author asked Konar whether Konar thought that the CPI(M)'s capture of governmental power at the state level was an essential precondition for peasant mobilization on a militant basis. He replied that while this would certainly help accelerate the agrarian movement, the party would wage struggles in the countryside even where the party remained outside the government. But in such cases, he acknowledged, it would take time to raise the struggles to a high political level.

[67] According to *People's Democracy*, May 18, 1969, it was then actively under way in Burdwan, Midnapore, Hoogly, Murshidabad, Bankura, Birbhum, Malda, 24-Parganas, and "other" districts.

[68] Konar claimed that there had been no such excesses in Burdwan District and that this was one reason why it had been possible to attract the middle peasants there to the CPI(M)'s peasant movement.

[69] CPI(M), *Our Tasks on Party Organization*, Calcutta, 1968, pp. 24-25.

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Kisan Sabha had risen to 400,000. Moreover, peasants constituted the bulk of the 705 delegates—103 of them full-time cadres—present at the meeting. Of this total, 71 were agricultural workers; 228, sharecroppers and poor peasants; 80, non-agricultural workers; 115, middle peasants; 204, from the "middle class," and 7, "others." A correspondent of *People's Democracy* found among the peasant delegates an "unprecedented class consciousness."[70]

About the time of the Kisan Sabha congress, the state CPI(M) formed 1,000 volunteer "auxiliary groups" at the village level. Each consisted of 5 to 10 militant cadres who were supposed to help the peasants defend their "newly-won rights."[71] However, Promode Das Gupta, General Secretary of the West Bengal party, told a state CPI(M) conference in December 1968 that while the party had been able to consolidate its rural support base in all the 17 districts, organizational weaknesses, leadership inadequacies, and ideological lapses had been overcome in no more than 5, and the task of building up the peasant movement "in an extensive contiguous area" remained "yet to be achieved."[72]

In the mid-term Bengal election of February 1969, the CPI(M) emerged as the largest group in the state assembly, but the party ran considerably behind the Congress in terms of percentage of the total vote. The CPI(M) garnered 80 of the 280 assembly seats—as compared with 55 for the Congress, its nearest competitor. On the other hand, it received only 19.97 percent of the valid votes cast, while the Congress got 41.32 percent. The CPI(M) vote was concentrated in five districts: Calcutta, Hoogly, Howrah, 24-Parganas, and Burdwan—all fairly highly urbanized. Only in Burdwan did the party's share of the total exceed that of the Congress (42.99 percent to 41.17 percent).

The March 1971 election produced quite a different outcome. Not only did the CPI(M) retain its position as the dominant political force in the West Bengal Assembly, but it also bested the ruling Congress in the popular vote. The CPI(M) polled 31.98 percent of the valid votes cast, while Mrs. Indira Gandhi's Congress won 28.20 percent. Perhaps more significant, the party now demonstrated a base of strong support extending across seven districts: Calcutta, 24-Parganas, Hoogly, Howrah, Burdwan, Birbhum, and Bandura. Together, these districts comprise a large, contiguous, urban-rural bailiwick with great potential impact on social alignments in adjacent Bihar and Orissa. It ought to be pointed out that the CPI(M) scored this electoral victory despite the powerful charismatic appeal of Mrs. Gandhi, despite an opposing electoral coalition including the ruling Congress, the CPI, and several socialist parties, and despite the dim prospects that the party could establish a viable united front after the balloting.

On a study tour of the CPI(M) rural strongholds in West Bengal in June-July 1971, the writer found that in at least five districts the party had fashioned a well-knit organization which reached out to the remotest villages. Each village had a *kisan sabha* unit with at least one full-time cadre, and these units conducted mobilization meetings almost every week. At several meetings, the writer witnessed efforts to build up local peasant assertiveness. While the head of the local *kisan sabha* initiated discussions, several peasants joined in; and at least in Burdwan District, these peasants employed the rhetoric of class struggle and spoke of the need to overthrow the "capitalist-feudal" system. Such efforts appeared to have produced results, for village leadership in some parts of the Bengal countryside no longer rested with the landed gentry. Encouraged by CPI(M) cadres, the peasants themselves were settling petty legal disputes and deciding social questions like marriage, funeral rites, and penalties for social offenses—functions that have traditionally belonged to the gentry. Moreover, the poor in numerous villages had organized a social boycott of the rich. For example, members of castes that traditionally performed services like barbering had refused to provide them to the gentry. While the Communists had not attempted anything like tax collection from the rural population (despite press reports to the contrary), they were regularly raising subscriptions for the *kisan sabha,* and contributions seemed to be forthcoming for relief of distressed "victims of the class struggle." Not only had the peasants learned to dodge police warrants but they were also hiding CPI(M) cadres. In short, a struggle which has some of the dimensions of a class struggle is now going on in portions of the Bengal countryside.

Thus far, however, the CPI(M)'s advances among the Indian peasantry have been confined largely to West Bengal. In December 1970, Harekrishna Konar, presiding at an extended meeting of the Central Council of the All-India Kisan Sabha, testi-

[70] *People's Democracy,* June 16, 1968.

[71] *Ibid.,* July 21, 1968. A similar volunteer corps was established in Kerala at the same juncture.

[72] *Ibid.,* Dec. 15, 1968.

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fied that West Bengal was the only state where the "peasant movement has come to occupy a very important place in the democratic movement." Not even in Kerala, he indicated, had the movement reached a comparable level, and elsewhere in the country it was still in the formative stage.[73] There was plenty of corroborating evidence. For example, while the national Kisan Sabha boasted 1,636,007 primary members, the majority of these came from West Bengal alone.[74] Furthermore, the body scarcely possessed a central organization, for the leaders of the CPI(M) who manned the center were too busy with operations in Bengal to give much time and attention to all-Indian activities.

In an interview with the writer in the summer of 1971, Konar freely acknowledged the current weaknesses of the party's peasant movement throughout much of India and manifested an awareness of the implications of these weaknesses:

We know that we are strong only in Bengal, Tripura, and Kerala, and that we are strongest in Bengal. We know that India is much larger than Bengal and Kerala, and that as long as our strength is confined to only these three areas, we cannot influence Indian politics beyond a certain limit. We expect to expand the movement into Orissa and Bihar in the next three to five years, but at the same time we intend to strengthen further our bases in Bengal and Kerala. We intend to make these bases impregnable.

The CPI (M) and the Future

Konar's comments suggest that the CPI(M) will in all likelihood not only continue to pursue its current policies but will pursue them with greater intensity in the years immediately ahead. What, then, does this prospect mean in terms of the overall Indian political picture?

The party claims that it has been functioning within the broad framework of the Indian political system—that in urging the land-hungry peasants to seize *benami* land it has merely implemented the laws enacted during Congress rule. But it has also declared that it seeks to wreck the political system from within, and it has actually been supplementing parliamentary activity with an increasing amount of extraparliamentary action. Indeed, the peasant movement in West Bengal has been constructed in accordance with the concept of armed resistance and armed defense. According to this concept, the rural poor will not provoke violent clashes, but they will resist, by means of arms if necessary, violent attacks of the landowners and the police.

For the present, the CPI(M) distinguishes between armed resistance and armed warfare, and it argues that objective conditions in India are not ripe for the latter. As Konar put it,

We are conscious of our weaknesses as of now, and we shall not provoke the class enemy because the state has a colossal apparatus of force at its disposal, which it will then unleash upon us. But we will certainly resist, with arms if necessary, the violent attacks of the class enemy and of the government on the toiling masses. Resistance will steel our cadres as well as the mass of workers and peasants. In fact, this has already happened to a large extent. The poor peasants of Bengal have lost their fear of the police. They are now losing their fear of armed police and the military that have been deployed in force against them in the countryside. No amount of oppression will cow the peasants of Bengal anymore. But we propose to give no provocation to the government to unleash, say, five divisions to suppress the peasant movement in Bengal.

Nevertheless, numerous violent clashes have actually occurred in the countryside since 1967, and in at least some areas CPI(M) cadres as well as sections of the deprived peasantry have demonstrated an inclination to guerrilla warfare. Equally pertinent, the party has evidently been preparing its cadres for underground functioning, and militant peasant elements in some portions of Bengal and Tripura appear to have been collecting arms, including firearms. Thus, one cannot rule out the possibility that a growing resort to violence could accompany any spread of the party's influence.

And while the CPI(M)'s peasant movement in India as a whole has great deficiencies from the organizational, leadership, and recruitment standpoints, objective conditions for such a spread remain highly favorable and will probably continue to be so in the near future. The party has openly designated Orissa and Bihar as its next primary targets for large-scale peasant mobilization. Both states have large masses of poor peasants—including a big population of tribals, among the most deprived groups in India.

[73] See the text of his address in *Millions Fight for Land and Wages.*
[74] See the Political Report in *ibid.*

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However, the nationalist rebellion in East Pakistan may have begun to modify the strategic perspective of the CPI(M)'s leaders. For several months the party has been trying to foster the growth of a National Liberation Front in East Pakistan that would link the various radical-left factions, including the National Awami League of Maulana Bhashani.[75] Though Bhashani has disowned the National Liberation Front that the CPI(M)'s counterpart in East Pakistan has launched with the support of the Indian party, radical elements seem to be playing some role in the resistance movement in East Pakistan. If this resistance movement expands throughout the East Pakistan countryside and if radical-left elements succeed in obtaining even a share of power in a future independent "Bangla Desh," a major CPI(M) base on the eastern flank of the subcontinent could emerge.[76]

It is not without significance that Konar opened his interview with this writer with a pointed reference to East Pakistan. He said:

There was an ideal objective revolutionary situation in East Bengal, and yet the Pakistani military could crush the 75 million people of Bangla Desh because the freedom movement totally lacked an organizational base in the towns and villages. This has a supreme lesson for us in India which we can ignore only at our peril. There can obviously be no revolution in our agrarian societies through city-based insurrections or spontaneous mass upsurges. The class enemy is strong enough and ruthless enough to crush such upsurges and insurrections. For our revolution we must have strong impregnable bases in the countryside, and an organization that can withstand the most ruthless oppression. This will take time, but perhaps less time than most people in India think. A strong and deep base in one region of India is much more important for the revolution than weak scattered followings all over the country.

Yet, despite the favorable objective conditions for further spread of the CPI(M)'s influence in rural areas and the party's determination to accomplish this end, such an eventuality is by no means assured. Indeed, the CPI(M) has been on the defensive in both West Bengal and Kerala since the spring of 1970. In Kerala, a CPI-led coalition, in recent months including the ruling Congress party, has been in power; and in West Bengal, the CPI(M) has been facing the combined opposition of the Congress party, the CPI, and several other left groups—though governing the state without the CPI(M) as a major coalition partner has proved difficult, as can be seen from the collapse of the Congress-CPI coalition within months of the March 1971 election and from the subsequent institution of central rule there. Moreover, since the spring of 1971, a number of regiments of the Indian army have been maintaining law and order in the West Bengal countryside. In effect, a major portion of their operational activity is directed against the CPI(M)'s rural base.

Whether or not the CPI(M) will be able to hold on to this existing base and expand it, first throughout West Bengal and then beyond, is the crucial question before the party and perhaps before Indian communism. The CPI(M) has finally contrived what appear to be tactics of militant peasant struggle relevant to the realities of Indian society. While Maoist manifestations may well occur sporadically in limited areas of rural India in view of the absence of peasant struggles and the lack of peasant organization in most places and of the objective situation of the poorer sections of the peasantry, it seems unlikely that the Maoist technique of peasant guerrilla warfare can become the mainstay of the Indian revolution. But the future of the CPI(M)'s peasant movement depends on whether it can attract additional large segments of the rural poor.

Meanwhile, the agrarian struggles of the Maoists and the CPI(M) have brought the land-reform issue to the forefront of Indian politics. If the political forces controlling India today can produce a quick and effective answer to the growing problem of the poverty of the poor, the bulk of whom live in the villages, neither the Maoists nor the CPI(M) may be able to go very far in mobilizing the peasantry. On the other hand, if the agrarian question remains untackled, communism in India will probably assume an increasingly agrarian content, focused on a set of problems inherent in Indian society. What the peasant struggles of the last four years have shown is that the Indian peasant is not unresponsive to militancy and violence, and that he probably constitutes potentially the most radical element in the class structure of Indian society.

[75] See N. C. Menon, "Left Extremists Not Likely to Dominate Bangla Leadership," *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), July 28, 1971.

[76] In July 1971, Lt. Gen. B. M. Kaul (retired), one of India's most controversial military figures, observed: "Once leadership in East Bengal passes to the extremists' hands, as is already happening, East and West Bengal, inspired by China, may become an enlarged Bangla Desh. China would then wield great influence in these two regions . . . ." See *Deccan Chronicle* (Bangalore), July 13, 1971. The combined population (120 million) exceeds that of most UN members.

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The National Question in Yugoslavia

By Paul Shoup

Yugoslavia is once more attracting widespread attention as a result of her unorthodox approach to the development of communism. Over the past decade, the Yugoslav Communists have introduced government, party and economic reforms which have done away with many of the basic characteristics of the totalitarian system. They have dispensed with direct central planning of the economy, have reduced party controls, and have promoted the independence of the trade unions and of the federal and republic assemblies (elected legislative bodies).[1] In 1971, the Yugoslav League of Communists (YLC) launched a major revision of the 1963 constitution—a change designed to devolve a wide range of federal powers to the six constituent republics and two autonomous provinces of the multinational state, in an attempt to cope with the destabilizing impact of rapidly mounting nationalism.

The nationalist pressures, which threatened to render the central government impotent, were fueled both by historical animosities among the national groups and by more recent rivalries among the republics over such issues as investment in regional development and apportionment of foreign-trade earnings. The need for decisive action in the face of mounting economic crisis and the everpresent question of the political succession to the aging President Tito have added further notes of urgency to the efforts to establish a workable, acceptable Yugoslav federal system. How successful the current constitutional revisions will be in creating such a system and in defusing the intense national pressures in the country will be known only when the complex relationships of the new federal structure have been worked out in practice. However, it would appear that the new arrangements have, at least temporarily, restored some measure of order to Yugoslav politics.

The origins of the present national problem in Yugoslavia reach back in time to World War II and before. Between the two world wars, Yugoslavia was a deeply divided nation whose nationalities, although of common South Slav origin, had never lived together within the boundaries of a common state prior to 1918. The country was ruled from Belgrade, largely in the interests of the Serbs. Croatia gained a measure of autonomy in 1939, but this concession came too late to end Serb-Croat differences over the national question.

World War II left bitter memories which all the subsequent efforts of the Communists have been unable to erase. The massacre of Serbs by the Croatian fascists—the Ustashi—has never been forgotten in Serbia. Furthermore, the fact that most of Tito's Partisans were Serbs, at least in the early years of the war, helped create the hostile conviction among many conservative-minded Croatians that communism itself was brought to Yugoslavia by and

[1] See George Zaninovich, "Yugoslav Party Evolution," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, Eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems* New York, Basic Books, 1969, pp. 484-508; and Winston M. Fiske, "The Constitutional Movement in Yugoslavia," *Slavic Review* (Columbus, Ohio), June 1971, pp. 277-97.

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for the Serbs. To a lesser extent, the other Slav nationalities also have nursed grievances from the war period. For example the Macedonians, although they won recognition as a nationality in their own right after the war (they had previously been treated as Serbs), found that the Communists' promises of autonomy and unification of all Macedonia went unfulfilled. The Hungarian and Albanian minorities, who had collaborated with the occupying powers during the war, remained deeply hostile to the Communists after that conflict and, in turn, were treated by the Communists as potentially subversive elements.

By clamping down on nationalistic manifestations after the war, the YLC managed to reduce national tensions considerably. The creation of six republics within a federal system based on the Soviet model and affirming the existence of distinct and equal nationalities in Yugoslavia also assuaged nationalist sentiments and strengthened the Communist regime. Consequently, when the Soviet Union turned on Tito in 1948, the Slav nationalities of Yugoslavia rallied in support of the YLC.

Nationalism and Decentralization

In the 1950's, however, the underlying national divisions began to make themselves felt again. Decentralization of the economic and administrative system, carried out as part of the campaign to abolish Stalinist forms of rule in Yugoslavia, stimulated local and republic interests and hastened the emergence of regional factions within the YLC leadership. Already early in the decade, party leaders had begun disputes concerning economic aid to the underdeveloped republics. By the late 1950's, the national controversy had come to embrace the intellectuals of various nationalities and to touch on such issues as the nature of the federal system, the historical assessment of the role of various nationalities during the war and the struggle for liberation, and the growing advocacy in some circles of a Yugoslav national consciousness and a Yugoslav socialist nation. The latter two concepts found support in the party program of 1958 but were accepted only reluctantly by many Communists, especially by those in the republics of Croatia and Slovenia.

The national disputes also became enmeshed in the growing controversy over the future course of political decentralization and economic reform in Yugoslavia. The conservative opponents of reform—led by secret police chief Aleksandar Rankovic—drew their support from Serbia and certain of the underdeveloped republics (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro). The liberal forces—favoring the extension of the market system and other reforms—could count on the backing of some Serbian and Macedonian Communists, but they depended primarily for support on the Croatian and Slovenian parties. In 1962, the reform program seemed to falter, and the liberal faction in the YLC leadership temporarily lost control to Rankovic. The repercussions of this setback were evidenced in increasing tensions over the national question, above all over the issue of "Yugoslavianism" and the future of the federal system. Communists of liberal and nationalist persuasion hinted darkly that the Rankovic forces intended to abolish the republics entirely, while others—not necessarily associated with Rankovic—ridiculed this fear and defended the views laid out in the 1958 party program.

With the victory of the liberal faction in 1966—signaled by the ouster of Rankovic from his party and government posts—the idea of a Yugoslav nation was totally discredited. In its place, official policy began to emphasize the role of the republics. The liberals, hoping to consolidate their victory, also pressed for wide-ranging devolution of power within the YLC, particularly to republic organizations of the party. This new emphasis was eventually to lead the republics to assume a major role in the Yugoslav political system, but they first had to overcome the inertia of established patterns. Notwithstanding the considerable decentralization of central government powers which had taken place in Yugoslavia, the form of government in the mid-1960's remained, in practice, unitary rather than federal. In this system the republic governments had few responsibilities other than to execute federal laws and decrees. Despite the growing discussion of their rights and responsibilities, these governments failed to broaden the scope of their activities and instead focused their efforts on placing republic spokesmen in the federal government and its agencies in order to assure the republics of their share of central government funds and revenues and to block decisions at the center which would adversely affect the interests of the republics. As long as this attitude persisted, the unitary (centralist) system of government remained firmly entrenched in Yugoslavia.

The first crack in this pattern came by the route of party reform. Following Rankovic's downfall, the liberal forces pressed for democratization of the

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YLC, with only moderate success. Nevertheless, at the Ninth Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists (in 1969), the republic organizations of the party were given greater freedom to determine their own policies concerning matters of local importance and, more significant, gained the right to name their own representatives to leading YLC bodies—the Presidium (formerly the Central Committee) and the Executive Bureau. Not only did this change greatly accelerate the tendency toward assumption by the republics of a major role in policy decisions at the center, but it also increased the frequency with which the highest party organs found themselves deadlocked and unable to reach a decision because of differences among the republics.

An important consequence of this growing stalemate was that an increasing burden of responsibility was placed on the government's decision-making bodies, especially the Federal Executive Council and the committees of the Federal Assembly. These were required to suggest solutions to sensitive or contentious issues which could not be settled within the party. While the trend away from party rule was perhaps laudable, the fact that it originated in a lack of unanimity in the top echelons of the party made it possible for the republics to ignore central decisions running counter to republic interests. This contributed to a paralysis of government in areas in which the republics were at odds. This became particularly acute in autumn 1970, when the central government found itself unable to agree on actions to check a rampant inflation and a deterioration in Yugoslavia's balance of payments. At this time a key member of the FEC—the Croatian Dr. Nikola Miljanic—resigned in protest over a delay in devaluation of the dinar, and the Council's President, the Slovene Mitja Ribicic, threatened to follow suit if he did not receive a vote of confidence from the Federal Assembly on his austerity program.[2] Under such circumstances, it became increasingly apparent that the republics would have to accept greater responsibilities for initiating their own policies in order to fill the political vacuum created by the absence of a "political center" in Belgrade.

A second, related development in the post-1966 period was a growing estrangement between the federal government and the advanced republics of Croatia and Slovenia. Although the fall of Rankovic and the ensuing acceleration of economic reform had benefited these republics, they found themselves overridden on a number of vital issues by the federal government, which was in turn backed by Serbia and a coalition of underdeveloped republics—Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.[3] As a result, Slovenes and Croats came to feel that their interests might best be served by a devolution of major federal government powers to the individual republics.

Economic Issues

Pivotal in many of these controversies have been economic disagreements. Such disagreements are both the source of national rivalries and a consequence of the tendency of republics to view economic issues from narrow, parochial perspectives. These disputes have grown as the system of market socialism introduced in Yugoslavia raised complex problems of economic policy—ranging from control over investment funds to the growing power of large commercial enterprises in Belgrade. Contributing to economic rivalries has been the increasing regionalization of the economy as a result of the policies of economic decentralization pursued by the YLC since the early 1950's. Not only republic but regional and local interests have sought to assert their independence in economic matters. These groups have engaged in a fierce competition which has resulted in the erection of temporary restrictions on local markets and the duplication of many branches of industry in different regions in defiance of overall economic rationality.

The competitive market system now in operation in Yugoslavia has placed the underdeveloped republics at a distinct disadvantage, for their industries are often unable to compete with more efficient plants in the advanced republics of Croatia and Slovenia. Economic growth rates, which have been erratic for Yugoslavia as a whole in recent years, have dropped sharply in the underdeveloped republics, further widening the gap. Consequently, the question of aid to underdeveloped areas has been of crucial importance and has provoked fierce debate. From the late 1950's until 1963, the General Investment Fund of the federal government channeled

[2] *Nedeljne informativne novine* (Belgrade), Nov. 8, 1970, p. 8. (Hereafter this publication will be referred to as *NIN*.)

[3] The issues cannot be gone into in detail here. They include questions of economic policy, constitutional revision, reform of the electoral system, and other matters. Often the Slovenes sided with the remaining republics, leaving the Croats alone in the opposition.

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large amounts of development aid to the less-developed republics. In 1963 the task of allocating investments was placed in the hands of the federal (Yugoslav) banks,[4] in the hope that decisions to grant investment loans would be freed of political considerations. In practice, the federal banks were drawn into the struggle among the republics and local units of government. In 1969, a substantial portion of the assets of these banks were turned over to the republics,[5] but Croatian and Slovenian Communists continued to demand that the remaining assets of the federal banks be distributed to the republics.

A program of assistance to underdeveloped regions was initiated in 1965 for the purpose of making development loans to the less-developed republics and the autonomous province of Kosovo. In 1970, the question of refinancing this fund led to a prolonged dispute between the advanced republics (reluctant contributors to the previous loan fund) and the recipient republics. Only in the spring of 1971 did it seem that a compromise solution was in sight whereby the developed republics would agree to contribute to the fund at a rate of 1.9 percent of the social product.[6]

In the controversy over refunding the loan program, Serbia, although sympathetic to the needs of the underdeveloped regions, remained on the sidelines. However, the question of the power of the large corporations headquartered in Belgrade (the capital of Serbia as well as of Yugoslavia) has pitted the Serbs against the Croats and Slovenes. While many enterprises have languished after the economic reforms of the mid-1960's, these great trading and reexport firms have prospered, amassing great amounts of capital which were reinvested by the firms themselves, not only in Serbia but in other republics. The profits from these ventures have further enriched the Belgrade concerns. To the Croats, in particular, the growth of the Belgrade firms seems proof that business in the capital has gained a privileged position as a result of the intervention of the federal government. In this context, one might note that the breakup of the secret police in the mid-1960's was accompanied by the transfer of some key security personnel to the large trading corporations. It is quite conceivable that these individuals have used their influence to put themselves and their enterprises in a favored position. Indeed, the largest of these firms, General Export, was permitted to set up its own airline long before permission for a Croatian airline was granted. To add insult to injury, General Export has invested large amounts in hotels on the

[4] The banks in question are the Yugoslav Investment Bank, the Yugoslav Bank for Foreign Trade, and the Yugoslav Agricultural Bank.

[5] *Ekonomska Politika* (Belgrade), Dec. 14, 1970, pp. 16-19, gives an excellent summary of the bank question. The size of the funds remaining in the federal banks for distribution among the republics at the end of 1970 has usually been placed at 4.5 billion dinars.

[6] Between 1965 and 1970, approximately 1.85 percent of the social product of the developed republics was set aside for loans to underdeveloped regions. The average term of the loans was 19.5 years at 2.5 percent interest. During the 1970 debate, the Slovenes and Croats advocated 10-year terms at 6 percent, with an initial grace period of several years in which no payments would be required. It is not clear whether the 1.9 percent contribution from social product—roughly equivalent to Gross National Product—refers to the entire country, or merely to the advanced republics (the poorer republics are presumably exempt from paying the levy). In the former case, if the poorer republics are indeed exempt, the developed republics would have to contribute more than 1.9 percent of their respective social product in order to bring the fund to 1.9 percent of the total Yugoslav social product. See *Borba* (Belgrade), Dec. 28, 1970; *Ekonomska Politika*, Jan. 11, 1971, p. 10; and Anton Vratusa, "Yugoslavia, 1971," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), October 1971, p. 161.

ECONOMIC ROOTS OF NATIONALISM

. . . we must take into account the fact that not only different but specific and objectively contradictory interests exist in relations among the nations, or rather the republics, of Yugoslavia. For instance, the position of a developed republic differs from that of a nondeveloped republic in the unified market. Furthermore, the internal pressures of the workers' class in these republics concerning living conditions and social production are different as well. The structure of productive forces in various republics is also different and sometimes contradictory, and therefore it can very easily happen that the unified policy measures of the Federation, in effect, affect the republics unevenly and make for conflicts. It is obvious that we cannot overcome these objective contradictions by resorting to ideological formulas, much less to state coercion via the Federation. On the contrary, excessive use of such coercion could throw the Federation into an exceedingly serious political crisis.

—From report of Edvard Kardelj to YLC Presidium, broadcast by Tanjug (the Yugoslav Telegraph Agency) from Belgrade on March 1, 1971.

Thus, Croatia is exploited, but it is not true that the peoples of other Yugoslav republics exploit it. It is rather the federal bureaucracy, reexporters, and banks which exploit it. Malicious commentators present to the world a revolt against these exploiters as a separatist action. . . .

—Comments by Drazen Budisa, Chairman of the Zagreb Student Federation, to an international student seminar, Borba (Belgrade), Sept. 8, 1971.

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Dalmatian coast of Croatia. The Croatians view this as an unfair economic penetration of Croatia by the Serbs and have encouraged workers' councils in the Dalmatian resort hotels founded by Serbian firms to show more independence toward the parent organization in Belgrade.[7]

Additional sources of controversy among the republics are the question of the application of controls over the economy to curb inflation and improve the balance of payments and the issue of sharing the economic powers of the central government with the republics under the new constitutional system. The latter problem has also given rise to the difficult task of apportioning among the republics the assets and liabilities of the various federal funds which are to be abolished.[8] The issues here are so complex as to defy summary. It may be noted, nevertheless, that in the economic policy debate in the fall of 1970, the underdeveloped republics (backed by Serbia) opposed devaluation, and that more recently Serbia has balked at enforcing the austerity program adopted by the federal government.[9] In the debate over distribution of economic power between the central and republic governments, Croatia has maintained that republics must be allowed to exercise some control over foreign trade and to enjoy the use of at least part of the foreign currency balances of the federal government.[10] Both these claims can be traced to Croatia's position as a major earner of foreign exchange. This republic has also demanded that remittances of foreign currencies from workers employed abroad should be shared with the localities from which the workers originated—a demand reflecting the fact that the greatest number of such workers residing outside Yugoslavia are from Croatia.

Accompanying and in part resulting from the strands of traditional animosities and economic rivalry discussed above, has been an increasing assertiveness on the part of Yugoslavia's diverse nationalities. The underdeveloped areas have expressed their resentment over the economic success of the advanced republics, while the latter have felt imposed upon by the political coalition led by Serbia and by requirements that the prosperous republics subsidize economic development of backward regions. These issues have been accentuated, particularly in the case of Serbia and Croatia, by deep-seated intercommunal hostility.

A New Tone of Stridency

A striking manifestation of the frustration felt in backward areas was the widespread rioting by the Albanian minority in 1968. On the other side of the coin, the advanced republics began to express their resentment with increasing vehemence during 1969. The Slovenian government reacted violently when the federal government diverted certain international funds which the former had hoped would be used for roadbuilding in Slovenia.[11] Soon thereafter, the Croatian party defied Belgrade in the so-called "Zanko affair." This incident began when Milos Zanko, then Croatia's permanent delegate to the Party Conference of the YLC and Croatian delegate to the Chamber of Nationalities of the Federal Assembly, published in the central newspaper *Borba* a series of articles critical of Croatian nationalism.[12] Rather than accept the criticism, the Croatian Communists forced Zanko to return to Zagreb (the Croatian capital) and, at the now celebrated 10th plenum of the Croatian League of Communists held in January 1970, deprived Zanko of his party and government posts.[13] Far from curbing Croatian nationalism, Zanko's initiative set the Croatian party on a course of vigorous defense of national interests.

Croatian nationalism is not a new problem for the Yugoslav League of Communists: during the war, Andrija Hebrang, First Secretary of the Croatian party, was removed from his post for displaying nationalist leanings. In the immediate postwar years, however, Croatian communism by and large remained aloof from the virulent nationalism so deeply ingrained in the outlook of many Croats. This detachment has changed significantly since the 10th Croatian party plenum. Through its front organization—the Croatian Socialist Alliance—the Croatian party has tangled with the Serbs over census procedures, the language problem, and other aspects of the

[7] *Politika* (Belgrade), Oct. 21, 1970, gives an account of one such hotel in Cavtat whose workers' council was caught in the struggle between the Croatian Communists and General Export.

[8] Funds being eliminated include federal investment funds still existing for special projects and other "non-budgetary" funds. For a useful summary of the problem, see *ibid.*, Jan. 23, 1971.

[9] According to a report appearing in the *Washington Post* (Washington, DC), Aug. 14, 1971.

[10] The laws in effect in 1970 required industries to give up all but 7 percent of foreign earnings. Croatia proposed that 25 percent be retained by the enterprises and an additional 25 percent be retained by the republic governments. See *ibid.*, May 21, 1971.

[11] *Politika*, July 31, 1969.

[12] Nov. 17-21, 1969.

[13] The resolutions can be found in *Borba*, Jan. 16-18, 1970.

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national question.[14] The takeover of the Zagreb University student movement by a nationalist group, although initially opposed by the party, was finally engineered with the help of a number of prominent Croatian Communists, among them Marko Veselica —who has become notorious for his nationalistic pronouncements.[15] The Croatian cultural organization Matica Hrvatska, widely known for its extreme nationalism, has been given cautious encouragement by the republic party. "Nasa lijepa Domovina"—a song long banned in Croatia because of its association with the Ustashi—not only is now tolerated but has been adopted by the Communists as the Croatian national anthem.

Not unexpectedly, nationalist groups in Croatia long suspicious of the Communists have now rallied to the party's support. At the same time, the surge in Croatian national feeling has brought new prominence to Croatian party leaders who have associated themselves with the nationalist trend, while older leaders have been eclipsed. Miko Tripalo, Secretary of the Croatian League of Communists and member of the YLC Executive Bureau, has emerged as an especially popular and vigorous defender of Croatian national rights.[16]

Increasing Croatian sensitivity and assertiveness has led to a deterioration of Serb-Croat relations. This is manifested not only in cultural disputes but also in the opposing positions the two republics have taken on constitutional reform. In this connection, the two republics find themselves in a position somewhat analogous to that which they occupied before the war. Serbia has tended to identify with the "Yugoslav idea"; Croatia, with the concept of statehood and sovereignty for itself and the other republics. The Serbs are quick to seize on manifestations of Croatian nationalism as a revival of Ustashi—*i.e.*, fascist—tendencies, while the Croats interpret any defense of the Yugoslav idea as a return to unitarianism and Serbian dominance.

The most sensitive issue in Serb-Croat relations has been the question of the Serbs living in Croatia. Any hint of discrimination against these Serbs prompts a comparison, in the minds of the Serbs in Serbia, with conditions which prevailed in Croatia during World War II. The Belgrade press has kept these fears alive by printing accounts of nationalist demonstrations, often with allegedly anti-Serb overtones, which have occurred in Croatia.[17] For its part, the Croatian party has until recently taken a firm line on the problem of the Serbs in Croatia—a position aimed at discouraging the development of ties between Serbia and the Serbs living in Croatia.[18]

CROATIAN "NATIONAL COMMUNISM"

The fact is that the working people of Croatia, the Croatian people, have been very interested in the changes in the [Yugoslav] Constitution. Therefore, nobody need be surprised that we also stress our national republican statehood and that we pay so much attention to the national aspect of the constitutional changes, too. Perhaps this does not matter to some people, but an assessment of the political situation in Croatia underestimating this national movement—basically colored with its socialist content—is, I think, a political delusion . . . .

—From speech of Miko Tripalo, Croatian representative on the Executive Bureau of the YLC Presidium, broadcast by Tanjug from Belgrade on May 15, 1971.

[14] Point 10 of the directives issued by the federal statistical office for conducting the 1971 census permitted a person to identify himself by his region of origin, *e.g.*, as a Dalmatian rather than Croatian. Croatia demanded postponement of the census, although Serbian comment suggested the regional affiliation was merely a residual category without nationality implications. Federal officials finally ruled that each republic was free to omit the question. These matters were discussed at great length by the Belgrade and Zagreb press during the month of February 1971. For a summary of the controversy over the existence of a distinct Croatian tongue, see *Politika*, Jan. 20, 1971.

[15] The troubles at Zagreb University began with the election of Ivan Cicak as pro-rector on December 21, 1970, over the opposition of the official student organization. The nationalist faction, of which Cicak was a member, forcibly took control of a meeting of the Zagreb student federation in early April. Among the nationalist speeches was one by Veselica calling for expulsion of all professors who did not accept a Croatian point of view on the national question. The same nationalist group later seized the student newspaper *Studenski list*. The events were summarized in the Belgrade student newspaper *Student*, April 13, 1971.

[16] Tripalo, who became a member of the Croatian Executive Committee in 1966, was chosen a member of the highest party organ of the YLC—the Executive Bureau—at the Ninth Congress of the YLC in 1969.

[17] See *Politika*, May 10, 1971, for one of the most publicized of such incidents, in Podravska Slatina. The controversy centered on an alleged parade through a Serbian village by Croats displaying the Croatian flag without the red star.

[18] At the February 12, 1971, session of the Executive Committee of the Croatian League of Communists Central Committee, Dr. Savka Dabcevic-Kucar stated: "I proceed from the fact that the Socialist Republic of Croatia is the homeland of Serbians in Croatia, that Serbians in our republic are linked to Croatia by ties of destiny, that they see their prospects and their prosperity in the development and prosperity of Croatia within Yugoslavia . . ." She suggested that those who disagreed "should, without any particular anxiety, leave the League in great numbers." (Broadcast by Tanjug—the Yugoslav Telegraph Agency—from Belgrade, Feb. 12, 1971). See also the interview with Vladimir Bakaric in *NIN*, Nov. 8, 1970.

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While the Serb-Croat confrontation is the most important source of national tensions in Yugoslavia today, it is far from the sole manifestation of resurgent nationalist feeling. Debate and controversy have flared over a wide range of issues. As noted above, the economically-depressed and rapidly-growing Albanian minority has been particularly vociferous. Since the 1968 rioting in Kosovo, the local party organization—now apparently under the control of representatives of the Albanian minority—has become outspoken in its demands for autonomy and greater economic assistance for the province.[19] Real or imagined acts of discrimination or biased reporting have also pitted Macedonians against the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina over the question of the national identity of the Moslem Slavs in Macedonia,[20] and the Turkish minority against the Albanians over alleged pressures exerted on the Turks during the 1971 census.[21] Even the Serbs and Montenegrins have quarreled over plans to rebuild the Njegos mausoleum on Mt. Lovcen in Montenegro.[22] Not surprisingly, these events have attracted the attention of nationalists abroad. Exile groups have increased their terrorist activities against Yugoslavia,[23] and it has also been rumored that foreign organizations have been active in aiding separatist groups in Croatia and elsewhere.[24]

All these developments have contributed to a marked change in the mood of the country. The policy of greater accommodation among nationalities, fostered by the YLC since coming to power, appears to have been reversed—at least temporarily—by events. The country is experiencing growing insecurity among its national and minority groups. Adding to this feeling in 1970 was growing concern over the absence of a political center capable of dealing decisively with a wide range of issues and over the possible consequences of Tito's eventual departure from the political scene.

The Succession Question

The Yugoslav League of Communists had taken up the succession question at its Ninth Congress, in 1969, when it affirmed the principle of a collective leadership once Tito passes from the leadership of the YLC. However, in early 1970, Tito, perhaps reacting to the show of defiance toward the federal government by the Slovenian and Croatian Communists, began to promote Edvard Kardelj as his heir apparent.[25] Kardelj has been a leading liberal, while at the same time advocating close cooperation among the republics—*e.g.*, he had criticized his fellow Slovenes for their nationalistic outburst in 1969. Thus, notwithstanding a certain lack of personal intimacy between the two men, Kardelj recommended himself to Tito as the party leader most capable of combining a defense of Yugoslav unity with a proven dedication to reform. However, Kardelj's association with the concept of Yugoslav unity and his involvement on behalf of the central party organization in the "Zanko affair" made him unacceptable to the Croatian and Slovenian Communists. Consequently, the campaign to designate Kardelj "Number Two" in the YLC rapidly subsided, although not before it had further aggravated Croatian and Slovenian fears that determination of a successor to Tito would in some way lead to reassertion of the power of the central government. The succession question thus became inextricably linked with the political controversy among the republics.

By the autumn of 1970, Yugoslavia faced a severe constitutional and political crisis. The competing republics had thrown the government into a paralyzing deadlock over a number of interrelated issues. The Croatian and Slovenian Communists had become convinced that the interests of their republics could be protected only through transfer of substantial power from the central to the republic governments and through distribution to the republics of the assets of federal funds and banks. Although the growing ineffectiveness of the federal government was pushing leaders in the remaining republics

[19] A meeting of the provincial party committee at the end of June 1971 featured a particularly sharp exchange between the Serbs and Montenegrin Communists, on the one hand, and the Albanian Communists on the other. The former group have been resisting a takeover of the party organization in Kosovo by the Albanians. See *Jedinstvo* (Pristina), July 2, 1971, and *Rilindja* (Pristina), June 22, 23 and 24, 1971.

[20] *Nova Makedonija* (Skoplje), Dec. 24, 1970; *NIN*, Feb. 7, 1971.

[21] *Politika*, April 1, 1971.

[22] The Montenegrins' plan for a new mausoleum has attracted international attention because of the damage it is feared will be caused to the summit of Mt. Lovcen. Serbian intellectuals opposing the new mausoleum have done much to publicize the case. For a summary of the entire affair, see *Le Monde* (Paris), June 9, 1971.

[23] The most dramatic act of terrorism was the April 7, 1971, attack on the Yugoslav Ambassador to Sweden, Vladimir Rolovic, who subsequently died of his wounds.

[24] The reputed leader of these groups is Vlado Dapcevic, who was released from a Yugoslav jail in 1955 after Soviet intercession on his behalf. See *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), July 6 and Sept. 14, 1970.

[25] Tito referred to Kardelj as his "comrade in arms" on the latter's birthday. *Borba*, Jan. 23, 1970.

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toward a similar conclusion, they persisted in branding the Slovenian-Croatian demands as excessively nationalistic. As the government grappled ineffectively with mounting inflation and a growing foreign trade deficit it became clear that constitutional reform—about which there had already been considerable theoretical discussion—was now a necessity if Yugoslavia was to avoid further economic and political dislocations.

The process of working out what the reform of the constitution would entail commenced on September 21, when Tito announced that a collective Presidency would replace the single Presidency provided for under the 1963 constitution.[26] By thus assuring the wary republics that Tito would not be succeeded by a single, central leader, this announcement removed a major cause of tension and an obstacle to constitutional revision. In succeeding months the idea of creating the collective Presidency was expanded to include proposals for major changes in the federal system.[27]

A complementary development was a proposal by the Serbian National Assembly that economic powers be distributed between the federal and republic governments.[28] Although not published in full, the proposal appears to have advocated greater economic responsibilities for the republics on the condition that the unity of the Yugoslav domestic market be preserved. This action reflected an important change in Serbian thinking—from a position hostile to constitutional reform to one which grudgingly recognized that the central government was no longer able to cope with the pressures being placed upon it and that under the circumstances the republics would have to accept greater responsibility for solving their own problems.

The Serbian proposals apparently served as the basis for complex negotiations among the republics and with the federal government during the winter of 1970-71. Simultaneously and relatedly, the constitutional amendments were being formulated. The amendments were formally drafted by a small group of top party leaders in a conference on the island of Brioni early in 1971 and were published for public debate and criticism.[29] The draft amendments were approved by the 16th plenum of the YLC Presidium early in March.[30] As we shall see, there was considerable debate over the revisions, but they were approved in final form by the Federal Assembly on June 30.[31] Although debate over implementation and interpretation of the amendments continues, the changes which they appear designed to make in the operation of the Yugoslav federal system may be summarized as follows.[32]

Constitutional Amendments

First, under the provisions of Amendment 33, the republics and autonomous provinces will participate directly in the work of all federal government organs. Prior assent of all republic and provincial governments must be obtained by the federal government before the latter can act on a wide range of economic issues—including the basic elements of the social plan, the foreign exchange system, foreign trade and credit relations with foreign countries, customs, aid to underdeveloped republics, turnover-tax rates, and financing of the activities of the federation. This requirement for prior consultation is the so-called "coordinating principle." It is foreseen that this coordination will occur not only within the federal government and the Federal Assembly, but also through special committees made up of republic representatives acting under the supervision of the federal and republic governments.

Second, the federal government has the power to make decisions in certain areas without consulting the republics, as well as to utilize federal administrative organs in carrying out these decisions. As enumerated in Amendment 31, these areas include defense, state security, foreign affairs, economic relations with foreign countries, protection of the unity of the market, and protection of Yugoslav citizens working abroad.

Third, according to Amendments 28 and 34, the only revenues which the federal government will collect directly will be customs and administrative fees. The bulk of the federal government's income will be derived from "contributions" of the republics and autonomous provinces based on the turnover tax. This tax on exchanges of goods and services is

[26] *The New York Times*, Sept. 22, 1970.

[27] Kardelj gave the first detailed exposition of the new system in October, and Tito added further details in his December address to the Federal Assembly. See *Borba*, Oct. 5 and Dec. 15, 1970.

[28] *Politika*, Oct. 23, 1970. The significance of the decision can be grasped from discussions in *NIN*, Nov. 1, 1970, p. 5; *Vjesnik u Srijedu* (Zagreb), Nov. 11, 1970, p. 7; and other publications.

[29] See full text of the amendments in *Borba*, Feb. 28, 1971.

[30] *Borba*, March 4, 1971.

[31] Tanjug broadcast from Belgrade, July 1, 1971.

[32] The official text of the amendments was printed in *Sluzbeni list* (Belgrade), No. 29, July 28, 1971.

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to be administered by the republic governments, although the rate will be determined by the federal government, thus preserving the principle of the unity of the market. There is also provision for federal control over the rates of various local and republic taxes in emergency situations.

Fourth, the Presidency is established as a type of "superexecutive." This collective body consists of three representatives from each republic and two from each autonomous province, and its members serve five-year terms.[33] The Presidency has the power to appoint key officials, to supervise the activity of the federal government, to propose legislation to the Federal Assembly, and to delay acts of the government or Federal Assembly from going into effect. Under certain circumstances the Presidency is empowered to initiate emergency legislation—specifically, when the coordinating procedure provided for in Amendment 33 breaks down. It may also force the dissolution of the Federal Assembly if the latter refuses to accept recommendations placed before it by the Presidency.[34] In addition, the Presidency controls three new councils responsible for formulating government policy on defense, security, and foreign affairs. Amendment 37 permits Tito to remain President with many of the powers of that office specified under the 1963 constitution, while also serving as presiding officer of the new Presidency. Upon Tito's retirement, the powers of his office will revert to the Presidency, which will appoint its own presiding officer; the latter will hold office for a one-year term and enjoy only limited powers and responsibilities.

Fifth, under the provisions of Amendment 30, the Federal Assembly is empowered to legislate on a broad range of subjects of all-Yugoslav importance. On the one hand, this provides the federation with the power to supervise most economic matters and to maintain such essential operations as the federal statistical service. On the other hand, these legislative actions must still be "coordinated" with the republics when they fall under Amendment 33.[35] Since the republics, too, may legislate on many of the subjects covered by Amendment 30, it seems possible in theory for a republic to block federal legislation while passing its own laws on such subjects as the monetary system, customs duties, and the social plan—*i.e.*, issues which in fact require a unified federal policy.[36] Although all acts contrary to the principle of the unified market are unconstitutional under Amendment 25, no power is given to either the federal government or the Federal Assembly to declare such acts null and void. Presumably such violations of the constitution must be ruled on by the Constitutional Court.[37] While the Federal Assembly may adopt legislation protecting the unified market, many such matters do fall under provisions of Amendment 33 and thus require prior approval by the republics and autonomous provinces.

On the matter of interrepublic economic controversies, the constitutional amendments strike a balance between the demands of Croatia and Slovenia and those of the remaining republics. Amendment 27 provides for a Yugoslav National Bank under republic control, but leaves open the question of the future of the existing federal banks. Amendments 21 through 23, which deal with the self-management (*i.e.*, decentralized economic) system, provide for stricter control over the use of profits of banks and trading organizations by the enterprises contributing funds to the operation of such establishments. This represents a victory for the Croatian and Slovenian Communists in their efforts to clip the wings of the large trading organizations and banks. On the other hand, Croatian demands for a share in foreign currency balances of the central government and for some control over foreign trade found no positive response in the revised constitution.

How is one to evaluate this remarkable set of constitutional amendments? In one sense they do not work as dramatic a change as one might think. Amendment 33—with its provisions for coordination

[33] The amendments originally provided for two representatives from each republic and one from each autonomous province. The number was increased in April, at Tito's suggestion, so that the three nationalities of Bosnia-Herzegovina—Serbs, Croats, and Moslems—could each be represented in the Presidency.

[34] Under Amendment 33 the Presidency can empower the Federal Executive Council to make proposals to the Federal Assembly for dealing with emergency situations when it has proven impossible to coordinate republic views. See also Amendment 36.

[35] An act is either coordinated prior to its introduction in the Federal Assembly, or if it is the product of an amendment or other initiative taken within the Assembly, it must be referred to the Federal Executive Council for coordination before being finally adopted.

[36] The amendments are so vague as to leave unclear whether any areas of legislative activity remain the exclusive prerogative of the federation. Defense, the fund for underdeveloped regions, and limitations on trade seem to fall into this category. It is conceivable that a republic might block federal legislation on such matters as the fund for underdeveloped regions without being able to pass any legislation of its own.

[37] The Constitutional Court, established in 1964, has the power to review acts, including laws and regulations of the federal government, for their constitutionality under Article 241 of the 1963 constitution. Amendment 40, dealing with the Court, does not change these powers but provides that the Court will be made up of 14 members—two from each republic and one from each of the autonomous provinces—with a president to be chosen from among the members.

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among the republics— writes into law what has, to a large degree, already become established practice. In this connection, the new procedures for breaking deadlocks in emergency situations provide the federal government with a means, not previously available, of ending disputes among republics. The constitution is also explicit now in placing responsibility for internal security matters in the hands of the federal government and its administrative organs. If strictly adhered to, this provision could reverse the trend—set in motion in 1966 by the dismissal of Rankovic—toward republic supervision of the secret police.[38]

Focus on the Republics

On the other hand, the republics are now recognized as the key unit of government in Yugoslavia. They have the power to control the federal government through their representatives in the federal administration, the Federal Executive Council, and the Presidency. The republics can block actions in the economic field which they deem inimical to republic interests, and they can presumably evolve their own *republic* programs in these areas. One may anticipate a trend toward still further regionalization of the Yugoslav economy, with each republic pursuing its own commercial and investment policies, drawing up its own development plans, and even seeking to develop contacts with foreign business firms.[39] For several years now, foreign trade delegations have been visiting republic governments, and Croatia has even sent its own delegation to Hungary. In theory at least, the initiative should also lie with the republics when it comes to delimiting general legislative responsibilities, for YLC leaders have repeatedly committed themselves to the concept of a federal government with severely limited powers. Kardelj, for example, has stated that the federal government will restrict its activities to national defense, international relations, preservation of the unity of the Yugoslav market, and "protecting the foundations of the socialist system."[40]

The long-term impact of the new amendments on the 1963 constitution is difficult to gauge, if only because these amendments accomplish only part of the task of constitutional revision and will function as part of a larger body of legislation dealing with the role of the courts and the Federal Assembly, the system of administration, and the republic constitutions.[41] As yet, this legislation is only in its earliest stages of development. It is especially difficult to judge the role that will be assumed by the Presidency. Already, the republic selections of representatives to this new body seem to reflect differing assessments of its importance.[42] Furthermore, the loose drafting of the amendments left unresolved major questions concerning the division of powers between the federal and republic governments, questions which could create endless confusion if tested in the courtroom.

The amendments were accepted with great reluctance in most parts of the country. The Croatian Communists accepted a compromise on the issue of control over foreign trade only when assured of strict observance of Amendment 33—*i.e.*, the "coordinating principle." The Serbian Communists were concerned over precisely this last provision and also objected to the powers vested in the collective Presidency and to the threat to the principle of a unified market posed by the new economic rights of the republics.[43] Discussions organized by students and faculty of Belgrade University[44] revealed that Serbian

[38] Amendments 2 and 18 to the 1963 constitution provided that the federation and the republics would share responsibility for state security; and the federal apparatus in this field was subsequently reduced by 60 percent. It has been suggested that the new system, although reversing the intent behind the above amendments, will provide for considerable decentralization of the secret police apparatus, with coordination carried out by the Presidency's council on security matters. Other duties of the Ministry of the Interior—besides state security—will be entirely in republic hands. *NIN*, Feb. 28, 1971, p. 11.

[39] A Croatian proposal for a polycentric economic system can be found in Centar za aktualni politicki studij, *Ustavna reforma*, Zagreb, 1971, pp. 20-21.

[40] *Komunist* (Belgrade), March 4, 1971.

[41] The "second stage" of constitutional reform will seek to rearrange the self-management system, socio-economic relations in the communes, the assembly system, and the judicial system in accordance with the recent amendments. It has been suggested that this may result in promulgation by the end of 1972 of a new constitution incorporating all the recent changes. Tanjug report broadcast from Belgrade, Oct. 13, 1971.

[42] Serbia chose representatives who are not members of the Party *Presidium* or the Executive Bureau of the YLC. Macedonia, on the other hand, selected two of its top Communists, both in the Executive Bureau, Krste Crvenkovski and Kiro Gligorov.

[43] *NIN*, March 14, 1971, pp. 11-12.

[44] The Assembly of the Student Federation of Belgrade University in late April opposed the revision on the grounds that it created a system of "dual sovereignty," that the Presidency was unacceptable because it was not responsible to any popularly elected body, and that a "common market" was being created instead of a unified market (Tanjug broadcast from Belgrade, April 22, 1971). The April 30 issue of *Student*, which gave a detailed account of the meeting, was banned by the public prosecutor, as was a similar publication of the University's Law Faculty—*Anali pravnog fakulteta*. The May 18 and 27 issues of *Student* summarize these developments.

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SOCIALIST AMALGAM FOR FEDERAL YUGOSLAVIA

Comrades, we are a socialist society in which the League of Communists is the ideopolitical protagonist of our entire development. However, behavior in the League of Communists is not good, and I am not pleased. I must say that I am tremendously hurt by this. You know that I have long been at the head of the Communist Party, or rather the YLC, but I believe that up to now we never had a situation such as we have now in the League of Communists. As long as I am in this position and as long as the membership wants to support me, I shall strive to create order in the League of Communists. We must have unity. However, we have some people now who violate this unity, although they too speak about it. All right, let us see who really is in favor of unity in deed and who violates it, thus destroying our community.

The request was again made here today to name those people undermining our unity. I shall actually name them one day, and I shall not wait long. Why should we delude ourselves? Our existence, our socialist state, our community are at stake. All our republics and the unity of our country are at stake. Who else but we Communists are responsible for all this? We must behave in this sense. And he who does not behave like this—out he goes from the League of Communists.

Many competences will be transferred from the Federation to the republics as a result of the adoption of the constitutional amendments. I think that this is good. However, there are also some people who, to be factual, by invoking the amendments, aim at closing themselves within their own borders and establishing a closed market, that is, a market which would not be unified, and this is a dangerous thing.

. . . Because of all this, I shall shortly convene a meeting of the members of the Presidium and the other most responsible people from the republics and provinces so that we will be able to discuss everything I have talked about, and we shall not leave the meeting until we agree . . . .

Tito speech to party aktiv in Kosovo, broadcast by Tanjug from Belgrade on April 15, 1971.

intellectual opinion is strongly opposed to the revised constitution on these grounds. In Slovenia, on the other hand, the complaint has been expressed that the amended constitution is essentially "unitary" in nature.[45]

The debate over the amendments brought new strains in interrepublic relations during the spring of 1971. In April, the Croatian party's Central Committee charged the federal security organs with cooperating with hostile elements abroad in efforts to discredit the Croatian party leadership by attempting to link certain of the members of the Croatian Central Committee with the organization of the exiled Croatian nationalist, Branomir Jelic.[46] Tito was forced to intervene in the ensuing furor. In a speech of April 14 that was widely reported abroad, he strongly criticized nationalist behavior in the YLC and promised a purge, if necessary, to remove nationalist elements.[47] The 17th Plenum of the YLC Presidium, held at the end of April, was successful in forcing republic party leaders to accept a common line against nationalist excesses and to support the constitutional amendments.[48]

However, the Croatian party leadership defiantly continued to flaunt its nationalism well into the summer. On July 5, Tito conferred with the republic's leadership and apparently left them no alternative but to curb nationalistic excesses among party members in Croatia.[49] The Fourth Conference of the Croatian LC, held in mid-July, showed a more sober tone,[50] and by the end of the month a purge of extreme nationalists (both Serb and Croat) from the Croatian party had begun.[51] As a result of these developments, the national crisis appears to have been contained for the moment. The stage has been set for a new period in which the principles of the new system will be put into practice and the actual balance of power between the republics and the federal government determined.

The present account of developments in Yugoslavia has, of necessity, passed rapidly over recent developments in many areas in order to focus on

[45] See the comments of Dr. Vladimir Krivic, President of the Constitutional Court of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia and Chairman of the Section for Relations Among Nations of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia, in *Politika*, April 6, 1971.

[46] At the 19th plenum of the Croatian Central Committee. Tanjug broadcast from Belgrade April 7, 1971. For an account of Jelic and his activities, see *Der Spiegel*, Oct. 5, 1970.

[47] *Politika*, April 16, 1971.

[48] Radio Belgrade broadcast, April 30, 1971.

[49] This was evidenced by the speech of Dusan Dragosavac to the Conference, broadcast from Belgrade, July 15, 1971.

[50] Tanjug broadcast from Belgrade July 15, 1971.

[51] Marko Veselica was one of the purge's first victims.

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the crisis in national relations. Yugoslavia today faces the problem of coordinating not only the demands of the republics but of other powerful interests—economic, social and political—which the system itself has helped to create. If the elaborate mechanisms developed over the past several years to represent these interests fail to operate properly, it may become necessary for the party or the army to intervene with the aim of restoring a strong central government. In his April 14 speech, Tito strongly criticized the party for its passivity, and it would appear that a campaign to overcome government instability by strengthening and tightening party controls is currently under way.

While it is still too early to judge how relationships between the federal government and the republics will develop or how power will be distributed between the two levels of government, it is a fact that the constitutional reforms did achieve the short-term objective of ending the deadlock within the federal government which had threatened to permit the country to slide into economic chaos. As the accord on constitutional revision was being worked out, the federal government moved ahead with a stabilization program which included a devaluation of the dinar. Moreover, the continued importance of the federal government is suggested by the fact that the federal budget for 1971 is as great, if not greater, than that for 1970. Also, proposals for reorganizing the Federal Executive Council and the federal secretariats provide for an administrative apparatus capable of playing a major role not only in defense and foreign policy but also in domestic affairs, should the need arise.[52]

Unfinished Business

There is reason to doubt, however, whether the federal government will enjoy the unified support of the republic governments. By the end of the summer of 1971, the economic policies of the government were once more under attack from a number of republics, including Serbia. While the constitutional revisions removed some of the grievances nursed by Slovenia and Croatia against the central government, controversy over other issues seems to have intensified. The lull in the national question may only be temporary. Certainly the purge in the Croatian party is only a minor affair. Nationalistically-oriented party leaders such as Miko Tripalo should be able to maintain their positions of power and continue to defend national interests within the YLC. As for the campaign to strengthen the role of the party, it can only succeed if the League is more united—especially in its central organs—than is presently the case.

The revised constitution therefore represents an imperfect transition from a system in which the central government was the dominant partner (and the interest of the republics lay primarily in seeking a voice at the center to block unwanted actions) toward a more truly federal form of government. It may be that the new arrangements will provide a suitable framework within which the republics can resolve their differences. On the other hand, the proclivity of the republics to forge weapons against "the center" may result—through application of the "coordinating principle"—in the emergence of a quasi-confederal system of government rather than the genuinely federal system sought by the designers of the revision.

The system of government toward which Yugoslavia is groping—one might speak of it as a form of constitutional communism resting on a flexible sharing of powers between the central and republic governments—nevertheless meets several important needs of the country. The existence of deep-rooted national differences is only one reason for pursuing the path of far-reaching decentralization of power. Since it is clear that economic difficulties, especially in the underdeveloped areas, will not be solved for many years, there may be something to say for placing responsibility for economic development squarely in the hands of the republics, rather than letting resentment mount solely against the federal government. In this regard, the devolution of economic powers, although it runs the risk of fragmenting the Yugoslav economy, could in the long run help preserve the unity of the country. If republic leaders in the YLC can reconcile their differences, the growth of "national communism" at the republic level may possibly contribute to a reinvigoration of the Yugoslav political system, just as Tito's experiment with national communism within the Soviet empire gave birth to a new era in Yugoslav politics two decades ago.

[52] The federal government is to have eight federal secretariats—foreign affairs, defense, internal affairs, economy, finances, foreign trade, labor and social policy, and judicial affairs and general administration, as well as nine federal institutes, three federal directorates, two federal inspectorates, and several other bodies. *Borba*, July 10, 1971.

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Albania's Expanding Horizons

By Peter R. Prifti

One of the more interesting repercussions of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 has been the reaction of Communist Albania. There is now considerable evidence that the invasion and the related enunciation of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine of the limited sovereignty of socialist countries prompted the Albanian Party of Labor to undertake a major reassessment and reorientation of its foreign policy in response to the changed political situation in Eastern Europe. The behavior of Tirana over the last three years gives evidence of a growing awareness that exclusive reliance on Peking—a dependence which dates back to 1961—has become an insufficient guarantee of Albanian national independence. As a result, one detects a very slow but cumulative cooling in the Sino-Albanian relationship. Simultaneously, Albania has taken serious steps to normalize relations with her Balkan neighbors and also to establish diplomatic and other ties with a majority of the countries of Western Europe—in other words, to forge an "opening to the West."

The post-1968 shift is not the first such radical change in Albanian foreign policy in the postwar period, but it marks the first time that an "extra-bloc" orientation has emerged. In 1948, Albania responded to intolerable pressures from Yugoslavia and the formal break between Belgrade and Moscow by building close ties with the Soviet Communist Party. However, Khrushchev's policy toward Albania in the late 1950's generated increasing suspicion and resistance on the part of the Albanian comrades, and these attitudes resulted in a second major shift of Albanian allegiance, this time from Moscow to Peking (in 1961). Both of these readjustments in Albanian foreign policy were effected entirely within the framework of the system of Communist states. Now, Tirana has overcome its ideological scruples enough to mend fences and establish ties with a greater number of nations of the non-Communist world than ever before.

To better understand the evolution of Tirana's foreign policy since August 1968, it is useful to consider Albania's relations with the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Yugoslavia, and Western Europe prior to the Czechoslovak crisis. Turning first to relations with Moscow, it should be noted that Soviet-Albanian ties were quite cordial until 1955, when Soviet party leader Khrushchev visited Belgrade to effect his famous reconciliation with Tito.[1] The Albanians, fearing a Soviet rapprochement with Tirana's arch rival (both politically and ideologically), had strongly opposed Khrushchev's trip. The Soviet leader's wholesale attack on Stalin at the 20th CPSU Congress in the following year increased the concern of the Stalinist leadership of Albania. Tirana's worst fears were confirmed during the Hungarian uprising in autumn 1956, when Khrushchev turned for advice on the matter of dealing with the Hungarians to none other than Tito—the man whom the Albanians viewed as the principal architect of

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[1] See for example Enver Hoxha, "Speech on Behalf of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor at the November 1960 Moscow Conference of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties," *Rruga e partise* (Tirana), August 1970, p. 30.

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the Hungarian revolt and the leading agent of counterrevolution within the socialist camp.[2] As we shall presently see, this view was also strongly stated by the Chinese—a factor which increasingly drew Tirana and Peking together.

Tensions continued to mount between Moscow and Tirana over a wide range of ideological, nationalist, interparty, and military matters. In June 1960, the Albanian Communists rejected Khrushchev's heavy-handed attempts to force them to join in a condemnation of China at the Bucharest Conference (of ruling Communist parties). The Albanians felt that their party's right to independence and equality with all other parties in the socialist camp had been brutally violated by the CPSU leader's pressure tactics.[3]

Moscow's assertions that the Albanians were "dogmatists," "sectarians," and "narrow nationalists" drew counterclaims from Tirana that Albanian foreign policy positions were in strict accord with Marxist-Leninist teachings and the interests of the socialist camp—*i.e.*, they, rather than the Khrushchev group, were the true "internationalists." Right up to the definitive rupture of Soviet-Albanian relations in late 1961, Soviet policy toward "revisionist" Yugoslavia remained a bitter bone of ideological contention. Khrushchev's repeated references to Yugoslavia as a "socialist country" seemed a clear provocation to Enver Hoxha, Albanian party General Secretary, for Yugoslavia had been expelled from the Cominform in 1948 and as late as November 1960 had been criticized by the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties. In Tirana's view, Moscow's friendly dealings with Belgrade were tantamount to open encouragement of an "enemy of the Albanian Party of Labor."[4]

Kremlin Pressure Tactics

The Soviet Union reacted to Tirana's conservative and intransigent line with a concerted campaign of political, economic and military measures designed to bring Albania to heel. Khrushchev enraged the Albanian Communists by holding talks about the "Greek minority in Albania" with Greek political leader Sophocles Venizelos in June 1960[5] and by ignoring Albania's concern over the fate of its nationals in Yugoslavia.[6] There is evidence that shortly after the 1960 Bucharest Conference, the CPSU initiated a campaign aimed at splitting the Albanian party and eliminating Hoxha from power. High-ranking party officials Liri Belishova and Koco Tashko were later purged for having "capitulated" to Moscow in this affair.[7] Furthermore, the Soviet ambassador to Tirana was accused of seeking "to incite the People's Army against the party leadership . . ."[8]

In the realm of economics, the Kremlin delayed and drastically curtailed Soviet shipments of grain to Albania in the summer of 1960 despite the threat of a famine there.[9] The following spring and summer, Moscow withdrew all its technical specialists from Albania, suspended all economic credits (including essential financial support for the Albanian Third Five-Year Plan, for the years 1961-65), and terminated scholarships for the 1,200 Albanians then studying in the Soviet Union.

The growing tensions between the two countries could not help but be reflected in military relations. This was admitted in a July 6, 1961, letter from the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor to the CPSU Central Committee,[10] which charged the Soviet Union with reneging on its commitment to furnish Albania with military equipment and asserted Albania's claim to ownership of all Soviet military installations at the Vlore naval base in Albania.[11] The Albanian leaders also took this opportunity to charge Moscow with manipulating the Warsaw Pact for Soviet ends without regard for Albania's national security. This charge doubtless stemmed from reports that Soviet Marshal A. A. Grechko, then Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact forces,

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 15-20.
[4] *Zeri i popullit* (Tirana), Nov. 8, 1961.
[5] *Ibid.*, Sept. 3, 1960, and Nov. 8, 1961.
[6] *Ibid.*, Sept. 19 and 20, 1962.
[7] Hoxha, "Speech . . . at the November 1960 Moscow Conference . . .," p. 20; also, *Pravda* (Moscow), Oct. 29, 1961.
[8] Hoxha, "Speech . . . at the November 1960 Moscow Conference . . .," p. 22.
[9] *Zeri i popullit*, Nov. 8, 1961.
[10] "Letter of the CC of the APL and the Council of Ministers of the Albanian People's Republic to the CPSU CC and the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union Wherein the True Causes of the Aggravation of Albanian-Soviet Relations Are Discovered," in *Dokumenta Kryesore te Partise se Punes se Shqiperise* (Principal Documents of the Albanian Party of Labor), Vol. IV, Tirana, 1970, pp. 25-61.
[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 42-50. Tirana claims that the Soviets, contrary to agreements with Albania, decided to "liquidate" the Vlore naval base and remove all of its military installations, including a submarine force which reportedly numbered 12 units. When Tirana balked at the proposal and instead claimed ownership over all installations at the base, Moscow accused the Albanians of "seizing" Soviet equipment and committing "acts of piracy." This conflict was resolved when Albania agreed to the evacuation of eight Soviet subs, while Tirana retained four subs for itself.

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had threatened to expel Albania from the pact.[12]

The rift became final in October and December 1961. Khrushchev chose the forum of the 22nd CPSU Congress to read Albania out of the world Communist movement publicly.[13] In December 1961, Moscow severed state relations with Albania, a measure which had never before been applied within the socialist camp, even to Tito.[14] These events froze Albania into a posture of hostility toward the CPSU which has persisted to this day. The departure of Khrushchev from power in October 1964 brought no improvement in Soviet-Albanian relations. Tirana continued to blast the "Brezhnev-Kosygin-Podgorny clique" for pursuing a policy of "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev." [15]

As relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated, Albania's ties with the People's Republic of China grew closer. Each of the latter two Communist states welcomed the support of the other for its ideological and political line and independent posture vis-à-vis Moscow. Implicit Chinese political and ideological support for Tirana was manifested as early as 1956 when *Jen-min Jih-pao* published a statement censuring the Yugoslavs for excessive criticism of Stalinism in the Soviet Union.[16] This critique followed strong Albanian attacks on Tito in the wake of the Hungarian revolution. Peking gave further support to Tirana's polemics against Tito in May 1958 with a vitriolic attack on the Yugoslav League of Communists.[17]

Once the Tirana-Moscow rift became final, the People's Republic of China rallied strongly in defense of the isolated Albanian comrades. At the 22nd CPSU Congress, the Chinese delegation was the only group to openly rebuke the Soviet party for making public its quarrel with Tirana. Chinese delegations again defended Albania against attacks by pro-Moscow delegations at the Bulgarian, Hungarian and Czechoslovak party congresses in late 1962. Peking's solidarity with Tirana was further demonstrated in January 1964 and again in March 1965 when PRC Premier Chou En-lai paid state visits to Albania—events which were aimed, among other things, at "raising the prestige of the Albanian leaders by providing concrete evidence of the close ties existing between Peking and Tirana." [18]

The Chinese also furnished the Albanians inestimable economic aid and credits, technical assistance, and large shipments of grain to fill the void left by the Soviet pullout. Already in February 1961, Peking had agreed to furnish $123 million to help finance the Albanian Third Five-Year Plan, including aid in the construction of 25 specific industrial projects. In June 1965, China reportedly made a new loan of $214 million to help finance the Fourth Five-Year Plan for 1966-70.[19] In the early 1960's, Chinese ex-

[12] Hoxha, "Speech . . . at the November 1960 Moscow Conference . . .," p. 22.

[13] *Pravda*, Oct. 18, 1961.

[14] "New Hostile Acts of N. Khrushchev's Group toward the Albanian People's Republic," *Zeri i popullit*, Dec. 10, 1961. (The Soviet note informing Tirana of Moscow's decision to break diplomatic relations was dated December 3, 1961.)

[15] "Khrushchevian Revisionism Did Not Disappear with N. Khrushchev's Fall," *ibid.*, Nov. 1, 1964, and "Khrushchevian Revisionists Face to Face with Serious Difficulties, Failures, and Contradictions," *ibid.*, Dec. 10, 1965.

[16] *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), Dec. 29, 1956. For an excellent account of early Sino-Albanian relations, see Daniel Tretiak, "The Founding of the Sino-Albanian Entente," *The China Quarterly* (London), April-June 1962, pp. 123-43.

[17] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, May 5, 1958, as translated in *Survey of the China Mainland Press* (Hong Kong), No. 1767, May 8, 1958.

[18] Nicholas C. Pano, *The People's Republic of Albania*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1968, p. 165.

[19] Jan S. Prybyla, "Albania's Economic Vassalage," *East Europe* (New York), January 1967, pp. 9-14.

A KHRUSHCHEV PARABLE

. . . the Chinese have done everything they can to misrepresent what happened [in the Cuban missile crisis—Ed.]. You get echoes of their propaganda here and there. The Albanians, for example.

The Albanians remind me of something that happened when I was young and used to work in the mines. . . . When the miners came up for lunch, they would amuse themselves by calling over small children and offering them kopeks if they would memorize some words and then go home and recite the words to their parents. When the children agreed and held out their hands, the miners gave them kopeks and proceeded to instruct the children in the foulest words known to the Russian language. And afterwards, when the kids left, the miners would howl with laughter when they imagined these tots teaching their parents such choice vocabulary.

It was stupid, of course, but this was the sort of thing that amused the miners. Well, the point of my story is: somebody has been teaching the Albanians dirty words and giving them kopeks.

—From comments of the late Soviet First Secretary N. S. Khrushchev in a 1962 interview with Norman Cousins, extracted with the permission of Mr. Cousins from his "The Improbable Triumvirate—Khrushchev, Kennedy, and Pope John," *Saturday Review* (New York), Oct. 30, 1971, p. 30.

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perts journeyed to Albania in increasing numbers to supervise construction of power projects, development of oil and mining industries, and expansion of the Durres harbor facilities. Joint agencies such as the Sino-Albanian Commission for Scientific and Technical Cooperation and the Sino-Albanian Shipping Company were formed. During the first half of the 1960's, an estimated 60 percent of Albanian foreign trade was with the PRC.[20]

As the foregoing suggests, Tirana became almost completely dependent on China in the critical years following the break with Moscow. Peking's response to Albania's needs at this vital juncture was timely and indispensable for the continued viability of Hoxha's regime. Chinese support was also evident in 1966-68, when Albania emulated Peking by staging its own cultural revolution aimed at consolidating Hoxha's power. Peking hailed this Albanian exercise as a great victory over revisionist ideology and the remnants of bourgeois and feudal influence in Albania. Through these years Chinese speeches, messages, and greetings to the Albanians invariably praised Hoxha as "a distinguished Marxist-Leninist" and described Albania as a "beacon light of socialism" on the European continent.

Throughout the period 1961-68, Albania's ideological position closely paralleled Peking's general foreign policy line. There was basic agreement between the two allies on the major ideological issues within the Communist world, such as the nature of imperialism, the criteria for measuring the transition to socialism, and the attitude to be adopted toward national liberation movements, as well as disarmament and nuclear warfare, peaceful coexistence, the class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the vanguard role of the party. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that Albania showed no initiative for independent action, or that it has exerted no influence whatsoever on Chinese policy. Tirana is not a mere spokesman for China. Albania's responses to international developments have been motivated—both before 1968 and after—primarily by what it conceives to be its own national interests. Although they are quick to deny it, Albania's leaders are, in fact if not in rhetoric, nationalists first and then Communists. In return for Albanian support of Peking's general ideological and foreign policy line, the Chinese have supported the Albanians on questions of vital national importance to the latter. For example, China has attacked the "Greek reactionaries" who "plan aggression" against Albania.[21] Again, with respect to Yugoslavia, China made no move to improve relations with Belgrade until after Albania had implicitly made common cause with its once bitter foe by publishing Belgrade's denunciation of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia (see below).

The Albanian gesture to Belgrade marked a significant thaw in relations with Yugoslavia, which—from Tirana's viewpoint—had remained basically frozen from 1948. The differences between Tirana and Belgrade had included matters of economics, interparty relations, and relations with the Soviet Union, but the basic cause of tension, as Albania saw it, was the persistent attempts by the Yugoslav Communists to dominate the Albanian Party of Labor and to reduce Albania to the status of a Yugoslav satellite. Tirana feels that Tito has sought to establish tutelage over the Albanians almost from the founding of the Albanian party in 1941. Belgrade fostered a pro-Tito faction within the Albanian party (headed by Koci Xoxe, Albanian Minister of the Interior), which sought to unseat Hoxha several times, particularly in 1944 and 1947.[22] In the economic area, Yugoslavia saw Albania as a source of raw materials and sought—through trade, monetary, and customs union agreements—to reduce Albania to an appendage of the Yugoslav economy. Consequently, Belgrade became concerned when Hoxha journeyed to Moscow in 1947 to conclude an economic accord with the Soviet Union. Interpreting this as an anti-Yugoslav initiative, Belgrade took steps to isolate Albania politically, economically, and militarily from the USSR.[23]

Tito's attempt to manipulate the Albanian party reached a high point in February 1948, when the Pro-Yugoslav Xoxe succeeded in temporarily eliminating from power two prominent members of the Hoxha group, Mehmet Shehu and Liri Belishova, and reportedly made preparations to physicaly liquidate Hoxha and his key supporters. Meantime, Belgrade made ready to dispatch two divisions to Albania for the ostensible purpose of heading off an invasion by the Greeks. The Albanians claimed that the purpose was to pave the way for the incorporation of Albania into the Yugoslav Federation.[24] Regardless of the motivation, the plans fell through when Stalin expelled Tito from the Cominform in June 1948.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

[21] *Zeri i popullit*, Sept. 29, 1967.

[22] *Dokumenta Kryesore . . .*, Vol. 1, Tirana, 1960, pp. 423-65.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 387, 392.

[24] Pano, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

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Stalin's action put an end to Belgrade's direct influence in Albania, but it did not, apparently, end Yugoslavia's attempts to destroy Hoxha. Tirana contends that after 1948 the "Tito clique" embarked on insurgency operations against Albania which included the dispatch of armed bands across the border to foment disorder and unrest. According to Albanian sources, Tito's agents in Albania tried in 1956 to organize a "counterrevolution" to coincide with the Hungarian revolt.[25] Five years later, in May 1961, at an espionage trial in Tirana, Yugoslavia was accused of plotting with Greece and the United States Sixth Fleet to overthrow the Hoxha leadership.[26]

Reacting to what it called intolerable provocations, as well as to the abhorrent Tito general line, Tirana in turn carried out a relentless and bitter campaign of polemics against Tito with the object of discrediting Yugoslavia and making impossible a rapprochement between Belgrade and the socialist camp. This policy, as we have seen, ran counter to Moscow's repeated efforts to normalize relations with Belgrade and, in fact, contributed in large measure to the exacerbation of Tirana-Moscow relations. When the final break with the USSR came in 1961, the Albanians—no longer restrained by Moscow—intensified their attacks on Tito, unremittingly calling him the betrayer of the socialist camp and the liquidator of socialism in Yugoslavia.

Throughout this pre-1968 period, Albania's view of the West was almost wholly negative. The West was identified with imperialism, monopoly capitalism, war, and aggression. It represented the class enemy, whose bellicose nature would never change and against whom Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries and progressive forces in the world must wage an all-out political, ideological and economic struggle to achieve the final victory of socialism and communism on a worldwide scale.

Isolated and Intractable

Thus, following the break with the Soviet Union, Albania became effectively isolated from all its European neighbors. She saw herself as the beleaguered outpost of Marxism-Leninism in the Balkans, striving heroically to build socialism with a pick in one hand and a rifle in the other. But by 1968, the political picture in the Balkans and East Europe had shifted in significant ways which made the Albanian isolation less complete, or which at least paved the way for change. In the wake of the fall of Aleksandar Rankovic from a position of power in Yugoslavia in July 1966, Belgrade adopted a policy of moderation aimed at reconciling existing differences with Albania. In April 1967, a military coup in Athens placed Greece under army rule; yet, contrary to Tirana's expectations, the ruling military junta proved less aggressive than its monarchist predecessors in pressing Greek territorial claims to southern Albania. Thus, Tirana felt somewhat less threatened than before by her neighbors.

Furthermore, the liberalization moves introduced in Czechoslovakia during 1967 and 1968 had persuaded the Albanians that the revisionist camp—headed by the Soviet Union—was disintegrating and that the disoriented and cowardly "anti-Marxist" clique in the Kremlin would do nothing to halt the process of disintegration.[27] Tirana thus looked forward confidently to the downfall of the revisionist parties in Eastern Europe and the reconquest of power by Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries, first in the East European capitals and finally in Moscow itself. Such was the state of the world as seen by the austere and highly doctrinaire Communist leadership in Tirana as it unswervingly pursued its seemingly intransigent foreign policy.

Obviously, Albania's rulers did not anticipate the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the event forced a sudden and drastic reappraisal of Hoxha's perceptions of the geopolitical realities in Europe. Tirana's immediate reaction was to issue a party and government declaration condemning Moscow in very strong terms and alerting the peoples of the socialist countries and the world to the "imperialist and fascist designs" of the "counter-revolutionary clique" ruling the USSR.[28] In fact, the declaration was a call for support in the face of the felt Soviet threat to Albanian independence. On September 12, Albanian Premier Mehmet Shehu, charging that the CPSU leaders had transformed the Warsaw Pact "from a defense pact against imperialist aggression into an aggressive pact against the socialist countries them-

[25] Hoxha, "Speech . . . at the November 1960 Moscow Conference . . .," p. 31.

[26] *Zeri i popullit*, May 16-26, 1961, and *Bashkimi* (Tirana), May 20, 1961.

[27] "The Working Class in Revisionist Countries Must Take the Field and Reestablish the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," *Zeri i popullit*, March 24, 1968.

[28] "Declaration of the APL Central Committee and the APR Council of Ministers on the Aggression of Soviet Revisionists and Their Satellites Against the Czechoslovak SR and the Czechoslovak People," *Zeri i popullit*, Aug. 23, 1968.

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selves," announced Albania's withdrawal from the pact.[29] This action, too, was taken to head off Soviet action against Albania on the pretext of defending the interests of a Warsaw Pact member country. On September 17, the Chinese Communist leaders sent a telegram endorsing Albania's action and full support in the event of a Soviet attack.[30]

At the same time, the Albanians took further steps to improve the country's defense posture. On September 29, a high-powered Albanian party and government delegation, headed by Defense Minister General Beqir Balluku, arrived in Peking to attend the 19th anniversary celebrations of the PRC. During their nine-day stay in Peking, the Albanians were received by Mao, and Balluku had "a very cordial talk" with Lin Piao and members of his staff.[31] The Chinese reciprocated in November, when Huang Yung-sheng, the Chinese Army Chief of Staff, led a delegation to Tirana on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of Albania's liberation.[32] It was the highest-ranking Chinese military delegation ever to visit Albania and served to reinforce Peking's offer of support two months earlier.

On the domestic front, the Albanian leaders mounted a vigorous campaign to mobilize public opinion against Moscow and to prepare the population psychologically for a possible Soviet armed attack on Albania. This war psychology was further intensified by a stream of articles in the nation's press urging the Czechoslovak people to trust to arms as the only means of regaining their freedom from the Soviet invaders and of restoring true socialism in their country.

Such were the political, military and psychological steps taken by Albania immediately after the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. These steps sought to bolster Albanian national security and to define the country's posture with regard to the Czechoslovak events. Albania's denunciation of the Soviets, her formal withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, the strengthening of ties with China—all were predictable. However, they constituted only the first phase of what now can be seen as a major readjustment of Albanian foreign policy. The second, more significant phase has witnessed notable Albanian initiatives toward improving the political atmosphere in the Balkans and coming to more realistic terms with the long-execrated and oft-maligned West.

[29] *Bashkimi* (Tirana), Sept. 13, 1968. See also Robin Alison Remington, *The Warsaw Pact* (Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution), Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1971, pp. 48-55.
[30] *Peking Review*, Sept. 20, 1968, pp. 3-4.
[31] *Bashkimi*, Oct. 8, 1968.
[32] *Peking Review*, Dec. 13, 1968, pp. 3-13.

ON SOVIET IMPERIALISM

The latest form of Soviet revisionist imperialism is . . . just as dangerous, crafty, and aggressive as American imperialism.

Our party, from the time when modern revisionism usurped power in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, has correctly summed up the situation and has pointed out that a "second front" is beginning to oppose socialism and communism in the world.

Today we are all witnessing the transformation of the revisionist Soviet Union into a chauvinistic and neocolonialist state. The Soviet revisionists' foreign policy is none other than the Great Russian policy of the old tsars; it is composed of the same expansionist ambitions, the same objectives of the subjugation and enslavement of peoples. The appetites of young Soviet revisionist imperialism are large. . . .

The barbaric aggression against Czechoslovakia was not a chance action, nor was it part of an exceptional situation without any future, but the paroxysm of an aggressive and chauvinistic policy drawn up as an official line, the beginning of a great offensive directed against the freedom and independence of many countries and peoples. It is a fact that at the same time that Czechoslovakia was being openly invaded, the silent occupation of Poland, democratic Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Mongolia was increasing. These countries have been practically turned into military provinces of Moscow's empire, where Soviet generals not only keep "order," but also make policies and even law.

. . . Brezhnev brought out the infamous theory of "limited sovereignty," and his zealous propagandists are trying to convince the world that the Soviet Union sent not tanks but "international aid" to Prague, that it is not oppressing satellite countries but is "strengthening the socialist community," that it is not exploiting them but is accelerating their "socialist integration," etc.

The theory of "limited sovereignty" is the theory of chauvinism and great power expansion, the theory by whose help the new Soviet imperialists are trying to stifle all sovereignty of other peoples and arrogate the "sovereign right" to intervene where and when they should. . . .

—From Enver Hoxha's speech to the 6th Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor, *Zeri i popullit*, Nov. 2, 1971.

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In this remarkable shift the only major factor of pre-1968 Albanian policy which has remained constant in the last three years has been Tirana's implacable hostility toward Moscow—a posture which has been maintained in spite of many Soviet attempts, direct and indirect, to resume trade and diplomatic relations with Albania. Far from accepting Moscow's overtures, Tirana has in recent years energetically pressed its efforts to promote anti-Soviet factionalism among the countries of Eastern Europe and the pro-Soviet Communist parties of Western Europe. In a major speech at Tirana in September 1970, Enver Hozha rejected Soviet appeals for a cessation of polemics and apparently closed the door irrevocably to Moscow's bid for a restoration of Soviet-Albanian ties. "Not being able to bite our hand," Hoxha said, "the Soviet revisionist traitors now want to kiss it." Reminding the Kremlin leaders of the Soviet party's "great political, ideological and economic debts to Albania" in the past, he described the Albania people as "the sworn enemies" of the present CPSU leadership.[33]

Hoxha clearly has a personal stake in perpetuating the Albanian-Soviet quarrel. For a decade now, he has developed and defended a totally uncompromising position toward Moscow, the "center of modern revisionism." He has insisted that the struggle between Marxist-Leninists and modern revisionists (*i.e.,* Moscow and its supporters) is a struggle to the death and that the revisionists are doomed by history to go down to defeat. For him to change course now and enter into relations with the Soviet Union would be an admission of error of such magnitude as to call into question the validity and integrity of the Albanian party's militant ideology and history. Even the powerful and politically adroit Hoxha might not be able to survive such a switch. It would therefore appear that as long as Hoxha remains in power, there is practically no chance for an improvement in Albania's relations with the USSR, barring truly drastic changes in Soviet policies.

Tirana-Peking Relations

It should come as no surprise that the Albanians have meanwhile continued to rely quite heavily on their ties with Peking and have hewed quite closely to the Chinese line on world issues and ideological matters. The Albanian Communists have ardently defended violent revolution as the only feasible road to the triumph of Marxism-Leninism throughout the world and warmly welcomed Mao Tse-tung's statement of May 20, 1970, that "revolution is the main trend in the world today." [34] During this period, the Albanians also hailed the Chinese Communist Party's Ninth Congress, held in April 1969, as "a historic event," praised Mao as "a distinguished Marxist-Leninist," reacted with great indignation to the Sino-Soviet border clashes (placing the blame entirely on Moscow), made strong pleas for China's admission to the United Nations, and strongly endorsed Chinese verbal attacks on the Soviet Union, particularly in connection with the signing of the Moscow-Bonn treaty, the fall of Gomulka, and the observance of the centennials of Lenin's birth (April 1970) and the Paris Commune (March 1971).[35] Tirana's contacts with Peking and exchanges of delegations at all levels have continued unabated, as have trade relations and scientific, technical and cultural cooperation between the two countries.

A new element, however, seems to have been introduced into Sino-Albanian relations as a consequence of China's moves toward limited detente with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the West. These Chinese initiatives mark a significant departure from Peking's long-time international posture and run counter to Tirana's own persistent militant stance vis-à-vis revisionists within the Communist world and the imperialists without. As a result, recent Albanian policy appears to have diverged from the Peking line either explicitly or implicitly (by Tirana's studied silence on Peking policy which meets with its disapproval).

This is evidenced in Albanian reactions to recent Sino-Soviet dealings. After Soviet Premier Kosygin met with Chou En-lai on September 11, 1969, to arrange for talks on the border dispute between the two countries, the Chinese toned down their attacks on Moscow and the CPSU leadership. The Albanians, however, have kept up a furious barrage of attacks on the USSR and its leaders—now referred to as "the new Tsars." Although a brief *Zeri i popullit* dispatch announced the opening of Sino-Soviet border talks in Peking on October 20, 1969, Tirana has neither reported nor commented on the subsequent progress of these negotiations. The Albanians

[33] *Zeri i popullit,* Sept. 19, 1970.

[34] *Peking Review,* May 23, 1970, pp. 8-9.

[35] *Zeri i popullit* has reprinted major Chinese statements on political developments and Communist anniversaries, including Lenin's centenary (on April 2, 1970), the fall of Gomulka (Dec. 24, 1970), and the Paris Commune centenary (March 20, 1971).

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likewise remained silent when a new Sino-Soviet trade agreement was signed in November 1970. Earlier in the year, Tirana made no mention of China's resumption of diplomatic relations with East European countries. This reticence was most graphically demonstrated by the Albanians' failure, in September 1970, to report the appointment of V. S. Tolstikov as the new Soviet Ambassador to China.

The Albanians have also reported—but again only briefly and without comment—the recent moves toward an improvement of Chinese-American relations. The Albanian press did note the visit of the US ping-pong team to Peking last April[36] and the more dramatic development in July when Chou En-lai invited President Nixon to visit China, but Tirana did not lose this opportunity to attack "US imperialism" as the principal "enemy of the peoples of the world" and the main danger to world peace.[37]

Peking's diplomatic activities since 1969 in relation to Moscow and Washington are, at the very least, an embarrassment to the Albanian leadership, inasmuch as they suggest that the Chinese leaders are willing to achieve a measure of accommodation with the two superpowers and to embrace, to a certain degree, the heretical doctrine of peaceful coexistence with the two archenemies of Marxism-Leninism and revolution. These steps by the People's Republic of China go far to explain Tirana's rather ambivalent and uncertain attitude toward Peking over the past two years.

But apart from such ideological considerations, China's reactivization and expansion of trade and diplomatic relations with the outside world cannot fail to concern the Albanian leadership on more practical grounds and to cause them to ponder the future of the Sino-Albanian alliance. Politically, China's recruitment of new friends and allies could mean that Peking will have less need of Albania's political and ideological support in the future. Paradoxically, China's admission to the United Nations last October—a development in which Albania played a conspicuous role—may, by enhancing Peking's general world prestige, reduce the PRC's need of Tirana. Also, as Peking emerges from its international isolation, it may seek to apply its limited economic and technical-assistance resources to cultivating new allies in the Third World. This in turn might force China to reduce its economic aid to Albania. Presumably, the contemplation of these contingencies has induced the Albanians to broaden economic and political contacts with its immediate neighbors and with Western Europe—as the only acceptable and feasible alternative under existing conditions.

Rediscovering Neighbors

A major element in Tirana's foreign policy reorientation has been the reversal of attitude toward Belgrade. This was signaled as early as August 27, 1968, when *Zeri i popullit* printed a short item on Belgrade's indignant reaction to the Czechoslovak invasion, thus aligning Tirana with its neighbor on a major international issue. In April 1969, Albania explicitly pledged its assistance to Belgrade in case of a Soviet attack on Yugoslavia.[38] In May 1970, Enver Hoxha took a more radical step by unequivocally proposing an improvement in Albanian-Yugoslav relations.[39] This informal proposal met with a warm response in Belgrade and was also prominently featured by the Chinese media, an indication that the PRC favored a normalization of relations between Tirana and Belgrade. China, herself, normalized relations with Tito's Yugoslavia in August 1970. This was, of course, a somewhat simpler matter for China, since the only issues at stake between Belgrade and Peking had been ideological ones. For Albania, long-standing issues of national independence were involved. Nevertheless, momentum toward a reconciliation increased, and on February 5, 1971, Belgrade and Tirana announced establishment of full diplomatic relations between Albania and Yugoslavia.[40]

In a brief two and a half years from the Czechoslovak invasion, Albanian policy toward Yugoslavia had changed from one of bitter, uncompromising hostility to one of friendship, neighborly cooperation, and tacit military alliance. What factors brought this about? Doubtless the major factor was Tirana's fear of Soviet aggression, a fear made all the more real by China's apparent backing down in the face of Soviet military pressure during the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes. It is indeed ironic that Brezhnev and Kosygin may unwittingly have succeeded where Khrushchev had failed—namely, to effect an

[36] *Ibid.*, April 15, 1971.

[37] *Ibid.*, July 18, 1971. The dispatch noted interestingly that Nixon's forthcoming visit was aimed at "the normalization of relations" between the United States and China.

[38] *Ibid.*, April 11, 1969.

[39] *Ibid.*, May 31, 1970.

[40] Vlado Teslic commentary in *Borba* (Belgrade), Feb. 6, 1971, and *Zeri i popullit* item of Feb. 6, 1971.

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PEACE IN THE BALKANS

The Albanian People's Republic desires that relations between our country and neighboring countries develop also in the future in a positive direction and in spheres of common interest, in the struggle against the interference and schemes of the big imperialist powers. . . . The Balkan peoples are fully in a position to decide by themselves and with sovereignty on everything concerning their mutual relations. The Balkans have never been a "powder keg" on their own account. They were so in the past through the fault of foreigners, the imperialists, who held all the detonators. The imperialists want this to be so again today. It is the duty of the Balkan peoples to cut all detonator pins with a sword so that peace and security be restored in the Balkans.

—From Enver Hoxha's speech to the 6th APL Congress, *Zeri i popullit*, Nov. 2, 1971.

Albanian-Yugoslav rapprochement as the first step in making the Balkans a zone of peace.[41]

Other factors bearing on Tirana's new policy toward Yugoslavia include a steady increase in trade between the two countries and visible improvement in the situation of the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia. In addition to being a contributing factor to Albanian-Yugoslav relations, the Yugoslav province of Kosovo has also been a barometer of these relations. As economic and political conditions in the province were improved after rioting by the Albanians there in 1968, the province has come to serve as a bridge between the countries rather than a source of tension. Thus, when Hoxha admitted in May 1970 that the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia had made steady gains toward winning equality and full national rights, he was both commenting on the true state of affairs and emitting a strong political signal to Belgrade.

In addition to viewing Yugoslavia as an important buffer state between Albania and Moscow, and therefore as crucial to national security, Tirana also has discovered considerable parallels between Albanian and Yugoslav policy on other international matters. Thus, both states oppose the existence of power blocs in Europe and have called for dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Again, both capitals have attacked the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, as well as any attempts by the major world powers to achieve hegemony over lesser states.

While improving its relations with Belgrade, Tirana has not neglected its other Balkan neighbors —Bulgaria and Greece. Although the Albanians continue to be critical of Sofia's close ties with Moscow, Albanian-Bulgarian relations have improved considerably from the situation in July 1968, when years of tension between the two countries culminated in Bulgaria's demand for the recall of the Albanian ambassador because of his "hostile activity" toward Bulgaria, to which Albania responded by demanding the recall of the Bulgarian representative in Tirana.[42] The way toward reconciliation was paved in November 1969, when Radio Sofia noted that the Bulgarian Government was "ready for full normalization" of relations with Tirana.[43] A year later, relations were normalized at the *chargé d'affaires* level.[44] A *Rabotnichesko delo* editorial on November 28, 1970 —the 26th anniversary of Albania's liberation— expressed Bulgaria's sympathy for Albania's struggles and successes in "building socialism" and establishing "good-neighborly relations in the Balkans." In May 1971, a five-year protocol covering "trade and payment procedures" in 1971-1975 was signed by the two countries.[45]

So far we have been examining Albania's relationships with Communist states. But the more significant aspect of current Albanian policy is its new westward orientation. Most dramatic is the improvement in Albania's relations with her traditional enemy, Greece—a NATO member whose government the Albanian leadership for years had attacked as a "fascist military clique." For her part, Greece considered herself to be technically at war with Albania since World War II days and persisted in her territorial claim on "Northern Epirus," *i.e.*, the southern portion of Albania.

However, in January 1970, with the signing in Paris of a trade agreement between the Albanian Chamber of Commerce and its Greek counterpart, the groundwork was laid for an improvement in

[41] On May 25, 1959, Khrushchev proposed to the governments of the Balkan nations "the creation in the Balkans and in the Adriatic region of a nuclear-weapons-free and missile-free zone." Tirana claims in this regard that Bulgaria, without consulting Albania, had notified Greece that the people's democracies in the Balkans agreed to disarm, provided Greece disarmed also. Albania rejected the Bulgarian initiative, because it excluded Italy, which—the Albanians feared—was capable of aggression against Albania. See *Rruga e partise*, August 1970, p. 11.

[42] *Zeri i popullit*, July 24, 1968.

[43] Michael Costello, "Bulgarian Moderation Toward Yugoslavia and Albania," *Radio Free Europe Research* (Bulgaria), Dec. 8, 1969.

[44] Broadcast by Radio Zagreb domestic service in Serbo-Croatian, Nov. 14, 1970.

[45] *Albania Report* (New York), May 1971, p. 4.

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Greek-Albanian relations.[46] Further progress was made in May-June 1970, when Tirana sent a trade mission—the first delegation of any kind in 30 years—to Athens to conclude a $1.8 million accord with Greece. This significant gesture prompted a Greek Foreign Ministry spokesman to suggest that the accord could open the way to "eventual diplomatic relations," [47] a conjecture which became a reality on May 6, 1971, when Albania and Greece agreed to resume full diplomatic relations.[48]

A major by-product of the accord appears to be renunciation by Greece of her territorial claim on "Northern Epirus." [49] For its part, the Hoxha leadership was anxious to strengthen Albania's southern flank against the possibility of a Soviet attack from the Mediterranean. The accord was also symptomatic of Tirana's broadening interest in contact with the West and in becoming more active in the European community of nations.

An "Opening to the West"

Examination of Albania's stance toward the West over the past two years reveals a certain contradiction between words and actions. While Tirana has continued its rhetorical attacks on Western imperialism, it has been making a genuine, concerted effort to expand ties with Western countries. The result is that, for the first time in 25 years, Albania has established an "opening to the West." One of the most important facets of this new posture toward the West is a growing interest in trade, manifested by Albania's unprecedented participation in international trade fairs held in Western countries. During 1970 alone, Albania took part in fairs held in France, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, and Great Britain, and the Albanian press noted with interest the presence of Western government officials and trade representatives at the Albanian pavilions.[50]

Related to trade is a new encouragement of foreign tourism in Albania. The country has liberalized its tourism policies and permitted a growing number of tourists from Western Europe and the United States to visit Albania. In addition to the Italian airline Alitalia, which had been Tirana's sole air link with the West, a Pakistan airline now connects the Albanian capital with both London and Paris.[51] Albania has also increased diplomatic activity in the West and presently has representatives in France, Italy, Austria, Turkey, Greece, Switzerland, Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland.

The developing relations with the West in the areas mentioned above, as well as in the fields of athletics, academic contacts, and cultural exchange, will doubtless expose Albanian politics and society to liberalizing influences and may move Albania closer to the West. This does not mean that Tirana has abandoned, or is about to abandon, the basic features of its foreign policy. Maintenance of sovereignty and independence, rapid economic development, the building of socialism at home, and the advancement of the proletarian revolution abroad—these have been, and apparently remain, Albania's basic goals.

However, these goals are now being pursued in a new and wider political framework. Aware of her isolated ideological and geographic position, Albania apparently has judged it both prudent and necessary to broaden her diplomatic and political base, in order to better meet the perceived Soviet threat to her national security. It is reasonable to expect that Tirana will continue to stress the primacy of its ties with Peking, while seeking to expand its relations with other countries. But in this new setting, Tirana's relationship with Peking will no longer be Albania's only major link with the outside world, as was the case during most of the 1960's. After facing eastward in one way or another for the past quarter of a century, Albania—like the double-headed eagle of its national flag—is beginning to look in two directions, East *and* West. It should be interesting to observe the impact of Tirana's new stance on the domestic scene in Albania, as well as on the nature and strength of the Sino-Albanian alliance.

[46] *Zeri i popullit*, Jan. 24, 1970; "A Commercial Agreement of Mutual Benefit to the Albanian and Greek Peoples," *Bashkimi*, Feb. 17, 1970. The *Bashkimi* article rather self-consciously and apologetically said that the agreement did not mean that Albania would veer away from its socialist path.

[47] *The New York Times*, June 3, 1970.

[48] *Zeri i popullit*, May 7, 1971.

[49] *The New York Times*, Nov. 14, 1971. A November 13 dispatch from Athens quoted Christian Zanthopoulos-Palamas, Greek Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, as saying that Greece "does not conspire against Albanian territory." Diplomatic observers in Athens inferred from this that Greece has dropped its old claim to "Northern Epirus."

[50] See in this connection the June 1971 issue of *Albanian Foreign Trade* (monthly publication of the Albanian Chamber of Commerce), which quotes extensively the views of French, Austrian and Swiss business executives concerning the merits of Albanian export goods.

[51] *Zeri i popullit*, Oct. 29, 1970.

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Corruption in the Soviet System

By Steven J. Staats

Corruption is present in varying degrees and forms in all but the most primitive societies. Certainly, the Soviet Union has not been immune. The national, regional and local press of the USSR contains myriad accounts of bribery, falsification of reports, party-state complicity in concealing corruption, misuse of public office and state funds, and patronage and nepotism in personnel appointments. The persistence with which the various forms of corruption have appeared as objects of criticism throughout the postwar period attests to the deep roots of this phenomenon in the Soviet political soil.

It is surprising that this enduring aspect of Soviet society has been subjected to so little scholarly examination—that its incidence, scale, and functions have not been rigorously investigated by Western scholars.[1] A primary obstacle to such examination is the fragmentary and indirect nature of the evidence provided by the official Soviet newspapers, magazines, and specialized journals. In the first place, most public accounts of corruption deal with misdeeds at regional or local levels and studiously avoid mention of wrongdoing at higher echelons—a result of the near-absolute power of high bureaucratic officials and their ability to suppress criticism of themselves in the Soviet Union's controlled press. Furthermore, sporadic campaigns of corruption-reporting may be consciously-designed efforts by the party leadership to discredit minority groups (*e.g.,* the Jews)[2] or political opponents, or else to single out a particularly undesirable or harmful form of corruption and to impress local officials with the necessity of combating it.[3] Thus, we encounter what might be termed the "corruption" of Soviet corruption-reporting. For this reason, it is obviously impossible to arrive at comprehensive statistics concerning the incidence of given types of corrupt practices or their scale (*i.e.,* the amounts of money involved).

Despite the inadequacies of the source materials and the selectivity of Soviet exposés of corruption, a systematic analysis of the available evidence—taking into account the acknowledged shortcomings of this material—can nevertheless shed considerable light on the nature and functions of corruption in the Soviet Union, as well as on the administrative and political system which breeds it. At the outset, however, we must devise a suitable definition of corruption—which is itself a risky matter, for the

[1] There are some exceptions: e.g., Leonard Schapiro notes that 9 percent of the 140,000 Communist Party members purged in 1921-22 were ousted for engaging in bribery, extortion, and other such corrupt acts (*The Communist Party of the Soviet Union,* rev. and enl. ed., New York, Random House, 1971, p. 236), and Sir John Maynard wrote of the succeeding NEP period as a "saturnalia of corruption, . . . with Soviet authorities horrified at the corruption which they found among the heads of state trusts and party members" (*The Russian Peasant,* New York, Collier, 1962, p. 194).

[2] For example, I. Leibler notes that 55 to 60 percent of all those shot for bribery, embezzlement, and speculation under 1961 Soviet legislation were Jews, with the figure running as high as 90 percent in the Ukraine. *Soviet Jewry and Human Rights,* Melbourne, Ramsay Ware Publishing, Ltd., 1965, pp. 30-35.

[3] For a discussion of how the CPSU Central Committee selects and controls what is to be published, see Alfred G. Meyer, *The Soviet Political System,* New York, Random House, 1965, pp. 343-44.

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definition can easily become so all-encompassing as to lose its capacity to serve as a principle of differentiation. Samuel P. Huntington perhaps comes closest to a workable definition of corruption for our purposes:

Corruption is behavior of public officials which deviates from accepted norms in order to serve private ends.[4]

Such a definition does, of course, introduce a relativistic note,[5] for corruption thus depends as much on the existence of a rule or norm as on the occurrence of a deviant act, and the rules and norms may change over time. The value of a concept such as "deviation" for defining corruption is that it emphasizes the fact that corruption need not be a property *inherent* in certain forms of behavior, but rather that it is a property *conferred upon* such behavior by the audiences which indirectly or directly witness them and reprove them by laws, regulations, and decrees.

Thus, for an act to fit our definition of corruption in the Soviet context, it must, first, violate some stipulation of the legal, political, or administrative codes of the USSR. The violation may be either active or passive (as in a failure to act when a certain act or procedure is required). The second distinguishing characteristic is that the act must be committed in relative secrecy, an indication that the perpetrator(s) recognize that the act is objectionable in the eyes of Soviet society. Third, there must be a transaction of some kind whereby inducement is involved. The inducement may be positive, as in the case of bribery or drawing upon bonds of friendship or kinship in order to influence decisions of government, or it may be negative, as in a threat to withdraw a benefit or impose a penalty. Beyond a certain point, negative inducement clearly ceases to be corruption and becomes coercion.

So much for a definition of corruption. More important is the question of why corruption exists in the Soviet Union, of the functions it performs in Soviet society and politics. Students of corruption have suggested that it is intimately related to a society undergoing social change. They argue that corruption is particularly prevalent in a society that is in transition from traditional, ascriptive, particularistic, and diffuse patterns of organization to more modern, achievement-oriented, universalistic, and specific patterns.[6] While, as we shall see below, it is true that certain types of corruption in the Soviet Union owe their existence to such a transitional situation in the more backward areas of the country, this hardly explains the persistence of corruption throughout what is basically a modern bureaucratic state.

The Soviet state bureaucracy, like most modern bureaucracies, is marked by both limited scope (the range of matters it can affect) and limited weight (the degree to which it can participate in rule-making). This would also seem to indicate that Soviet conditions are not favorable for corruption, since corruption, as F. W. Riggs has suggested,[7] is more likely where bureaucracies engage in a wide scope of activities and are relatively unlimited by the central political authorities. The Soviet state bureaucracy is limited because each department tends to be functionally specific and responsible for the implementation of a narrow range of policies. And although the bureaucracy as a whole plays a significant role in rule-making through *rule-application,* its weight is severely limited by the tight political control and interpenetration of its structure by the Soviet Communist Party. Such a fusion of party and state authority—with the intensive system of cross-checks and monitoring that it entails—might normally be expected to discourage, if not preclude, administrative corruption.

The Functionality of Corruption

What then explains the prevalence of bureaucratic and political corruption in the USSR? In examining the problem, the author has erected several theoretical models to explain the ubiquity and importance of various forms of corruption and to demonstrate that

[4] *Political Order in Changing Societies,* New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968, p. 59.

[5] Although one might desire a definition permitting comparative analysis of corruption in diverse societies, there is also the danger of introducing Western or non-Marxist biases. For example, it is doubtful whether the expediting activity of industrial managers considered corrupt by USSR legal standards would be considered corrupt in the West.

[6] Representative examples of this approach may be found in Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simpkins, *Corruption in Developing Countries,* London, G. Allen and Unwin, 1963; W. F. Wertheim, *East-West Parallels: Sociological Approaches to Modern Asia,* Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1965, pp. 103-31; and Huntington, *op. cit.,* pp. 59-71. The model of transitional society is drawn from Max Black, Ed., *The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons,* Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1961, p. 350.

[7] *Administration in Developing Countries,* Boston, Houghton and Mifflin, 1964, pp. 226-27 and 246-47.

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corruption—in addition to serving private ends—performs certain necessary functions in terms of the Soviet political system as a whole.[8] By examining the functionality of corruption, one may discover that the phenomenon is, in fact, an important feature of the system rather than an aberration.

The first hypothesis to be tested is that corruption may be a method of adjusting a poorly-articulated administrative structure. As Soviet spokesmen openly admit, many areas of administration still suffer from chronic inefficiency, poor staffing and organization, and lack of coordination among agencies that are interdependent. A particularly persistent problem is the inability of the bureaucracy to deliver industrial raw material supplies on time and in the required quantities and quality. As a representative of one knitting enterprise recently complained,

. . . Year in and year out the association is allotted only enough yarn for its production program, and we have no chance to build stable inventories. Hence the downtime of knitting machinery. Because of interruptions in raw material deliveries, it is frequently necessary to have materials delivered by airplane.[9]

Faced with the imperatives of surmounting such problems in order to fulfill production targets, managers resort to *blat* or the intermediation of the *tolkach.*

The Soviet expression *blat* refers to the use of personal influence to obtain favors to which a certain department, enterprise, or official is not legally or formally entitled. It can refer to such actions as procuring materials in contravention of the provisions of the state plan, or persuading ministry officials to relieve one's own firm of a difficult production task. The influence exerted may be based on friendship, but there is often an implication of a reciprocation of favors *quid pro quo.* The institution of the *tolkach* (or expediter) is also resorted to when the manager chooses to operate indirectly in achieving his ends. One Soviet commentator, A. Frolov, observed in *Pravda* of January 21, 1971, that the *tolkach* remains very much a part of contemporary Soviet society, a fact which, he patently admits, "is attributable to violation of production cooperation plans by enterprises and supply agencies, to frequent changes by ministries in enterprise plans, to lateness in supplying technical documentation, and to carelessness and substandard work. . . ." Yet, as interviews with Soviet émigrés reveal, such widespread informal mechanisms are not sanctioned by the rules or ideology of the system[10]—*i.e.,* they are corrupt.

What one discovers is that in certain circumstances, corruption on a limited scale may make an important contribution to organizational efficiency and goal-fulfillment. The motivation to perform corrupt acts in such instances may stem from identification with and concern for the interests and goals of the larger organization. In a word, such corruption may be functional in terms of the standards of performance set down by central agencies. Significantly, a study of the reasons for the continuance of *blat*

[8] One must avoid the extreme of ascribing only positive functions to corruption and failing to trace undesirable side effects. This shortcoming is present with some representatives of the structural-functional school of sociology; see for example Jose Veloso Abueva's "The Contribution of Nepotism, Spoils and Graft to Political Development," in *East-West Center Review* (Honolulu), No. 3, 1966, pp. 45-54.

[9] *Pravda* (Moscow), Dec. 16, 1969. For other accounts of bureaucratic bottlenecks see *ibid.,* Oct. 23, 1969, Jan. 9 and March 6, 1970, and *Izvestia* (Moscow), Oct. 29, 1969, and Dec. 5, 1970.

[10] See John A. Armstrong, "Sources of Administrative Behavior: Some Soviet and Western European Comparisons," *American Political Science Review* (Menasha, Wisconsin), September 1965, p. 655, fn. 10.

EXPEDITIOUS MEASURES

Before me sits a typical "expediter" (*tolkach*) who wishes to remain unnamed. The "expediter" works for a bus factory. In the first quarter of last year alone, he was on official travel more than two months. [He asks:] "Are my enterprise and I really to blame for these travels? Do you think it is enjoyable to go knocking on doors with a briefcase full of letters and orders and to have to beg and plead for supplies and equipment? But everything has to be done to avoid paralysis of the enterprise's work. . . ."

We read in a document of the USSR People's Control Committee: "Travel expenses related to supply matters accounted for more than 70 percent of all money spent on official travel by the four furniture factories of the Omsk Lumber (Omskles) Trust."

The increase in travel of so-called "expediters" is attributable to the fact that while factory supply personnel are [held] fully responsible for securing the necessary materials for their enterprises, the various subdivisions of the USSR State Supply Committee—the territorial administrations, depots, and other supply installations—are not [held] responsible for supplying plants and factories with supplies, raw materials, and parts.

—A. Frolov, in *Izvestia*, Jan. 21, 1971.

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and bribery in the Soviet system carried out by researchers of the Soviet prosecutor's office in 1961 arrived at essentially the same conclusion.[11]

This is not to suggest that corruption of the above order does not create its own problems. Failure of an organization to honor a delivery contract (because the item was sent elsewhere as a result of some corrupt arrangement) may, for example, disrupt another organized economic or administrative activity. In other words, because of their particularistic nature, there is no guarantee that such corrupt relationships will produce a final result conforming to true or stated national interests or priorities. Consequently, the regime officially proscribes such behavior, presumably winking at it when favored activities benefit and prosecuting it when the overall effects prove harmful.[12]

This first model of corruption stresses relationships *within* the administrative bureaucracy. A second model concentrates more on the role of corruption in mediating between the interests of the Soviet citizen as a private consumer of goods and services and the administrative bureaucracy which is the ultimate purveyor of these goods and services. Because of the rigidities of the Soviet command economy, there is a continual imbalance between supply and demand. To the extent that corruption works to equilibrate these two forces—*i.e.*, to introduce market (albeit, black-market) attributes into the command system—it can be seen to be functional.

Thus, black markets have thrived in numerous fields—the private manufacture of consumer goods in short supply, currency speculation, sale of grain and other primary food commodities that have been diverted from state supplies by illegal means or grown by persons spending excessive time in cultivating private plots, and the construction of private houses or dachas. *Izvestia* of August 21, 1968, devoted a whole section to discussion of speculation and profiteering on "deficit" goods smuggled out of factories and warehouses for sale on the black market.[13]

There is also what has been termed "black-market bureaucracy,"[14] a form of corruption resulting from the fact that the Soviet government is equally unable to satisfy popular demand for services. That is, prices on government services often are set according to supply and demand (through the mechanism of bribes) rather than remaining fixed impartially for all comers, as would be the case in an ideal bureaucratic system. Thus, a construction official in Pskov was found guilty of accepting a 200-ruble bribe (approximately 222 dollars) in order to assign company housing space to an individual out of turn.[15] In his time, Khrushchev attacked the prevalence of such corruption:

Bribes are given for selling off state resources, for granting permits for apartments, for allotting plots of land, for granting pensions, for admission to higher educational establishments, and even for the awarding of diplomas. . . . This disease, this bribery, has infected some of the central departments and institutions, including many leading officials with a party card in their pocket.[16]

Bribe-taking continues to concern Soviet leadership, as evidenced by Brezhnev's comments at the 24th CPSU Congress last year.[17]

In its "ideal" form, black-market corruption is universalistic and impersonal—the goods or services go to the highest bidder. More frequently, however, the model is impure: the bureaucrat performs illegal favors for relatives, members of his ethnic group, or close friends (nonetheless extracting from them what he can in cash, goods, or services). The particular type of black-market corruption which predominates varies widely from area to area in the Soviet Union. The first is more likely to occur in modern urban, industrialized areas, whereas personal links presumably prevail in the many rural and minority areas where traditional norms persist.[18] While the latter

[11] *Sotsialisticheskaia zakonnost* (Moscow), August 1961.

[12] Decrees of May 1961 and February 1962 established the death penalty for repeated or serious bribery, embezzlement, black-market operations, pilfering, etc. The decrees did fail to single out illegal procurement activities by enterprises for such punishment, and a content analysis of the Soviet press since then has failed to turn up any executions for this particular sort of activity. For texts of the decrees see *Izvestia*, May 7, 1961, and *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR* (Moscow), Feb. 21, 1962, pp. 221-22.

[13] For details on the various Soviet black markets see *Message from Moscow*, London, Jonathon Cape Ltd., 1969, pp. 151-62.

[14] The author has adopted, with significant alterations, this theoretical framework from R.O. Tilman, "Emergence of Black-Market Bureaucracy: Administration, Development, and Corruption in the New States," *Public Administration Review* (Washington, DC), September-October 1968, pp. 440-42.

[15] *Pravda*, Aug. 13, 1969.

[16] *Ibid.*, Nov. 20, 1962.

[17] The General Secretary called for continued struggle against such vestiges of the past as "money-grubbing, bribe-taking, parasitism, slander, anonymous letters, drunkenness, etc." *Ibid.*, March 30, 1971.

[18] T. W. Shinn provides a detailed exposition of the persistence of traditional norms in outlying regions of the USSR in "The Law of the Russian Peasant Household," *Slavic Review* (New York), October 1961, pp. 80-85.

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cases support the contention that corruption is closely identified with transitional societies, the former type is very much part of the Soviet Union's version of a modern bureaucratic state. Whenever the centralized allocative mechanism breaks down in the face of serious disequilibrium between supply and demand —regardless of whether one is talking about baby carriages or apartment permits—corruption is likely to result, introducing market features in the command economy.

Having examined two models which demonstrate the functions that corruption performs in the Soviet system, we can turn to a brief analysis of who it is that participates in corrupt practices. There is little information to suggest what there may be in the Soviet cultural learning process that conditions a person to accept illegal inducements in order to perform illegal acts. However, it is possible to detect certain groups in the Soviet Union that tend more than others to become involved in corruption. The first such group, though not necessarily the most important, consists of the natives of Central Asia and other relatively backward areas of the Soviet Union. Here, the loyalties of citizens are fragmented, centering more on family, caste, ethnic, and religious ties, or even a shared local dialect, rather than on allegiance to broader communities. In many respects, corruption in such areas is indeed linked to the transition of the given area to a more modern social structure. A report from the December 1969 plenary session of the Central Committee of the Azerbaidzhan Communist Party typifies this situation:

Many instances of unscrupulousness in the selection and promotion of cadres were discovered in Kirovabad; this has led to large-scale embezzlement and theft. There is speculation in private homes and automobiles in the city; individual homes are being constructed by people who cannot afford them, and large plots of land were illegally taken from the state. Taking advantage of his official position [as First Secretary of the Kirovabad City Party Committee], *Comrade Alizade promoted his relatives and close friends to responsible posts, though they were not entitled to such posts by personal, professional, or political qualifications.*[19]

The most common participant in corrupt activities is the administrator or bureaucrat who is in a position to expedite a shipment or shunt goods and services off to the private consumer who is willing to pay the black-market price. As has been demonstrated above, such aspects of the Soviet system as poorly articulated bureaucratic channels and tautness in the supply of goods and services combine to encourage bureaucrats to accept bribes in return for performing illegal acts. Furthermore, the command economy places heavy pressures on managers and bureaucrats to fulfill plans. When a bonus, job tenure, or promotion is riding on successful fulfillment of a production assignment, a manager may well resort either to false reporting or to *blat*.

Party Involvement

A striking feature of most of the cases of Soviet corruption open to our scrutiny is that they involve members of the Communist Party. As noted above, most cases involve corruption in lower party echelons, although according to Soviet testimony, the phenomenon does reach into the highest party and government circles.[20] The fact that corruption persists within the very institution which is supposed to monitor and control all aspects of Soviet life suggests the existence of a common interest impelling party members as well as other social groups to collude in the perpetration and/or concealment of corrupt acts.

We are dealing here with what is referred to in the USSR as *krugovaia poruka* (mutual guarantee)—*i.e.*, the rendering of mutual aid among members of a group who feel a sense of solidarity, mutual responsibility and dependence, particularly when the aid occurs outside of or in direct violation of the formal rules of the organization.[21] For *blat*, bribery, misappropriation, and other forms of corruption to be successful, there must be the active assistance or ac-

[19] "Communique on the Plenary Session of the Azerbaidzhan Communist Party Central Committee," *Bakinskii rabochii* (Baku), March 2, 1970.

[20] See Khruschev's comment in this regard (p. 43 above). G. M. Malenkov in his *Report to the 19th Party Congress*, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952, p. 124, castigated many high-level officials for corrupt practices. More recently, Oleg Penkovsky observed: ". . . The sons, daughters, sons-in-law of all our important party and government officials finish higher educational institutions and get good jobs . . . everything is done by pull, through friends and family connections. The newspapers scream that nepotism must be stamped out, but what happens? They punish some factory director for giving a job to his niece. But we must look higher and see what is happening at the top." *The Penkovsky Papers*, London, Fontana Books, 1967, pp. 211-12.

[21] The pioneering work in the study of *krugovaia poruka* was performed by J. S. Berliner in *Factory and Manager in the USSR*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1957, pp. 320-29.

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quiescence of others in its execution and in the evasion of detection or punishment. Motivation for such behavior is likely to exist when a number of persons depend upon one another in important ways, such as in the proper completion of their respective tasks in the society's division of labor; when, at a given time, several of them have burdens that could be lightened or problems that could be solved by violating the rules; or when it is possible that, sooner or later, any of the persons involved might find himself faced with similar burdens. *Krugovaia poruka* implies reciprocity, but not necessarily on a *quid pro quo* basis.

Krugovaia poruka comes to embrace those very individuals whose duty it is to prevent and expose collusion and corruption. By the very nature of their job, the controllers are thrown into close contact and interaction with those whom they are assigned to supervise, and in the process the controllers often become dependent upon the controlled. Such collusion may result in *semeistvennost—i.e.,* the establishment between government agencies of strong and viable protective alliances that cut across the lines of command and supervision meticulously constructed by the CPSU to exercise control over the state structure. Here, the close relationship between party and state, designed to ensure compliance with central party directives, may actually work to impede compliance by making it difficult to properly assign credit or culpability in a given sphere of activity.

The Soviet party has consistently attempted to prevent corruption and collusion among party and government officials by maintaining close control over key personnel appointment through the *nomenklatura* system. The Soviets define *nomènklatura* as "a list, whose incumbents are approved by a higher party, governmental, or professional organization."[22] However, the evidence of collusion and "mutual protection societies" refutes such judgments of Soviet institutions as ". . . the scope for local officials to manipulate party membership policies for their own purposes is likely to be narrow." [23] Once the power to appoint key local officials has been diverted to promote private ends, the *nomenklatura* system can actually operate to protect corrupt officials. No criminal proceedings can be initiated against an official without the consent of the party organs to whose *nomenklatura* list he belongs.[24] An incident reported in *Pravda* of January 28, 1970, is revealing in this regard. A collective farm chairman in Orenburg Province was relieved of his duties by the party for embezzlement, nepotism, and corruption. Instead of facing legal prosecution for his misdeeds, the faithful comrade next turned up as manager of the district government's communal enterprises—in other words, he was promoted. There are numerous complaints in the Soviet press that local party bodies not only fail to discipline malfeasants in their ranks

BATTLING BRIBERY

In a special decree of February 20, 1962, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet increased the criminal responsibility for bribery. The decree specifies as aggravating circumstances the acceptance of bribes by officials in responsible positions, repeated acceptance of bribes, or the use of extortion. In such cases, the guilty are subject to deprivation of freedom for terms of eight to 15 years and confiscation of personal property; under especially aggravating circumstances, the penalty is death. The responsibility for giving a bribe or acting as a go-between was also raised.

—From article by N. Zhogin, USSR Deputy Prosecutor General, *Izvestia* (Moscow), March 14, 1970.

A regular plenary session of the USSR Supreme Court was held a few days ago with A. F. Gorkin presiding. The plenary session heard reports by V. I. Maisuradze, Chairman of the Georgian Republic Supreme Court; B. A. Azan, Chairman of the Latvian Republic Supreme Court; and V. I. Terebilov, Vice-Chairman of the USSR Supreme Court, on the fulfillment of the July 31, 1962, resolution of the plenary session of the USSR Supreme Court "On Judicial Practice in Cases of Bribe-Taking." The plenary session noted that the above-mentioned crimes, as judicial practice corroborates, are *not widespread* in the country, *but nonetheless represent a major social danger* and require decisive measures to eradicate them. Meanwhile, available data indicate that although judicial bodies have conducted a certain amount of work in recent years in intensifying the fight against bribe-taking, in a number of places courts are not yet taking appropriate measures to mobilize every effort to liquidate this shameful vestige of the past.

—From an *Izvestia* report, July 10, 1970. (Emphasis added—Ed.)

[22] *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar v dvukh tomakh* (Two-Volume Encyclopedic Dictionary), Moscow, 1964, Vol. II, p. 107. L. G. Churchward has estimated that some 400,000 positions in the local government of the USSR and an additional 200,000 positions in central and republic governments are filled from the *nomenklatura* lists. "Bureaucracy in the USA-USSR," *Coexistence* (London), No. 5, 1968, pp. 205-06.

[23] T. H. Rigby, *Communist Party Membership in the USSR, 1917-67,* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1968, p. 62.

[24] Churchward, *op. cit.,* p. 205.

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AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION . . .

Caption: "Laying in a Supply." Commentary in upper right corner states: "The warehouses of many enterprises are overloaded with excessive inventories of raw and semifinished materials."

—From *Krokodil* (Moscow), No. 5, February 1969.

adequately,[25] but also suppress criticism and persecute those who attempt to disclose corrupt practices.[26] As a result, party members often ignore their solemn obligation to

develop criticism and self-criticism . . ., to come out against all actions which inflict damage on the party and the state, and to report them to party organs, up to and including the Central Committee of the CPSU.[27]

In saying this, one must not overestimate the extent of corruption or overlook other factors which might reduce collusion between party and other agencies. For instance, a party secretary who becomes too involved in the fortunes of a factory manager whom he was assigned to control clearly loses his usefulness in the eyes of his party superiors and will likely be removed if the relationship is discovered. And there is nothing to guarantee that the party will protect its appointees from government prosecution under the stringent anticorruption legislation enacted in May 1961 and February 1962.[28]

Corruption in Perspective

What general conclusions can one draw from this examination of corruption in Soviet society? First, it is clear that corruption, while not necessarily institutionalized, is an important systemic feature of contemporary Soviet life and not just a transient phenomenon. One might say that the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, overcentralized bureaucracy is one with a rigid, overcentralized, and *honest* bureaucracy. Our examination has demonstrated that in the Soviet case it is often as much for organizational ends as for personal gain that the Soviet administrator hoards materials, conceals resources, participates in the black market, and breaks countless other rules imposed on him.

While unlimited corruption can obviously be destructive of organizational goals, the current situation in the USSR displays none of the symptoms of those societies (described by Samuel P. Huntington [29]) in which corruption is most evident among national leaders, which suffer from a low level of political institutionalization, and which are therefore susceptible to violent overthrow. From the admittedly impressionistic picture afforded by Soviet evidence, it would seem that corruption is most frequently encountered at the lower levels of the CPSU and government apparatuses, and that the incidence of corruption does not increase the higher the rank of the officials examined.

One way of looking at the role of corruption in Soviet politics is from the perspective of interest articulation. As we have already noted, lower party and government officials often find considerable common interest in moderating output goals, procuring resources, and collaborating to insulate one another from the pressures exerted by their superiors. Interestingly enough, this provides evidence of strong interest articulation at the *output* or *imple-*

[25] *Pravda*, Jan. 2, 1970. See also *ibid.*, Aug. 11, 1969, and Jan. 11, 1970, and *Izvestia*, Nov. 1, 1969, and Nov. 11, 1970.

[26] See *Pravda* of Jan. 28, Feb. 8, May 22, Oct. 7, and Nov. 31, 1970.

[27] *XXII sezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskovo Soiuza: stenograficheskii otchiot* (22nd CPSU Congress: Stenographic Report), Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962, Vol. III, p. 338.

[28] See footnote 12.

[29] *Op. cit.*, p. 61.

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mentation stage of Soviet politics.[30] One might suggest that it is at this point, rather than at the input stage, that particular interests are most effective in amending concrete Soviet policies.

This insight, incidentally, introduces new perspectives on the autonomy and unity of party organizations and on the differentiation of the government and party hierarchies. Normally one might assume that the presence of corruption in a Soviet-type system would serve to differentiate the two hierarchies, *i.e.,* that corruption would be symptomatic of the government bureaucracy's efforts to escape from the controlling policies of the party. Instead, at least at the local level, corruption actually leads to consolidation and unity of the two hierarchies, albeit through patronage, nepotism, and incorrect selection of leading cadres. In well-organized protective alliances between local party and state officials, there may be an elaborate conspiracy to cut corners, break laws and regulations, defraud higher supervisory organizations, and engage in other illegal practices. This suggests a distinct conflict between *official* and *real* roles. It also illustrates the relative independence of many lower officials from control by higher echelons and refutes the oversimplified notion of Soviet bureaucratic politics as represented in the pure totalitarian model—in which an omnipotent elite issues commands which subordinate elements blindly execute.

The fact that party and government functionaries are intimately involved in Soviet corruption differentiates this phenomenon from the situation in certain Asian countries where corruption seems centered among groups that are denied access to formal political channels (*e.g.,* minority groups or foreign companies). The subjects examined in our study were not out-groups denied access to membership in the CPSU.

Some forms of corruption in the Soviet Union are linked to the social transformations taking place in a modernizing USSR. In outlying locales the various forms of corruption help to "humanize" social change and the harshness of elite-conceived plans for social and economic modernization. People caught in the throes of change may have more faith in a system that they can influence to some degree, through personal action, than one they do not know how to manipulate or are unable to manipulate. The human element provided through nepotism and kinship ties may thus be an important means of ensuring loyalty on the part of a tradition-bound people to new social structures. In Myron McMullan's words, a degree of low-level corruption can "soften relations of officials and people," [31] or as Edward Shils stated, it "humanizes government and makes it less awesome." [32]

Collusion, concealment, and cooperation in corrupt activities by certain party officials and state employees may even directly enhance their feeling of having a stake in the system and give them a vested interest in retaining its general form. Thus, the CPSU ceases to be a remote abstraction or oppressor; gradually, by action and deed rather than by propaganda, it becomes a helpful and tangible organization worthy of support. Involvement engenders a sense of belonging, and a sense of comradely solidarity based on friendship replaces the rigid and elaborate rules of personnel selection by the party.

Finally, even the periodic exposure of corruption scandals and the efforts to combat corruption may, in fact, serve to strengthen overall values, to follow Max Gluckman's argument.[33] Social norms usually emerge as an abstract synthesis of the repeatedly expressed sentiments of the community regarding a given type of behavior. Reiterated group censure of a given act of deviation sharpens the authority of the violated norms and defines more clearly the boundaries of acceptable behavior. There have been numerous antiparasite and anticorruption drives in the Soviet Union (apart from the normal operations of control agencies).[34] The masses have been mobilized into "people's control" organizations, people's militia squads, and "young Komsomol" groups to assist in combating black marketeering, currency speculation, and parasitism (living on private sources of income). Through such devices, the elite groups attempt to resuscitate citizen support for the norms of the regime and to suppress any deviant behavior.

From all this, it emerges that corruption is unlikely to be eradicated tomorrow in the Soviet Union, if only because of the important functions it continues to perform. It appears that corruption may be as integral to Soviet life as vodka and kasha.

[30] J. C. Scott suggested this process of group influence and described the groups most likely to benefit from it in developing Asian countries. "The Analysis of Corruption in Developing Nations," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* (London), June 1969.

[31] "A Theory of Corruption," *Sociological Review* (Keele, England), June 1961, pp. 181-200.

[32] *Political Development in the New States,* Mouton, 1962, p. 385.

[33] See Gluckman's *Custom and Conflict,* Blackwell, 1955, p. 135.

[34] See P. Juviler and H. W. Morton, Eds., *Soviet Policy Making,* London, Pall Mall Press, 1967, pp. 168 ff.

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China's New Diplomacy
A Symposium (II)

EDITORS' NOTE: We present in the following pages the concluding part of our symposium on the significance and ramifications of China's new diplomacy. The questions which were put to the participants as the basis for their commentaries are repeated below. The opinions which they express do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Government.

1 What domestic and foreign factors prompted the leadership of the People's Republic of China to initiate their recent foreign policy overtures to the US, to other Western powers, and to Yugoslavia and Romania?

2 What implications do these developments have with respect to Peking's general posture in international affairs, both in state-to-state relations and as regards revolutionary movements?

3 What implications do the Chinese moves have for Chinese policy in Asia? In particular, what will be the probable effect on China's relations with Japan and her other Asian neighbors?

4 What will be the import of Chinese initiatives for Sino-Soviet relations?

5 What sort of relationship does Peking seek with the US and other Western nations? In view of the response from the US and other Western countries, what are the prospects for China's relations with them?

James C. Thomson Jr.

1 Peering at China through a glass darkly, I would give heaviest weight to foreign factors in producing Peking's new diplomatic excursions. Domestic factors—*e.g.*, the restoration of relative order after the Cultural Revolution—have mainly provided the milieu in which cartographic imperatives can begin to shape foreign policy. By cartographic imperatives I mean the world map as viewed from Peking. Its two central features, as China moves into the 1970's, are the very long frontier shared with a hostile Soviet superpower and the awesome unleashed energy of the Japanese archipelago. Moscow combines ideological heresy (or, at the least, schism) with territorial imperialism, nuclear power, and the Czech example of the Brezhnev Doctrine in action. Tokyo combines dazzling economic power with an as yet unfocused nationalism, a recent imperialist past, and a potential nuclear future.

Counterposed against these not imaginary threats is the fact, as Peking seems to see it, of American withdrawal from Pacific overextension—a withdrawal dictated both by non-success in Indochina and by disarray back home. Once the Laos "incursion" collapsed and Nixon did not respond by going nuclear, the Chinese—or so recent visitors have told us—decided that events as well as intentions would force some real substance into the so-called Nixon Doctrine. America, if still an enemy, was a receding threat. But not so the two other threats.

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The principle of using barbarians to control other barbarians is hardly new to Chinese geopolitics. So it seems reasonable for Peking to begin to patch things up with Washington as a balance against both Moscow and Tokyo. All that was needed was evidence that Washington meant business about winding down the war *and* that Washington was serious about a Sino-American thaw—indeed, that President Nixon, for multifarious reasons, needed such a thaw. Laos provided such evidence; and so has the administration's behavior on both the Kissinger and United Nations tracks (actually two eventually competing tracks)—a successful experiment in the diplomacy of multiplicity.

2 These developments, now capped by Peking's entry into the United Nations, foretell a not-so-new Chinese return to international involvement as a great-but-not-superpower spokesman for (a) Chinese national interests, and (b) "Third World" interests. Sometimes the two will clash, as in East Pakistan; and one can probably assume that—at least close to home—Chinese national interests, as judged from Peking, will prevail.

To put the matter simply, China has returned to the diplomacy of Bandung and Geneva. But the world, of course, has changed; and in the changed context China emerges as a permanently accepted, adult power, thanks to new recognitions by other governments and the UN vote. From here on, club membership can work two ways: it can bring some altered ground rules to the club itself, forced by the new member in league with others; but it can also affect the new member's world view, inducing adjustment and compromise lest he find himself standing entirely alone looking foolish and impotent.

It is no new thing for Peking to have to let state-to-state relations coexist with revolutionary aspirations. But it is a new thing to have to do so on such a grand and complex scale. China's revolutionary aims and visions will not soon change—indeed, they will be regularly reemphasized in Chinese rhetoric; but China's actual behavior, long constrained by do-it-yourself caveats about the export of revolution (as well as by military realism), will be further constrained by the processes of international bureaucratic engagement. Add to such constraints traditional Chinese adroitness at accommodation where vital national interests are not involved, and the Chinese may soon be behaving, if not sounding, like a senior club member rather than a new boy.

3 It is a truism that China's paramount external interest is the security of China's frontiers—and, by extension, the maintenance of non-hostile neighbors on those frontiers. China's borders have seemed threatened in recent years by both the United States and the Soviet Union. But the US presence in Asia is receding, and soon Japan may feel some itch to fill the vacuum through its economic involvement in South Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia.

China's primary territorial aspiration is the recovery of Taiwan. Yet such is Peking's confidence about the ultimate outcome that it may well be willing to bypass the Taiwan issue in its relations with some states. This is clearly one meaning of the Chinese leader's readiness to receive the President in spite of Washington's dual-representation effort at the UN and the US defense treaty with the Chinese Nationalists. Peking seems to be choosing, with good reason, to put its faith in time and mortality. Hong Kong, that foreign enclave on Chinese soil, is a mutually profitable anomaly that will probably rejoin the mainland at the end of the century when the relevant British lease expires. Chinese ingenuity and patience on both sides of the Taiwan Straits could make of Formosa—once Chiang Kai-shek and Mao depart the scene—another Hong Kong, temporarily independent for years to come, sustained by ambiguity and by mutual economic advantage, but perhaps eventually becoming part of China on terms acceptable to both sides. In the meantime, all that Peking may actually require, for face-saving purposes, is the withdrawal of US military forces from Taiwan but not abrogation of the defense treaty—a withdrawal that will still leave the island entirely capable of its own defense.

Beyond its frontiers and Taiwan, Peking's central long-term concern in Asia is, as indicated earlier, the evolving role of Japan. Here the Peking-Washington relationship can be used by the Chinese to press Prime Minister Sato—or, more likely, his successor—into more rapid accommodation with China. Peking's leverage in Japanese politics has increased as a result, *inter alia,* of the rather harsh diplomacy that Washington has employed vis-a-vis Tokyo. This volatile trilateral relationship is, however, one that Peking must play upon with care. Complete alienation between Tokyo and its American nuclear protector could produce a free-floating, insecure, nationalist Japan that might move once again into the path of military adventurism.

Those unresolved conflicts in Asia, namely Korea

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and Indochina, will continue to rank high in terms of Chinese rhetoric. But the status quo in Korea seems unchangeable and relatively unthreatening, hence tolerable to Peking for the foreseeable future. And Peking may well calculate that the Indochina conflict, posing no further threat to China, will probably be resolved in favor of local Communist forces (or at the least "neutralists") in the next several years.

In general, it can be assumed that Peking will continue to cheer on Asian revolutionary movements where they stand a good chance of success, but to subordinate such cheering to correct state-to-state relations in the majority of cases.

4 A central spur to both American and Chinese initiatives that led to the thaw of 1971 has been each nation's relationship with the USSR. For two decades now Sino-American hostility has been a great boon to Moscow; Russian leaders could act as they chose toward each party without having to calculate the consequences on the third side of the triangle. That luxury has now been terminated—with consequences far less disturbing to the Soviet-American relationship than Washington's Soviet experts had predicted through much of the 1960's.

Chinese and American initiatives have certainly made the Russians uncomfortable. But the longer-term consequence should be precisely what Washington and Peking had in mind: the addition of new constraints to Soviet foreign policy. Such constraints may well push Moscow toward greater accommodation with Peking as well as with Peking's rivals (Japan, the US, perhaps even Taiwan). The outcome, however, will not be warm rapprochement between Moscow and Peking. There is too much at issue—in both the ideological and state realms—to permit such a result in the new quadrilateral world of East Asia.

5 Peking seeks, first and foremost, a relationship of equality with the US and other Western nations. Relations in the past have been strikingly unequal. Under the doctrine of containment and isolation, American military forces spread out to fill the Asian power vacuum left by Japan's World War II defeat. Regardless of the validity of Washington's various rationales, such moves looked to Peking like a clear and present threat: a quest for American hegemony by force of arms.

America's Indochina intervention seemed to Peking the last great effort to achieve such hegemony. But now that an incumbent President can call that intervention a "mistake" and can seek to withdraw—however slowly and however destructively in terms of the war's elevation from ground to air—Peking is fairly sure that the old inequality is being corrected. In the fluid new circumstances of the early 1970's, a reemerging China can begin to discuss with a receding America some alternative structure—some new ground rules—for peace in Asia. It is important to the Chinese to enter such discussions before the new Japan moves in, with or without American encouragement, to fill the gap.

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In this context, Peking stands a fairly good chance of moving gradually toward satisfactory one-to-one relationships with the US and other Western powers. The primary content of such relationships will be verbal: *i.e.*, discussions at all levels, long and difficult negotiations groping toward mutually acceptable formulas of disengagement, and perhaps, in time, even formal treaties of non-aggression. But at the same time, such primary content will probably be gradually expanded to include scientific and cultural exchanges and also trade. In the area of trade, Sino-American relations are likely to proceed especially slowly as a result of the Taiwan obstacle, China's dedication to economic "self-reliance," and the fact that much that America might offer in goods can be obtained more cheaply elsewhere.

V. P. Dutt

China's foreign policy is headed on a new course —a dramatic shift that has been dictated by the imperatives of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the changing international situation. The new policy increasingly appears to bear the stamp of Chou En-lai, and it is being pursued within the Maoist framework and objective of bringing about a restructuring of power relations in the world. It also suggests an effort by Peking to make a better adjustment to global realities. In brief, Peking could not continue to be the odd-man-out in the international community; the exigencies of the conflict with the Soviet Union demanded that the PRC start functioning as a "normal" big power in its conduct of foreign affairs.

In its long search for security and, beyond that, for the restoration of a preeminent position for China in world affairs, Peking experimented with various policies before adopting its present course. In 1955 it was prepared to go along with the desires of other Asian countries and to make an effort at talks with Washington for the satisfaction of its objectives. By 1959, despairing of obtaining a settlement that would meet its demands, Peking switched to a policy of militant hostility toward the United States, hoping to create such intolerable tensions in the world as to force a US retreat in Asia. Peking also applied itself assiduously to the task of knocking together a group of Afro-Asian countries as a rival center of power under the PRC's aegis. In the course of the 1960's, however, it became clear that Peking would not get anywhere without a direct settlement with the United States.

It can be argued that China began preparing the ground for a dialogue with the US as early as 1962. As Mao set about the task of portraying the Soviet Union as the principal foe of Peking in the present period, the implication was obvious that sooner or later the time would come for an opening toward the West. Mao had always emphasized that all of a revolutionary movement's forces should be concentrated against the principal enemy, or "contradiction," and that toward this end it was permissible to make tactical adjustments with respect to secondary "contradictions." Thus, in the interest of fighting the chief enemy, temporary alliances with other enemies should be explored. China's situation in the 1960's was both unusual and un-Maoist in that Peking found itself locked in conflict with both the superpowers and with many other countries as well. This kind of dispersal of strength was contrary to the strategy and tactics that had been advocated by Mao throughout the period of the Chinese Communist's revolutionary struggle. Therefore, it is not illogical to conclude that at least some elements of the Chinese leadership viewed the buildup of the struggle against the Soviet Union as a development that could, and indeed must, lead eventually toward negotiations with the United States and thereby help Peking break out of its dilemma.

It is true that the United States took the initiative in starting the dialogue with China, but events were moving inexorably toward such an outcome. The profound transformation of public opinion in the United States greatly facilitated the Sino-US rapprochement. Opinion in the United States had been moving sharply away from involvement in Asian wars and toward negotiations with Peking, a fact that could not be ignored by the administration in Washington. To the Chinese, this meant that the United States was a "receding threat," while in their view the Soviet Union was posing an "increasing threat." Thus the factor of US public opinion combined with the escalation of the Sino-Soviet conflict to make the time ripe for a thaw in Sino-American relations.

While China's new course could thus be interpreted as an effort to get back on the track of "Maoist" strategy, it is equally clear that the component of ideology has yielded its position of primacy to the component of national interest in

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Peking's foreign policy. At a minimum, China's retreat from isolation has been aimed at preempting any possibility of the US and the USSR joining hands, thereby imperiling Chinese interests. (In this respect, Peking has to some degree been successful in aggravating uncertainty and instability in the relations between the two superpowers). It is again mainly considerations of national interest that have led Peking and Washington to break the ice in their mutual relations. Peking's ultimate hope is to bring about a shift in the international power structure that will allow it to become one of the superpowers. Meantime, both Peking and Washington must expect to use the new rapprochement to apply pressure against the Soviet Union.

The continued rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union remains a fundamental fact and factor in international relations. In the US view, the USSR has been extending its influence too rapidly in West Asia, Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean and other regions of the world. It has been partly with an eye to curbing the growing power of the Soviet Union and imposing new pressures on Moscow that Washington has taken such a big step toward détente with Peking; possibly US strategists also hope to induce the Soviets to revise their stand on other important issues in which Washington and Moscow are intimately involved. From Peking's vantage point, the "defreezing" of relations with the US has provided new room for maneuver and pressure against the "principal enemy."

Without doubt, domestic developments in China also contributed to the initiatives taken by Peking to improve relations with the West. The Cultural Revolution was a "many-splendored thing," a number of whose facets and effects have yet to be scrutinized and understood; but it has become increasingly obvious that Mao took the opportunity of the Cultural Revolution to weed out those in the leadership who might have been inclined to take the view that the struggle against the United States, particularly in Vietnam, necessitated some adjustment of relations with the Soviet Union. It is conceivable that in 1965 and early 1966, alarmed at the escalating conflict in Vietnam and the increasing threat to the security of China that this escalation posed, Liu Shao-ch'i and some of his associates within the then ascendant group in the party Politburo might have advocated a partial readjustment with the USSR in order to meet the mounting threat in Vietnam.

Mao clearly took the opposite view that the more fundamental conflict was with the Soviet Union and that China ought to be talking to Washington in order to contain the "Soviet challenge." The establishment of Mao's supremacy in the Cultural Revolution paved the way for the adoption of such an approach to Washington. More broadly, the retreat from extremist postures in 1966-67, the return to normalcy, the dominance of an army intent on restoring order, and finally the enhanced prestige and power of Chou En-lai, representing the great pillar of continuity and stability in the regime, made it possible to introduce new flexibility into China's foreign policy. Such flexibility in foreign relations has always followed in the wake of a comparative lull on the domestic scene in China .

Prior to the rapprochement with the United States, Peking had already taken steps to improve relations with several Western and East European countries. In Third World areas, too, from Libya to Chile to Zambia, the Chinese have been engaging in active diplomacy to undo the effects of their earlier policies. In the case of Yugoslavia and Romania, Peking's new approach has a further significance. Historically, the Chinese have always tried to find allies in the ranks of the enemy. Peking has long been aligned with Albania; by befriending Yugoslavia it has moved closer to the Soviet sphere of influence, while its overtures to Romania have carried the war right into the enemy camp. The Chinese may not be able to control "barbarian through barbarian," but they must certainly hope to encourage confusion and disarray in the Soviet bloc.

The shift in Peking's stance also creates the opportunity for a better working relationship between China and some of its Asian neighbors. In this connection, it seems possible that the Chinese leaders have come to realize that the tide of revolution they hoped would sweep the Afro-Asian countries is in fact on the ebb. While Peking's public posture has given no hint of it, recognition that the revolutionary tide was receding could have led to an "agonizing reappraisal" of strategy and to the consequent modification in China's relations with Asian as well as West European countries.

Certainly, the stridency of Peking's propaganda against a number of other countries has been significantly moderated. If one compares the propaganda that poured forth from Peking in the last half of the 1960's with what is appearing now, the change is very noticeable. In the 1960's prominence was given to the news of pro-Peking Communist or insurrectionary movements in Burma, India, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and elsewhere. According

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to the Chinese press, the revolution was on the upswing in Malaysia and Thailand; the people of India were rising up in armed revolt against the "reactionary pro-imperialist and pro-landlord government of India" (much stress was laid on the activities of the Nagas, the Mizos, and the Naxalites); the "reactionary fascist government" of Ne Win in Burma was fast losing control, while the armed struggle of the Burmese Communist Party was on the advance.

Today these events no longer make headlines in Peking's treatment of international developments. The reporting on Thailand is less strident and that on Malaysia far lower in key, while coverage of revolutionary activity in Burma and India is fairly infrequent. In the cases of Burma and Malaysia, Peking has made a positive effort at normalization of relations. In the process, the Chinese must have discovered that most Asian countries were quite ready to respond to Chinese gestures for improving relations.

It seems clear that Peking will pursue the goal of revolution more carefully and selectively than before; support for revolutionary forces in other countries will be extended only in cases where Peking feels particular animosity or where no Chinese interest would be threatened. Even before the recent shift in its foreign policy, Peking was not totally indiscriminate in the choice of movements which it would support—for example, during the worst days of the Cultural Revolution, it did not allow its relations with Pakistan, Nepal or Ceylon to be impaired. More circumspection in the range and choice of "enemies" is an important feature of the new phase of Chinese foreign policy.

In short, normalization of state relations with as many countries as possible and observance of the established codes of international conduct have been revived as useful tactical approaches in China's foreign policy. Peking does, however, perceive a new threat and a new challenge in Asia, apart from that offered by the Soviet Union. This is the formidable problem posed by an industrialized Japan. Peking has shown an acute awareness of Japan and its potentially important role, realizing full well that Japan's growing economic power will give it crucial political weight in Asia. For Peking, the identity and order of enemies—actual and potential—has changed radically over the last decade. In the 1960's, the list would have read the USA, the USSR, India and Yugoslavia. The new order of enemies, reduced to two, can be listed as the USSR and Japan.

Peking is likely to adopt a dual policy toward Japan—a policy of the carrot and the stick. The Japanese government will continue to be the target of a barrage of strident attacks for its allegedly "reactionary, anti-China" policies. At the same time, promises of friendship, increased trade, and normalization of relations will be offered on the condition that Tokyo change the course of its foreign policy. It is unlikely that Peking has as yet thought through a long-term policy toward Japan; its future attitude will depend to a large extent on developments within Japan and particularly on the impact of the division of public opinion there. But certainly Japan has become one of the vital preoccupations in China's foreign policy.

China has neither forgotten its grievances nor given up its goals. But it has gained an appreciation of the value of subtler forms of diplomacy and has adopted a new strategy for the achievement of these goals. The new strategy envisages an opening toward the United States and the West, the concentration of forces against the Soviet Union as the principal enemy, and a struggle against the revival of Japanese power. Above all, Peking seeks to function as an independent center of power pursuing the traditional game of power politics.

A. M. Halpern

1 Changes in China's environment, internal and external, in recent years created the context for the latest Chinese moves in foreign policy; but they were not, of themselves, the sole impetus for Peking's new course.

The overriding consideration governing all Chinese policies in the interim since the Cultural Revolution has been the need for political and economic reconstruction. This need has governed the limits of the options available to the Chinese. China's situation in the first year of the Fourth Five-Year Plan is reminiscent in a number of ways of conditions in 1953, the first year of the First Five-Year Plan. There is a difference in that China is not at present allied to a great power or a bloc and thus has neither the advantages nor the drawbacks of such a relationship. Yet the more important common feature in the two situations is that now, as then, the PRC's great need is for a long-term, stable and peaceful

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international environment. Minimally reasonable men in a situation like this would desire (a) to avoid military adventures, and (b) to reduce threats to their own national security. Within these limits there is room for choice among a variety of strategies and tactics.

Slow and erratic as the process has been, consolidation of a new domestic political structure in China has taken place. At the local level, a workable division of responsibility between the army, the revolutionary committees, and the reorganized party appears to have evolved. While the new structure is not and probably never will be free of strains, by the beginning of 1970 the leadership could foresee movement toward stability. The confident mood conveyed by a New Year's editorial entitled "Usher in the Great 1970's" was probably not illusory, though it was based more on expectation than on actual achievement. Developments in 1971 revealed weaknesses in the new structure; nevertheless, the regime has continued to direct the attention of its public more to current and future progress than to combating threats to stability.

Within the top leadership, more or less organized cliques still exist, and an internal power struggle goes on. Inevitably, one or another clique remains not fully satisfied with the course of events. Controversy over ideology and its reflection in concrete policies persists, and one cannot rule out the possibility that such controversy may once again intensify to the point of conflict. For the present, however, there are several signs that the doctrinal temperature has been lowered, while production has been revived.

The impact of these developments on foreign policy up to mid-1971 was probably of a general rather than a particular order. What is most important is that relative domestic stability liberated Chou En-lai's time, which formerly had been preempted for attention to internal affairs, and made it available for attention to foreign affairs. A professional apparatus for handling foreign relations has been reconstituted in large part. It is clearly under Chou En-lai's control and relatively protected from intervention on the part of other major figures in the elite.

A most important development in the external environment was the decline of potential threats to China's national security. The PRC's perception of this change can be fairly accurately dated. The slogans issued for National Day (October 1) 1969, called on the people of the world to "unite and oppose the war of aggression launched by any imperialism or social-imperialism" by using "revolutionary war to eliminate the war of aggression." This slogan focused attention on China's vulnerability and need for support. In contrast, Mao's statement of May 20, 1970, which is still cited as authoritative, declared that, while the danger of a new world war still exists, "revolution is the main trend in the world today."

This slogan minimizes China's vulnerability. Instead it focuses attention on promising developments outside China and on the PRC's ability to support them. Though Chou En-lai has plainly said that PRC slogans are not to be taken absolutely literally,[1] neither are they issued at random, thoughtlessly, or without reference to the regime's current tactics. In a number of areas of action, there have been discernible shifts in the pattern of Chinese tactics, both verbal and behavioral, all dating from about the middle of 1970.

2 The PRC's international posture of 1966-68, consisting of little beyond sterile gestures, is now obviously dated. This is not to say that it had no rationale, served no purpose, or reflected no genuine convictions, but only that it was adapted to peculiar situations which no longer exist. Peking's current posture cannot yet be fully comprehended, in part because it is still evolving and responding to the course of events, and in part because it may be developing in several different directions at the same time.

The revolutionary perspective—according to which Communist China's mission is to lead the world revolutionary people's struggle against the antipopular forces of "imperialism, revisionism, and all reactionaries"—still has its devoted adherents within the Chinese leadership. The thesis regularly receives lip service and occasionally more substantial respect through the publication of authoritative doctrinal articles, as on the 100th anniversary of the Paris Commune.

The clients who were attracted to the PRC by this posture—revolutionary movements in Asia and the Middle East, as well as "true Marxist-Leninist" parties throughout the world—constitute a not negligible political capital for the PRC. At the present time, however, their claim on the PRC's reciprocal

[1] In his widely publicized interview with James Reston, published in *The New York Times*, Aug. 10, 1971.

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loyalty seems to have been made contingent on the quality of their performance and perhaps on their value as bargaining counters in state-to-state relations.

The environmental changes described above, coupled with the realistic prospect that the Indochina conflict could move toward a resolution acceptable to the PRC, created room for development beyond and away from the revolutionary posture. As early as the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (April 1969), the PRC showed itself aware of its new opportunity to undertake other kinds of actions, notably in state-to-state relations with many, but not all, states. It could not help but be aware of worldwide receptivity to such actions, whether in the form of Chinese initiatives or in response to the initiatives of others. While the Chinese leadership seemingly felt no pressure to move prematurely, by mid-1970 it was clearly deemphasizing revolutionary Maoism as the basic guideline of foreign policy.

The PRC has been much preoccupied with the problem of superpower duopoly, without having been fully convinced that the duopoly is in fact the dominating feature of the world situation. There is no evidence that the PRC gave serious thought to a policy of alignment—necessarily as a junior partner—with either superpower. If, on the other hand, it considered asserting itself as the third superpower, by the end of 1970 it disavowed this as a live option. The reasons may be that it recognized, as Chou En-lai has explained, the inadequacy of its resources for engaging effectively in such a three-sided game; or that other, more attractive strategies were available; or both.

Of the other strategies available to Peking, one would be to undertake leadership of the "oppressed peoples" of the world against both superpowers. This variant of the revolutionary approach was probably considered seriously but judged insufficient in terms of China's needs and opportunities. A second strategy would be to accept the status of a medium power, at least for the present, and to identify common interests with—but not try to claim leadership of—other countries of similar standing. This is the posture Romania and Yugoslavia have evidently suggested to the Chinese with a degree of success, as indicated by the increasingly frequent Chinese expressions of approval for nonalignment in recent months. If the Chinese pursue this course further, it should logically lead them in the end to perceive the world situation as neither bipolar, duopolistic, or tripolar, but in fact multipolar.

One cannot, at present, go further in defining the new Chinese posture than recognizing the trends that have developed and noting that the current pattern of operations is more selective and more differentiated than at any time since the foundation of the PRC. The implications of decisions yet to be made are far from clear, and there can easily be reversals of direction. Further, when one speaks of postures, one speaks of maximum objectives. The nearer one comes to success in defining postures, the more one succeeds in obscuring the fall-back positions a country may have in mind and the minimum objectives it may eventually find satisfactory.

3 Especially in a multipolar world, the PRC must take the Japanese challenge seriously. The rest of Asia represents not a challenge but rather an area of potential competition between China and Japan. The PRC's policy problems with regard to Japan and to the rest of Asia are of two different orders. Possible future Sino-US understandings accordingly have different impacts in the two cases.

Nowhere has receptivity to improved state relations with the PRC been higher than in Asia, and nowhere have the Chinese moved more slowly to take advantage of it. The continuing Indochina conflict does not completely account for the lag. In the light of the PRC's readiness to engage in dialogue with the United States, one can surmise that the Chinese leadership preferred to postpone action on relations with Asian countries pending clarification of Washington's future interests in the area. Diplomatic moves in Asia undertaken in an atmosphere of Sino-American hostility would be unpromising and might increase tension with the US. A prior Sino-American understanding would avoid tension and give China a stronger hand in dealing with the Asians. Having taken the first major steps to approach Asia via dialogue with the US, the Chinese have moved to improve their relations with two of the lesser Asian countries, Malaysia and Burma. This may indicate that Peking intends to deal with the Asian countries in order of size and ease of handling, leaving the bigger and more problematical relationships for the last.

Toward Japan, however, the Chinese have moved aggressively and without waiting for the dialogue with the US to develop. They have conducted substantial operations designed to put pressure on the Japanese government to alter its China policy and its defense policy. A sizable, though heterogeneous,

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portion of the Japanese public favors the same changes in Japan's policies as the PRC does, and between these elements and the Chinese there is continuous contact. The PRC would like to see the present Prime Minister forced out of office. Even though his likely successor would hardly differ in basic orientation, the change of officeholders would facilitate certain policy shifts that the Chinese would view as steps in the right direction.

Just how genuine the PRC's expressed concern may be about Japan's growing military strength is hard to judge. It is unlikely that the PRC could turn any Japanese government away from defense policies it has determined to adopt, but the constant barrage of Chinese propaganda could help effect delays or modifications before decisions were made—or so Peking must hope. By the same token, it is unlikely that the PRC could displace Japanese influence in Asia by offering to assume Japan's role in the area, since the PRC would not have the resources to do so; but it could to some degree impede Japan's progress in her Asian relations by increasing its own influence on social and political forces other than those with whom Japan's relations are firm.

Any change in US policy toward China, especially one resulting from purely bilateral discussions, would affect the equilibrium in Sino-Japanese relations and accelerate the rate of change in Japan's China policy. The hypothetical possibilities are absurdly numerous. It is highly probable that the net change will be to the PRC's advantage, but whether to a significant degree cannot yet be predicted.

What this analysis suggests is not the image of an Asia dominated by China, which will have expelled other extra-regional influences, but rather the image of a more stabilized, less tense Asia, subsisting in a more ramified, multipolar environment, with which China could live more comfortably than it has in the past. Some recent Chinese behavior can be evaluated as contributing to this development, but the process of arriving at the outcome will be complicated, will require the surrender by several major actors (including the PRC) of cherished ambitions, and can never be guaranteed to be irreversible.

4 The import of China's emerging posture for the Soviet Union has to be measured in terms of both the immediate issues and the longer-range, indirect competition between the two countries.

In the short run, the possibility of a Sino-Soviet war seems to be receding. Both sides are prepared for war, but neither is intent on having one, and the US regards a Sino-Soviet war as a consummation devoutly to be avoided. Even a tentative Sino-American understanding would probably strengthen the hand of the Chinese—not to fight a war but to obtain a relatively advantageous resolution of Sino-Soviet issues *without* a war.

While direct conflict may be avoided, the PRC can be expected to continue to oppose Soviet influence in several third areas. Chinese approval and support of a potential Balkan axis (Romania-Yugoslavia-Albania) adds something to the difficulty of Soviet problems in an area of major concern. The countries involved, however, do not seem determined to drive the USSR into a corner from which it can only fight its way out. They seem more interested in attaining greater freedom of action, and this is an important point of common interest between these countries and the PRC.

To the extent that a Sino-US understanding would assist the general drift toward a diversified, multipolar world system, it would be to the advantage of countries which wish to reduce the power of any single country to dictate to them. Outside the Eastern European context, the USSR's posture is already adapted to this trend in many areas. It will incur disadvantages in some areas where it may wish to increase its influence for the ulterior purpose of containing China.

5 In the West, as in Asia, one country stands apart from the others in the strategic view of the PRC.

The interests and commitments of most European and Latin American countries impinge on only a few aspects of PRC policy, and these are not of a nature to arouse competition. The characteristic areas of contact favor expedient approaches on both sides, and the Chinese formula of peaceful coexistence is easily achieved in bilateral relations. On the Chinese side, there is a long-standing interest in cultivating divisions between the Western countries and the US, but only a minor capacity to do so. If Peking seriously pursues a strategy of cooperating as a medium power with other medium powers on a case-by-case basis, the West outside the United States offers it opportunities.

By contrast, US and Chinese interests and commitments obviously have impinged on one another over a wide range of issues and in competitive ways. The main area of contact—direct and indirect—is

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Asia. Thus, US relations with China, unlike those of other Western countries, cannot be confined to strictly bilateral concerns. Sino-US relations will lead to peaceful coexistence only if a whole range of substantive problems—and first of all, the issues that affect the future of Asia—prove susceptible of mutual agreement.

Chou En-lai has laid out, in his conversations with James Reston, the PRC's initial demands, with no indication of a *quid pro quo.* What remains to be explored is: first, whether the Chinese can really adjust, ideologically and tactically, to the status of a medium power; second, whether they really accept the concept of a multipolar world; third, whether they genuinely envision the development of an Asian status quo equally acceptable to themselves and to the US and therefore giving Peking no incentive to upset it; and, finally, whether they see a dialogue with the US as merely another version of a tit-for-tat struggle with a temporarily vulnerable adversary, or as a real opportunity to secure a long-term peaceful and stable international environment.

George E. Taylor

The rapid change in the international posture of the People's Republic of China is a shift in tactics that may also open up the possibility of a shift in strategic objectives. Although superficially the invitation to President Nixon to visit China compares, in dramatic impact, with the Chinese Communists' acceptance of a United Front with Chiang Kai-shek in 1937 or the sudden announcement of the Stalin-Hitler pact in 1939, actually the only parallel lies in the tactical flexibility of Communist parties and states. There the comparison seems to end. Unlike the events of 1937 and 1939, this is the action of a single Communist power in competition with another one, and it comes at a later time when the big Communist parties and states are not maneuvering for survival in a hostile world. In view of the problems which plague all countries, whatever their ideologies, it is possible but not necessarily probable that the new alignment may lead to a moderation of Communist strategic objectives to something short of world domination.

The rapid reemergence of the PRC on the internataional scene during the last two years can be explained by a combination of internal and external developments. The leaders of the Chinese Communist regime have always been concerned with three main sets of objectives. The first is to strengthen and extend the political power and authority of the party and state. Because Peking has absorbed the Tibetans and Mongols and reestablished spheres of influence in Korea and Southeast Asia, this objective appears on the surface to be nothing different from the foreign policy of any great power—in this case, an effort to restore the ancient glories of China. There are clearly many aspects of Peking's policy that parallel those of a conventional great power. But there is also a specific component. The dynamics of the power structure of a Communist regime demand territorial and political expansion, but in a very special context. Like the Soviet Communists, the Chinese Communists have conceptions of power, the state, nationalism, and "national interest" which stem from a specific ideological base. There are Communist universals which modify traditional great-power behavior.

The second objective of Communist China is to seek to influence, possibly eventually to dominate, the policies of the Communist world. In its present phase, this involves a struggle with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and a campaign for organizational support in Communist parties in every part of the world. The noisy and dramatic aspects of the Peking-Moscow split conceal the fact that the struggle for power is built into the Communist system. The personal struggles that began with the birth of the Chinese Communist Party took second place to party-vs.-party and state-vs.-state conflicts after 1949. This was when China began to build "socialism in one country" in Asia after the attempted general revolution in colonial Asia initiated in 1948 failed to materialize.

The third Chinese objective is to shift the world balance of forces in favor of the Communist bloc of states, an objective shared with the Soviet Union but one which Peking would prefer to guide according to its own ideas. Peking in fact appears to be trying to use the Soviet Union in its efforts to promote revolution in Asia, just as Moscow tried, after 1923, to use China to conquer Europe.

All three of the objectives are closely connected; they are pursued at the same time, and often in conflict with each other; and priorities change. There have been times when Peking put the struggle with Moscow ahead of other considerations and paid for this choice with considerable strains on the

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Chinese economy and risks attendant on disunity within the Communist bloc. Short-term sacrifices have been accepted for the sake of long-term gains. The dynamics of Chinese Communist policies determine strategy and tactics and provide the key to the relative emphasis which is put on the pursuit of each objective.

The recent Chinese foreign policy initiatives were made possible by the Peking leaders' success in strengthening the machinery of state and party after the turbulent struggles of the Cultural Revolution. Obviously nothing much could be done when nearly every important Chinese diplomat abroad had been called home, when Red Guards at one time occupied the Foreign Office, and when even the question of who was to make policy decisions was itself clearly at stake. Throughout this period of self-imposed isolation, foreign policy was quite possibly one of the main issues in the internal struggle. During the 1960's there must have been considerable division in Peking over the ending of the "lean-to-one-side" policy, over responsibility for the turnabout in Indonesia, over failures in Africa, the dangers of Vietnam involvement, and the threatening attitude of the Soviet Union. But whatever the divisions over foreign policy, the growth of Chinese nuclear power continued, apparently unobstructed, and the world became increasingly aware that China's nuclear capacity had to be taken seriously into account. It threw a shadow over future strategy for Japan and over the whole American treaty system in East Asia and the Pacific.

Peking's new initiatives were facilitated, not by the rise of new leaders, but by the strengthened grip of the old. Some American scholars assumed that a change in leadership in Peking would be necessary, presumably after the death of Mao, before a more "pragmatic" Chinese approach to world affairs could be expected. It was argued that the second generation of Chinese leaders, by some strange alchemy, would be less ideological than the first. By the same token, the same scholars argued that the United States should also be pragmatic and signal its readiness for an accommodation. This was based on the shaky assertion that Washington's China policy since World War II had been an expression of ideological or emotional anti-communism. These views were also based on the extraordinary assumption that there was a meaningful distinction to be made between the terms "ideological" and "pragmatic." Chairman Mao was considered "ideological" and therefore romantic, irrational, and unable to see his country's best interest, whereas the second generation of "pragmatist" leaders would take a reasonable and rational view—one that the US could perhaps understand and even approve.

But it has been clear through the whole of his career that Mao is quite capable of shifting gears when this seems tactically desirable, and on this occasion no amount of coaxing, especially by the US, could have been effective in making him change course against his will. Mao and Chou took the initiative—at a time and in a manner of their own choosing—in seeking an arrangement of sorts with the US. It is true that Peking's "ping-pong diplomacy," which received the most publicity, came after President Nixon's gesture of March 15, 1971, in removing passport restrictions on private visits to China, but this latter gesture was no more than the occasion, certainly not the cause, of Peking's shift in tactics. President Nixon's reaction to the table-tennis invitation—namely, his moves to lift some trade restrictions, to permit the use of American ships to carry Chinese cargoes, to ease currency controls, and to authorize the grant of visas to Chinese wishing to visit the US—also represented an expression of policy already made.

The domestic factors involved in the Chinese policy shift—*i.e.*, the reestablishment of Mao's leadership and the success of the nuclear program—made it possible for Peking to take advantage of the new balance of external forces. It was no longer necessary for the consolidation of the domestic power base to take top priority. In the meantime, Peking's relationship with the Soviet Union had become more alarming. The question of independent Chinese control of nuclear power—the main cause of the Sino-Soviet dispute from the very beginning—had become more acute as China's nuclear capacity increased. From the Soviet point of view, time was running out for the tempting option of a preemptive strike. Friction was so intense that Peking apparently came to the conclusion that the USSR had to be considered the main source of immediate danger to the integrity of the Chinese state. The example of what had happened to Czechoslovakia removed all doubt about the lengths to which Moscow was prepared to go. Under these circumstances, the risks involved in improving relations with the US seemed less than the danger of provoking Moscow into hasty action.

It was explained to the Chinese people, or at least to the politically literate, that the counterrevolutionary policy of the enemy called for "various forms

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of struggle," among them a flexible policy of taking advantage of international rivalries, and that it was good practice to make alliances with secondary enemies such as the US in order to neutralize the primary foe.

There was nothing new about the struggle with Moscow, except its new intensity and the danger of armed conflict. While it might in itself have been sufficient reason for finally ceasing to "lean to one side," it happened to coincide with an American retreat from military involvement in Vietnam, for which the ideological justification had been announced in the Nixon Doctrine. This raised the question of the possible movement of Soviet influence into the vacuum left by the American withdrawal, providing another reason why the Soviet threat to China took on a higher priority in the eyes of Peking. The danger of involvement with the Americans, on the other hand, was no longer credible. At the same time, the steady increase in international support for Peking's admission to the United Nations had already resulted in a simple majority vote in Peking's favor in the UN Assembly, compelling the US to review its whole China policy.

Such developments created new opportunities for a worldwide diplomatic offensive by China at the expense of Moscow .The fact that Peking had agreed with Moscow to resume ambassadorial relations and to increase Sino-Soviet trade, which had gone down to under $57 million in 1969 at the time of the Ussuri and Sinkiang border clashes, in no way suggests a weakening of either party's commitment to the struggle. China now had the chance to further her second objective—competition with Moscow for domination in the Communist world.

Peking's new worldwide diplomatic offensive had several aspects. One was the drive for membership in the UN, which turned out to be successful and pretty much on Peking's terms, in addition to coming a year, perhaps, before it was expected. The expulsion of Taiwan from the UN was an important step toward the first objective of strengthening the party and state. Another aspect of the campaign was to improve relations with the US, a task in which Peking apparently could count on cooperation from Washington. There are many legal and political difficulties in the way, but the UN action, whatever its other implications, certainly removes some of these obstacles. The extent of Sino-American cooperation, however, will be influenced by the reactions of the Soviet Union.

A very serious aspect of China's new policy, from Moscow's viewpoint, is the unabashed effort to strengthen regionalism in the Balkans in order to undermine Moscow's control. In this context, Romania and Yugoslavia are key countries, and Peking has made overtures to both. On Romania's National Day, the Chinese Foreign Office denounced the USSR's proposed military maneuvers in Romania and its efforts to dominate the Balkan countries.

A fourth aspect of China's drive was the bid for leadership in the Third World, not through subversion (although this was not given up), but by means of regular diplomacy, an approach which Peking had criticized Moscow for using. Now Peking, too, began to commend nonaligned countries on their independence since it is to China's advantage to have a nonaligned bloc dominated neither by Moscow nor by Washington. The conference of nonaligned countries held in 1970 actually called for Peking's admission to the UN.

Peking supports much of this diplomatic offensive with economic assistance to developing countries. Chinese offers of credit in 1970 totaled nearly $700 million, $400 million more than those of the Soviet Union and three times the amount offered by Eastern Europe. While this year may prove to have been exceptional in that the new Chinese credits included $400 million for the Zambia-Tanzania railway, the amount of Chinese aid is unquestionably running higher than it did during the last half of the 1960's. The main recipients have been Tanzania, Zambia, and Pakistan, but Peking has also been active in Ceylon, Latin America, and the Middle East. The motives behind Peking's economic diplomacy came out clearly in the Sudan, where China continued to support the Nimeri government at the time

NOTICE OF ERRATA

TO OUR READERS: Robert L. Farlow's article, "Romanian Foreign Policy: A Case of Partial Alignment," in the last issue of *Problems of Communism,* contained the following errors that warrant correction:

Page 59, col. 2, line 26: "1969 Budapest conference" should read "1969 Moscow conference."
Page 62, col. 1, lines 32-35: "by its unenthusiastic response to the 1969 decision to convoke a world conference of Communist parties, though it did attend the final gathering in 1970" should read "by its unenthusiastic response to the 1968 decision to convoke a world conference of Communist parties, though it did attend the final gathering in 1969."

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of the attempted Communist coup of 1971, which apparently was Soviet-supported. In its expansion of state-to-state relations, Peking was looking for votes in the UN, the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan, and the discomfiture of the Soviet Union, rather than for ideological conformity.

Such policies require a certain amount of adjustment in Peking's relations with revolutionary movements abroad. It is not wise to give material support to Maoist groups in countries where Peking is reviving state relations and seeking diplomatic recognition. But support of revolutionary movements is not a popularity contest; it is a matter of organization and training, as in northern Thailand. This can be done secretly, or at least in such a way as to defy definite proof. To the true believers a general increase in the prestige of Communist China does no harm. This is especially true if it occurs at the expense of the United States.

What are the implications of Peking's moves for Chinese policies in Asia? Chinese propaganda has already emphasized the self-proving thesis of the threat of a revived Japanese militarism. It is only because of China's investment in nuclear power and her growing importance in international affairs that the question of Japanese rearmament is even raised. The combination of improved Sino-American relations and China's growing nuclear capacity is sure to bring to a head in Japan the question of future national strategy. This is a truly explosive issue, but one which could hardly be avoided much longer. It will be resolved under a new set of conditions in which the US position in Asia is changing. Taiwan has suffered a serious political blow, and the People's Republic of China has nuclear power and increased international standing. In other words, Peking will have considerable influence on the future national strategy of Japan.

The new posture of the People's Republic will have more influence in the long rather than the short run on the overseas Chinese. For the time being, Peking is emphasizing the virtues of nonalignment and seeking markets for its consumer goods. In the search for markets and other economic relations, ideological purity is not the criterion. Although special attention is given in Europe to Romania and Yugoslavia for obvious reasons, China also trades with Greece, the Federal Republic of Germany (which does not recognize Peking), Italy, and the United Kingdom; and the Chinese, unlike the Russians, are similarly ready to deal with the European Economic Community. In the developing world, the political differences with Malaysia are no obstacle to increasing trade relations. The same is true of Pakistan, which provides port facilities in Karachi for Chinese goods shipped overland from Sinkiang Province and destined for Africa and the Middle East. Complications on the political side are well illustrated by Peking's efforts to improve state relations and trade with Burma (with whom ambassadors have been exchanged), while at the same time the Chinese quietly help local insurgents attempting to subvert the Burmese government. Peking has a similar attitude toward Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and India. (The Soviet Union has the same problem, especially in Indonesia, because it has parallel policies. State-to-state relations do not exclude subversion.)

Soviet reactions to China's new policies and achievements have been immediate and widespread. It was hardly possible to intensify the two powers' rivalry, but new initiatives had to be met with new policies. We can credit to the Chinese the Soviet treaty with India and the reassertion of support for Hanoi by Podgorny in person. The flurry of diplomatic activity which brought Kosygin to Canada and Brezhnev to Paris was obviously based on many considerations, but China was one of them, as it was most certainly for the Soviet invitation to President Nixon to visit Moscow after his trip to Peking. The Chinese initiatives have thus been taken by Moscow as a calculated threat to the interests of the Soviet Union. The treaty with India was intended as the first step in a Soviet move to counter the new Chinese bid for leadership in the Third World by constructing a Soviet-led bloc of Asian states.

Clearly, if one Communist state can improve its relations with the US at the expense of the Soviet Union, others might try, too. The challenge of the Chinese action to the USSR is so serious and direct that Moscow may feel it necessary to take retaliatory measures. This is a definite risk. It must be difficult for Moscow to accept a Chinese accommodation with the West (sought in order to counter Soviet threats) which can be presented as a Communist triumph at which all Communists should rejoice. If the Soviets do not undertake a preemptive strike against Communist China (and it may already be too late to do so), then they will have to choose between playing politics in China to bring about either separatism or a friendly regime, on the one hand, and reaching an accommodation with Peking on a state-to-state basis, on the other.

What does all this mean for China's relations with

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the US and the Western powers? The heart of the matter is whether or not the new initiative is a tactical maneuver or a real change of strategy. Put in terms of Peking's three main sets of objectives, does it mean that the third objective—to change the balance of world forces in favor of communism—ceases to be a practical matter and will in fact (though perhaps never in name) be allowed to lapse? From the point of view of Peking's present leaders, an imminent decline in US power would be disastrous. Peking needs the US to restrain the USSR and may even prefer that the Japanese-American security treaty stay in force in order to delay a Japanese decision to go nuclear. If the Sino-Soviet conflict continues without resolution, then both protagonists will prefer a balance of power, and the objective of changing the balance of world forces will be approached with caution and may be indefinitely postponed.

Peking should have no insuperable problems in establishing a working relationship with the US and the Western powers. The main question is her relationship with the Soviet Union. If this remains one of permanent detachment, then forces will be set in motion that will change the character of the cold war, especially if the non-Communist powers continue to accept the conditions of "peaceful coexistence." But other trends are more likely. The Soviets may well proceed to contain China and try to solve the China problem by forcing the pace of disintegration and decline in the non-Communist world. Aggressive Soviet confrontation with the West would force China to either support the bloc or lose significance in it, and were such a policy to prove successful, it could turn the balance of forces overwhelmingly against China.

David Mozingo

1 It is mistaken to assume that the reorientations taking place in China's relations with a number of countries stem mainly, or even in the first instance, from Peking's initiatives. Rather, Peking is essentially responding to major changes in the international situation, including conciliatory gestures from a number of countries, especially the initiatives of the United States. The main impetus has come from the Nixon administration, which reduced the Taiwan Straits patrol, stopped military reconnaissance flights over Chinese territory, pulled out the bulk of US troop strength in Vietnam, and publicly made known the American President's desire for a parley at the summit in Peking.

Although the recent initiatives have come from Washington, however, the Chinese for at least three years have also wanted a relaxation of tensions and a settlement of outstanding issues with the United States. The main factors behind this change in Peking's attitude are growing fear of Russia and the gradual but steady pullback of American power from Asia. Apparently, the August 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the "Brezhnev Doctrine" proclaiming Moscow's right to install pliant pro-Russian regimes in socialist states, and the menacing build-up of Soviet forces along the Chinese border settled, for the moment, the debate inside the Chinese leadership over whether the Russians or the Americans are the main enemy at this point in history. However, the first "cue" from Peking—*i.e.*, the November 26, 1968, offer to conclude a peaceful coexistence pact tied to the removal of the US military presence from the Taiwan area—was ignored by Washington. And, of course, the subsequent US-backed invasions of Laos and Cambodia had the short-term effect of discouraging any further "signals" from Peking.

The longer-range effect of the Laos and Cambodia incursions, however, was actually to accelerate China's interest in defusing Sino-American tensions. When, from the Chinese viewpoint, it became clear that both these operations were essentially defeated and, more importantly, that the US was continuing to withdraw troops from Vietnam, then Peking's strategic evaluation of US intentions had to change radically. Nixon's response to the Cambodian/Laotian setbacks demonstrated (more convincingly than Johnson's response to the Tet reversal) that American power in Asia was in fact receding, and that is what Peking most wants from Washington.

2 The Chinese assessment that Soviet "imperialism" has replaced US "imperialism" as the main danger does not imply that major reversals should be anticipated in the general direction of Peking's policies. China remains an "alterationist" power. She is committed to: 1) breaking up what she regards as the US-Soviet-imposed status quo; 2) vigorously asserting a Chinese presence in all situations affecting her interests; and 3) as in the past,

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supporting revolutionary movements on a selective basis.

What has changed, however—largely as a result of the political debate during the Cultural Revolution struggle—is Peking's conception of the international role it should play under present conditions. While the great-power objective has not been abandoned, the Chinese leaders at this stage envision the PRC playing a comparatively modest, though still important, role in international power politics. This strongly implies that China does not intend to rival, or emulate, the nuclear superstates. Nor is it likely that she will attempt to lead coalitions with other ideological, regional, or power groupings, as she did in the past. In line with current American thinking, China apparently recognizes that the era of the great-power blocs is over, and she is adapting to this fact.

3 By adopting a restrained and essentially nonaligned posture themselves, the Chinese leaders seek to undermine the viability of existing security pacts and the necessity of acquiring nuclear weapons on the part of other Asian countries, especially Japan. In this way, and at the very time that the US military presence in the region is being diminished, Peking hopes to set in motion a general process of accommodation between China and her neighbors.

How far this process can go and what form it will take mainly turn on what the Japanese decide to do. The assumption in some US circles seems to be that a Sino-American accommodation will inevitably tend to push Tokyo down an expansionist, and possibly nuclear, track, and that therefore China will eventually accept—indeed welcome—the continuance of a strong US military presence in Asia, especially if this would forestall a Japanese decision to go nuclear. But while the future promises a number of threats and risks, Peking is almost certain to feel that she can deal more effectively with Japan by relying on the total Asian context (and not on her own strength alone) after the American military presence is removed. For this reason, any attempts by Washington to manipulate Chinese fears of a nuclear Japan are not likely to convince Peking that US "imperialism" is really a reliable ally in the containment of Japan, and hence that China should accommodate to the continuation of a substantial US military presence in Asia while abandoning revolutionaries and her claim to Taiwan.

4 Some easing of Sino-American tensions no doubt has been long anticipated in Moscow because, sooner or later, Washington and Peking were going to discover that Russia was the main beneficiary of their wasteful, inconclusive struggle in Asia. Strategically, the Soviet Union has little to be worried about since a US-China thaw can only go so far. The US is not going to sacrifice its whole relationship with Japan for any future scenarios involving China; and similarly, it is inconceivable that Washington would rush to China's defense (as she would to Japan's) in the event of a Soviet attack.

To the extent that the Indians, Japanese, Koreans and Vietnamese become alarmed over any budding US-China thaw, the Soviets are well placed to cause Peking additional grief. As against these prospects, China's capacity to egg on the East Europeans in their efforts to become independent of Moscow is not only limited but—after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia—dangerous and counterproductive for them, as well as for China.

An overriding consideration which continues to set limits on the Sino-Soviet conflict is that Moscow, very much like Washington, still has strong hopes for improved relations with a post-Mao China. Hence, while the Soviets do not like the US-China courtship, it does not follow that they are likely to instigate new tensions, and it may not be necessary to do so. Mao's overture to Washington has very probably come at the cost of serious divisions within the Chinese leadership—in the political as well as the military ranks. If the Americans rebuff him and the US-China relationship turns cold again, the Russians will likely be standing in the wings, ready to offer a hand to Mao's successors.

5 Primarily, the Chinese want the United States to abandon what they regard as policies of intervention, containment, and counterrevolution in Asia. Getting the Americans to withdraw from Taiwan, one way or another, is crucial to achieving these aims. For, as Peking sees it, once the US acknowledges that the island's future is wholly an internal Chinese issue, the mantle of American supremacy in Asia will speedily fall away—for all to see—and the way will be cleared for Taipei's eventual accommodation with Peking and for the early abandonment of anti-China policies by Peking's Asian neighbors.

What Peking wants and what she may be able to get are two different things. The Americans have not

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yet decided: 1) whether or how to divest themselves of Taiwan; and 2) how any disposition of Taiwan would affect the role Washington wants Japan to play in Asia. Naturally the Chinese would like the US to move toward a "One China" policy, using its great economic leverage on Japan to ensure that Tokyo also accepts Taiwan's early return to the mainland. Realistically, however, Peking must conclude that Washington intends to keep all options open for a number of years into the future.

The real meaning China must see behind the current talk of "One China, One Taiwan" or "One China, but not now" is that both ideas serve Washington's need to buy time—time to create a new political-military structure in East Asia centered around Japan; time to see if a post-Mao China requires less or more "containment"; time for Taiwan to be more fully incorporated into the Japanese orbit so that the absorption of what will soon be a radically different Chinese society on Taiwan will seem a disproportionately hard task, even to Peking, and hence may be abandoned. If this should be the path that Washington decides to take—and Peking must be wary that it may be—then the old sources of US-China conflict are more likely simply to take new forms than to disappear.

Richard L. Walker

Communist doctrine proclaims that the Western world is destined to move through a succession of business cycles caused by inherent contradictions within the system, and these will bring about the inevitable downfall of capitalism. Had we an equally deterministic and dialectic view of the Communist states, we might be tempted to present Peking's new diplomacy as an expected phase in regular periods of tension and relaxation—three to four years in duration—which have followed each other with remarkable regularity since the establishment of the PRC in October 1949. There just may be something to this notion. Mao's style of rule has involved internal drives and tension, in the economic and social spheres as well as in politics, which, when the point of diminishing returns has been reached, have always eased up.

Interestingly enough, these interims have been clearly reflected in the foreign policy of the PRC. During periods of relaxation the talented and charming Chou En-lai emerges as the leader who is the seeming embodiment of an apparently new and eminently reasonable policy in Peking. Following the initial purges and mass drives and the external hostility wrought by the Korean War (1950-53), Chou proved the flexible representative of the new line of the *panch shila*—the five principles of peaceful coexistence—and the Bandung Spirit (1954-57). Again, following the frenzy of the Great Leap and its hostile external manifestations in the Taiwan Straits and against Japan, India, and the USSR (1958-61), it was the flexible Chinese Premier who emerged as the reasonable man, went off on an African safari, and persuaded de Gaulle as well as several new African states that the Chinese political scene had been stabilized and that smooth relations with the PRC could be expected over the long-run future (1962-65).

But then came the Cultural Revolution (1966-69), and Peking's behavior and hostility were enough to make all but a few apologists apprehensive. The extremes of the Mao cult, including manifestations on the part of Chinese representatives abroad, seem unbelievable when seen from the perspective of the 1970's, when once again Premier Chou En-lai has appeared as the personification of an apparent new Chinese reasonableness. Can he, however, guarantee that Chairman Mao will not come forth once again with a new scheme for revolutionizing the Chinese and world scenes?

There are disquieting parallels between the latter days of Mao and Stalin. It is tempting to speculate whether we have seen the last of the purges, for over the past 22 years we have watched Mao's former close comrades being removed from the stage one by one (to all appearances including, most recently, Mao's erstwhile heir-designate, Lin Piao). Could there be yet future victims of the aging visionary, Mao, whose determination to remake the Chinese nation continues to be frustrated by a cultural legacy which not even he can escape?

Whether or not we accept a deterministic approach to the ebb and flow of policies in the PRC, it has nevertheless been clear in the past two decades that internal factors have had primacy in deciding the thrust of Peking's policies. A continuation of Chou En-lai's reengagement with the outside world will likely depend more than anything upon the nature of the continuing succession struggle and the stability of his own position inside the PRC. The flux within the top levels in Peking makes it

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apparent that we still cannot write or speak with any degree of assurance about "the leadership" there, as if it were a cohesive group with policies and plans set for the 1970's.

The foregoing provides at least the framework of a historical perspective within which one may view Peking's present decision to join the world.

1 As the purges of the Cultural Revolution drew to a close in 1969 (though some of the spillover even now continues to agitate mainland China), Chinese leaders as perceptive as Chou En-lai and some of his colleagues must have had powerful arguments for a change in direction. The previous period, which had begun in 1965 with the failure of the Communists' attempted coup in Indonesia, had seen a confluence of developments whose quantitative weight called out for a qualitative change. Internally, after political and economic disruptions and major social dislocations, including the forced movement to the countryside and frontiers of tens of millions of young Maoist stalwarts, China needed to rebuild the ruling party, the economy, and confidence in the leadership. Externally, relations with the outside world were in a parlous state, owing in large measure to the extremist actions of such factions as the "May 16th Group." Perhaps there was a realization within the leadership that only a dramatic Leninist-type reversal of course could be expected to produce a reaction in Peking's favor on the part of world leaders concerned about their relations with the Middle Kingdom.

More important in leadership calculations were the great changes which had taken place in the world environment in the period since Mao launched his Great Leap in 1958. Some of these changes deserve listing, because in our concentration on the Sino-Soviet conflict—which obviously is a major factor behind the new line in Peking—there has been a tendency to overlook what might be other important areas of interest to the leaders of a "new tide."

A. The surge in economic and attendant political power of the "New Japan" stands at the top of the list. For example, when the 1970 trade statistics came out, it was probably not difficult for Peking to appreciate that Japan's more than $38 billion in foreign trade offered Tokyo remarkable political leverage and bargaining power in the Pacific basin and particularly in Southeast Asia. When recent history is taken into account, it is not difficult to understand why China, more than most nations, should be apprehensive about Japan's new economic prowess.

B. A related factor was the growing interdependence of many Asian areas—Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and even Australia, besides Japan—in a web of new multinational activities from which China had excluded herself. Many of the patterns of trade, travel, communications, and corporate undertakings which had grown up around China, particularly in the decade of the 1960's, were becoming locked in. Further isolation from these trends would have placed Peking's representatives at an increasing disadvantage when the time came to reengage with the world.

C. The acceleration of technological change, perhaps best symbolized by communications satellites and a computer net linking countries around China, must have thrown into high relief some of the costs of Maoist approaches to the contemporary world—for example, the closure of institutions of higher learning in China for more than three years during the Cultural Revolution.

D. The past decade had witnessed the emergence of new patterns of cooperation for development among some of the very nations Peking once thought it could influence with its own "model" for economic progress. The activity of such organizations as the Asian Development Bank, the World Health Organization and the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, which operate within the framework of the United Nations, possibly provided an added incentive for the PRC to enter the world body. Far from offering a model, the Chinese leaders may have decided that they themselves could benefit from the experience and guidance which these international bodies had to offer.

E. Finally, there was the new posture of the United States. The Nixon Doctrine and a series of initiatives from Washington probably provided the ultimate catalyst for the new formulas from Peking. A withdrawal of the stabilizing US influence from the Western Pacific might suddenly have seemed more dangerous in the eyes of Chou En-lai than that monster, "American imperialism," which he had been excoriating for more than 25 years. After all, the Chinese had not really encountered any "American imperialists" for more than two decades in the place which mattered most to them—China. With Soviet military power waxing in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and with Japanese economic power creating major ties of dependence on Tokyo around

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the borders of China, Washington's representatives probably looked far less ferocious. (It is in fact this author's view that before too many years have passed, Peking's leaders may quietly inform Washington that although they must denounce it in public, they would prefer to see the United States-Japanese security treaty retained as a way of discouraging further Japanese rearmament.)

Such factors as the above were perceived by the Nixon administration in Washington. They offered a chance for an imaginative initiative toward Peking, an initiative which was sustained and convincing enough to persuade Chou En-lai to respond. But he had to wait until his position *vis-à-vis* the Cultural Revolutionists and mass mobilizers (including Lin Piao) was sufficiently strong to let him carry through a major change of direction.

2 A real problem which Peking's new diplomacy presents for Chou is the possibility of an upsurge of internal ferment of the sort which plagued Soviet leaders after the "Thaw." It is difficult for the Chinese Communists to enter actively into intercourse with other nations without exposing many of their upcoming young leaders to realities which China's controlled media have never disclosed—thereby revealing a world in which the "all-powerful thought of Mao Tse-tung" has little relevance. Chou En-lai has also had to make a calculation weighing the advantages of an attempt to enter actively into the new technological era through active interchange with the West against the costs of undermining Peking's position of revolutionary leadership, particularly in adjacent areas of Asia. Obviously Asia's chief Stalinist, Kim Il-song, was stunned by the shift in the PRC's policy: it took 22 days before Pyongyang figured out how to handle the announcement of Dr. Henry Kissinger's visit to Peking. The Naxalites in India must also be confused and feel that their Chinese comrades have "gone soft on capitalism."

On the other hand, Peking has made it clear that the normalization of state-to-state relations does not necessarily mean a relaxation of support for revolutionary violence in the cause of "liberation." It is here that the euphoria attendant upon the PRC's UN membership and the smiles from the Chinese Premier can prove disarming. It is worth noting that in the month bracketing the visit by the American ping-pong team to Peking in April 1971, the Chinese Communists made a quantum jump forward in their outward expressions of support for revolutionary forces. Their moves included the inauguration of a new clandestine radio station backing the activity of the insurgents in Burma, a portentous statement on the second anniversary of the New People's Army in the Philippines, and new pledges of solidarity with the Palestine Liberation Organization. State-to-state relations will not be allowed to preclude Peking's selective assistance—including cadre training and in some cases logistics support—for insurgencies in the Third World.

3 East and Southeast Asia, however, remain the major areas of concern for the PRC. One way in which Peking could compete with the growing influence of Japan would be to exploit its potential for winning support among the overseas Chinese. But this would be no easy task. On the one hand, there is the problem that such an approach might aggravate local anti-Chinese sentiments; and there is also the problem of the still not inconsequential influence of a rival claimant to Chinese loyalties, namely Taiwan—where, among other types of contact, thousands of overseas Chinese students are annually in residence getting a traditional Chinese-type education.

Taiwan obviously remains a priority consideration in Peking's foreign policy and a source of great sensitivity. This was clearly demonstrated in the PRC's vehement reaction to the Nixon-Sato joint communiqué of November 21, 1969, announcing agreement on the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. In particular, Peking was greatly agitated over phrasing which linked Japanese security with that of Taiwan. We can anticipate that Chou En-lai will exert maximum economic and diplomatic pressures upon Japan and other countries in the Western Pacific to try to isolate the government on Taiwan. The long-standing political division over the "China question" in Japan, intensified by the surprise element in the White House's overture to Peking, will offer the PRC an opportunity to play up the Taiwan issue as a threat to peace and to exploit other problems in the US-Japanese relationship.

4 A China which is actively and positively engaged in political activities around the world, including occupation of a seat on the United Nations Security Council, can be a much more serious chal-

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lenge to Soviet claims for world Communist leadership than was the angry, introspective giant of the Cultural Revolution period. During the times when the Chinese pose is represented by Chou En-lai's smiles, it is easy to forget that the major leaders in the PRC remain first-generation, dedicated Communist true-believers (Nehru forgot this to his great sorrow). Yet in fact, ideological conviction lends intensity to Chinese relations with the Soviets—whether on a competitive, antagonistic, or accommodating course.

It must be assumed that the Chinese Communist leaders, including Chou, regard their new flexibility toward the West and in the Soviet Union's East European backyard as giving them a bargaining power which they did not possess at the time of the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969, and which they now urgently need in face of the Soviets' clearcut military superiority. Yet it is not inconceivable that they might hope eventually to parlay their new position into an acceptable rapprochement with the Soviet Union aimed at a revival of that unified world Communist movement which both sides assert they seek.

5 Peking's loosening-up process has just started. It would be foolish to think that renewed contacts with China offer outsiders much opportunity to influence the course of internal political developments in what remains highly authoritarian system. Those who are working their way to top positions under the aging Maoist elite are not Fabian Socialists or Confucian gentry; they are tough practitioners of revolutionary violence. While we may now be entering a period of seemingly smooth relations with the PRC, this should not becloud our understanding of the underlying ethos of the Chinese Communist structure.

The leaders now directing Peking's policies have clearly decided to regularize relations with the world. While we can exert every effort to expand contacts with the Chinese people and to keep those relations smooth, much will depend upon the ultimate resolution of the succession struggle in China. The issue is far from settled. The big question is whether there will be time for the world to build *enough interdependent relations with the PRC to* make a return to hostility too high a price for the Chinese to pay, even if someone in the leadership should start thinking about a new Cultural Revolution.

Edward Friedman

1 The question should have been: Why did the Nixon administration undertake new initiatives towards the People's Republic of China? President Nixon had already moved on such matters as reducing US naval patrols in the Taiwan Straits, ending overflights of Chinese territory, and suspending most US-imposed restrictions on trading with China. To stress the Chinese response rather than the Nixon initiatives would incorrectly suggest that there may have been some previous serious overture to Peking which the Chinese turned down. The fact is that this was Washington's first serious opening to the new China. And the Mao Tse-tung government of course accepted it.

I say "of course" because as early as 1949 Mao explained that China would do business with anyone, that the door was open for commercial transactions. However, this and subsequent Chinese overtures over a span of two decades were more than rebuffed by successive American administrations. President Truman initiated the US embargo on trade with the new China even before its government formally took power in 1949. This was followed by a series of further unfriendly American acts, and in 1963 President Kennedy even contemplated bombing China to keep her from manufacturing nuclear weapons. Yet, in 1964, China's Foreign Minister declared that "our policy of peaceful coexistence does not exclude any country, not even the United States," further expressing "hope that Sino-American relations can improve." [1]

Into 1965, further Chinese overtures were reportedly conveyed to Washington by Canadian, French, and Japanese intermediaries. But the Johnson administration paid little heed to these, having apparently persuaded itself that world peace depended on US action to combat what it saw as "proxy" Chinese aggression in Indochina. Now hoping for cooperation with Moscow, the Johnson administration could not respond positively to such indications as the 1966 report of a Japanese visitor to Peking "that the real target of Chinese antago-

[1] Quoted in W. C. Adie, "China's Foreign Policy II, The Developed World," *The World Today* (London), June 1968, p. 267.

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nism is not the United States so much as the Soviet Union.[2] In sum, the Kennedy-Johnson policies based on detente with the Soviet Union and the goal of US primacy in the Third World treated China as a major competitor and enemy and thus closed the door to Chinese overtures.

The Mao Tse-tung/Chou En-lai forces responsible for the long series of overtures to Washington were at times (especially in 1958 and again in 1967) overridden by the anti-American opposition within the leadership when their moves went unreciprocated by the US. Still, the major leadership elements around Mao apparently believed that since America's vital interest did not extend to continental Asia, Washington would eventually accept Peking's view that America and China need not be major enemies. Mao and Chou acted on this vision as far back as 1944 when they sought talks with President Roosevelt and again in 1946 when, against the will of many of their colleagues, they accepted the Marshall mission.

Thus, contrary to the view of those in the West who see the last two decades of the cold war in Asia solely as an American response to a Chinese threat, the ruling groups in Peking know that they have often risked much to achieve normal state-to-state relations with the United States. And now they are aware that President Nixon also has assumed political risks at home in attempting an opening to China.

2 Most Western analysts misconstrue China's reading of interstate relations because they project their own emphasis on personal and politico-military factors and slight China's Leninist stress on structural and economic matters. These analysts, disagreeing with the Chinese on the major dynamics of the international world, have too often written off insightful Chinese estimates of world trends as empty words, dangerous ignorance, or ideological bias. Yet, whereas these Western experts as late as 1970 were insisting that no improvement in US relations with China was possible for many years, Chinese analysts had concluded that the deteriorating US international economic position would finally oblige Washington to undertake an opening toward China. Consequently, in November 1968, even before the Cultural Revolution had ended, China made a formal overture to the new American President-elect.

Perhaps because their own difficult situation had long sensitized them to the consequences of economic constraints that impose unhappy choices on ruling groups, the Chinese quite early saw the need for America to abandon its superpower position and thus open up a new world, a non-bipolar world, in state-to-state relations. The Chinese noted the inability of the Johnson administration to give India the large-scale aid it needed, which left India more dependent on Russian largesse. And during Mr. Nixon's election campaign Chinese analysts caught his insistence that America had to make choices and that the industrial world came first, suggesting that the Kennedy-Johnson policies of ever more spending on guns and butter and concentrating on combating Third World revolutions—policies which made China the hypostatized enemy and Russia an occasional ally in maintaining the global status quo —would be slighted or abandoned. Thus, the change in Washington appeared to the Chinese to open the way for frank discussions about the future of Asia.

Indeed, the present fundamental reshaping of international arrangements was already inherent in the situation at the end of the 1950's. Western Europe then broke with the strict American embargo against China and offered Peking an alternative to an increasingly distasteful dependence on the Soviet Union for advanced industrial equipment. So-called economic miracles in France, West Germany, and Japan revived their war-ruined economies and undermined US economic domination of the capitalist world. Monolithic capitalism was giving way to what one Chinese analyst termed "polycentric capitalism." France under de Gaulle was already asserting her monetary as well as political independence. The Chinese moved more of their international dealings away from unstable and US-dependent British sterling to the French franc, increased trade with Japan's monopoly capitalists in the hope of enhancing Japanese nationalist urges to take the de Gaulle road, and generally tried to further the ability of both the United States' and Russia's industrial allies to act independently of the two superpowers.

Ironically, this decade-old Peking policy of allying with the so-called "second intermediate zone" (*e.g.*, Romania, Yugoslavia, France, Germany)—which was mainly a rationalization of China's need for advanced industrial equipment in a world offering no other sources than these or the United States

[2] Reported in *US News & World Report* (Washington DC), Oct. 24, 1966, p. 83.

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(which refused to trade with China) and the Soviet Union (which tried to exploit China's economic dependencies in order to dictate to her)—has been ideologically undermined by the weakening of the US international economic position.

To clarify this, let us examine the dilemma that China may now face as an outgrowth of the Maoist commitment to allying with all who can be allied with against the major enemy. From the late 1940's, this enemy was considered to be US imperialism, which ignored China's overtures and carried out a hostile, forward strategy against China. By the late 1950's the deterioration of the US economic position began to accelerate. Inflation became endemic. The rate of productivity increase declined. Gold flowed out till in 1971 the US reserve was less than what many considered a security minimum. Faith that the weakened dollar (see Seymour Harris, Ed., *The Dollar in Crisis,* New York, 1961!) would be bailed out by the strengthened yen, mark, and franc proved ill-founded. Mao and Chou evidently concluded that President Nixon must realize that he had no choice but to pull back from expensive overseas adventures, and that this might open the way for profitable discussions of Asian politics with the US President. But here lies China's dilemma. If the US is no longer dominant, then won't growing Chinese ties with Europe serve mainly to strengthen European neo-colonial control of former colonies in the Third World? In that case China becomes an enemy of the world's anti-imperialist peoples. Similarly, if it is Japan rather than America that is gaining economic hegemony over East and Southeast Asia, then won't opposition to America again put China on the side of major, growing neo-colonialisms? In short, the Chinese leaders find themselves compelled by present international realities to choose among options none of which is harmonious with their value preferences. If, indeed, the Nixon visit does produce a successful Sino-US rapprochement, ruling circles in Peking may be forced to rethink the very fundamentals of their foreign policy.

3 The Chinese have paid the closest attention to the consequences of the new international economic realities for Japan's future foreign policies. Paying close attention, however, does not mean that the Chinese can do much about the situation, even about tendencies which they very much fear. Financially and economically, China remains a relatively weak nation in comparison to Japan or America. In 1958 China broke off economic ties with Japan in an attempt to assert her independence and to exert pressure on the Kishi government, which had chosen to align itself with Chiang Kai-shek and with the Dulles anti-Communist containment policies in Asia. Yet, within a year Peking was forced to seek a face-saving way to reestablish the beneficial trade relations with Japan, and by 1963 these ties had developed to a point where they were beginning to alienate the Japanese Left from a Chinese government that appeared to have become closely associated with Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party.

Similarly today, the practical issue of the moment is not China's long-range predictions of Japanese political and military expansion to follow on Japan's growing economic hegemony in Asia, but rather the increasing economic ties between the ruling groups in Tokyo and Peking. As the 1960's ended, for example, a major Japanese shipping line, apparently aided by government-backed bank loans, allowed a dummy firm in Hong Kong to rent ships to Chinese agents to carry some of the PRC's trade with Europe. The Chinese, worried about scarce foreign exchange needed to purchase and stockpile strategic materials, thus gained a way to undercut the oligopolistic prices of European ship charterers, and the Japanese shipping line acquired a bargaining counter toward gaining previously-denied entry into the lucrative, powerful, and European-dominated Far Eastern Freight Conference. Generally committed to making China an advanced industrial power as swiftly as possible, China's ruling group increased imports from Japan in 1970 by almost 50 percent even while they denounced growing Japanese militarism.

This is not to suggest that the Chinese are not genuinely anxious over potential Japanese militarism. Rather it is to highlight how little independent force China can bring to bear in international relations. The previously-mentioned partial switch by the Chinese from the pound to the franc was mainly a matter of squirming between hard currencies controlled by one imperialist or another. They sought to safeguard China's hard-earned foreign exchange against British devaluation of the pound by turning to the franc, only to have this alternative backfire when the French uprisings of May 1968 hurt the franc.

There has been a regrettable tendency among some Western analysts to argue against, rather than to investigate, Chinese charges of tendencies to-

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ward Japanese militarism in Asia. It is understandable that these analysts, who have staked so much on the notion of a Japan made pacifist, guilt-conscious, and allergic to nuclear weaponry by her defeat in World War II and subsequent US occupation, should insist that a Japanese economy dependent on international oceanic peace and led by men who do not even want economic war or anything else reminiscent of the sources of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor should ridicule the Chinese and point to an alleged fundamental contradiction in the Chinese position. How can the Chinese, they argue, claim to fear Japan and still demand that the Pentagon's weaponry be removed from Asia when, without the US military (and nuclear) presence, Japan would more swiftly rearm, go the nuclear route, and heighten tensions and the likelihood of great power hostilities in Asia?

But where, then, is the fundamental transformation of Japan? Chinese Marxists—and not only Chinese Marxists—have trouble believing that a supposedly reformed Japanese psyche constitutes sufficient resistance to overwhelming international politico-economic demands. Herman Kahn recently said of Japan in Asia, "This is Japan's natural area of expansion. If you have a dynamic country like Japan with an economic backwater area which is relatively primitive and undefended, the idea of taking over is as natural as Americans taking over what is now the western United States." He added, "If necessary, with troops." [3] Former Japanese Defense Agency head Yasuhiro Nakasone himself, in the autumn of 1970, stated: "Japan will actively invest her capital in Southeast Asia and will own sizable assets in this area. This will give rise to rights and interests and a vital frontier. In order to defend them, Japan will eventually require military strength." [4]

Actually an extreme vision of Japanese expansion is as dangerous as the view of a pacifist Japan. What the Chinese are saying is rather that moves now in such places as Korea and Southeast Asia toward nations independent of great-power military occupation would increase the likelihood of peace and development of all nations with interests in the region. But progress in such a direction is most likely only if major powers such as the United States or the Soviet Union similarly feel a need for such movement.

[3] Interview with Herman Kahn, *ibid.*, Feb. 8, 1971, p. 62.

[4] Quoted in S. Budkevich and M. Raginsky, "The Tokyo Trials, A Reminder," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 8, 1971, p. 74.

Meanwhile, the Japanese government must extrapolate from such things as the deterioration of the US economic position, the political power of various protectionist interests in the US, and the recent American surcharge on imports. While fervently hoping to improve relations with Washington and halt these anti-Japanese tendencies, the ruling faction of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party cannot simply wait to see if America goes further down an anti-Japanese and protectionist route. Instead, it must prepare for a defense of what it considers its vital international economic interests.

Japan is moving toward an autarkic, yen-dependent area of cheap-labor regions such as Korea and Formosa and raw material areas such as Indonesia. Japan's foreign exchange surplus will be turned not only to aid, investment, and various other attractions to win over the elites of such areas, but also to military preparations with which to back up her political will. The point, then—and Chou En-lai clearly understands this—is not that Japan is about to launch some military adventure today. Rather, a continuation of developing tendencies means that a broadening of Japan's military role in Asia is an all too likely prospect.

Yet, the Chinese can do little about it. Indeed they must improve relations with Japan's rulers. Once we are aware of the extremely minimal leverage the PRC can bring to bear against even this single potential danger to its security, we must begin to question the general assumption that it has been necessary to balance an essentially agrarian China with the might of the world's three major industrial powers—America, Russia, and Japan—when China's steel output, one index of military potential, is but five percent of theirs.

4 Meanwhile the group around Mao is happy with the prospect of warmer relations with Washington. It reduces the likelihood that hawks in the Soviet Union can win the upper hand and launch a preemptive strike against China's nuclear installations, possibly followed by a march on Peking, which is only a few hundred miles from the Mongolian border. Peace increases the probabilities of more normal state-to-state relations and higher levels of trade with the USSR, both of which Peking would welcome.

Of course, there are groups in China, especially in the army and the party, which would prefer friendship with Russia to compromises with Amer-

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ica. These groups previously benefited from such things as Russian military equipment but will not benefit similarly from reconciliation with America. They would prefer to compromise some Chinese sovereignty momentarily in a deal with the USSR against America rather than try to maneuver independently with and against the two giants. The passing of Mao, who has so deeply undercut party dictatorship, and the failure of his opening to America could help to win power for these more pro-Russian and anti-American elements.

Only if the centrality of opposition to US imperialism as a pillar of post-1948 Chinese thinking on interstate relations is fully grasped can one discern the new possibilities that might flow from a successful Maoist diplomacy undermining that experiential and conceptual underpinning. If Washington were to turn away from its forward strategy in Asia, Peking for its part might move away from unhappy choices imposed by antagonistic American moves. For example, the continued praise of Stalin in Maoist China precludes a full airing and analysis of the unfortunate consequences of the Stalinist path. China's praise of Stalin surely is not based on any liking for Stalin's agrarian prescriptions, for his purges, for his treatment of East Europe, or for his ill-conceived policies toward China prior to 1949. It seems based rather on Stalin's backing of China's refusal to give in to US military pressure and nuclear threats during the Korean War, in contrast to Khruschev and his successors, who refused in 1958 to support China in the Taiwan Straits confrontation. If the US eschews hostility toward China and opposition to US imperialism ceases to be a foundation stone of China's foreign policy, then there will be no need for Peking to use Stalin as a brick to beat his allegedly "too soft on America" successors. Surely we must all be aware of the liberating potential inherent in a more openly critical Chinese attitude toward Stalin.

5 Chinese and American leaders have very different notions as to what all this change—and potential further change—may mean. To be sure, both presently prefer a world of negotiation among nation states. Nonetheless, Mr. Nixon's hope that we are entering a harmonious era of commerce, not war, seems a bit of wishful thinking to Chinese analysts who are Leninists, not Comtians. They do not see commercial competition as inexorably leading to world peace. Rather, the origins of World War I and the subsequent Japanese invasion of China indicate to China's Leninists that, unless more is done politically, interimperialist economic competition in the Pacific may explode once again in a war which can wreck China. The Mao-Chou leadership appears willing to negotiate, bargain, and compromise to help avoid such a destructive development.

To be sure, this pattern of ordinary power politics which emerges in Peking is rationalized by an ideological assumption that China is the center of world revolution. As Chinese analysts see it, this center has been consolidated by the Cultural Revolution. Meanwhile a new bureaucratic class has emerged to reverse the revolutionary gains of the Soviet Union. In addition, second-rank capitalist powers have grown immensely stronger and have harnessed Third World economies to the industrial areas. Neocolonialism has scored great gains as it has overwhelmed the newly independent nations and tied them to an international division of labor serving the needs of the major industrial countries. Havana, for example, is thus dependent on Moscow.

The situation, as the Chinese judge it, does not favor immediate revolutionary change. The defeat of imperialism is seen as a historical task requiring centuries more. Meanwhile China concentrates on her own development and on normal state-to-state relations; and she waits. Momentous upheavals are predicted for the future, but Mao is not clear on when or what will bring that future into being. At least as much as US leaders are sincere in their commitment to democracy, so Chinese leaders are sincere in their revolutionary commitment and in their preference for aiding people fighting against foreign domination. Whether this makes Chinese foreign policy revolutionary depends much on whether or not one accepts China's Hegel-like claim to embody the revolutionary essence. Even here, Chinese leaders seem humbled by the reality of their nonrevolutionary policy in places such as Ceylon, Pakistan, and Burma. China remains revolutionary mainly to the extent that its own society continues to embody a genuine and continuing struggle for social equality, the devolution of power, and experiments with popular institutions which limit hierarchical, bureaucratic control. Clearly, whatever the state and potential of Leninist-Maoist theory and social practice, the Mao-Chou diplomacy is not now and virtually never has been practically premised on a primary commitment to world anti-imperialist revolution.

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Books

International Triangle

By Uri Ra'anan

O. EDMUND CLUBB: *China and Russia.* New York, Columbia University Press, 1971.
WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH: *Cold War and Coexistence: Russia, China and the US.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971.

CONTEMPORARY ANALYSES of the complex interplay between the US, China and the USSR have suffered from what could be described as "linear" thinking. Both observers and practitioners of international affairs have tended to take a one-dimensional view of Sino-Soviet, Sino-American and Soviet-American affairs respectively, concentrating in each case on issues that directly and immediately concern the particular pair of protagonists under study. On the whole, little effort has been made to see how far the state of Sino-American relations, for instance, may be regarded as a function of the Sino-Soviet and American-Soviet conflicts.

Thus, much ink has been spilled over the putative role of such questions as Chinese membership in the UN, Taiwan, and Vietnam in the development of the Washington-Peking dialogue. Considerably less attention has been paid, however, to the areas where rivalry with the third party, the USSR, has created parallel Chinese and American interests: In Eastern Europe, for example, both Peking and Washington would presumably favor steps that might discourage the Kremlin from resorting to any "Czechoslovak measures" against the autonomist aspirations of Bucharest, Belgrade and Tirana. For that matter, next to the Mao regime itself, the US government clearly would be the party most strongly motivated to deter possible Soviet moves against the PRC, since aggressive steps on Moscow's part, if successful, could relegate China once more to the status of a Russian dependency or could result in her dismemberment and neutralization as a power, freeing the Kremlin from all future concern about Russia's eastern flank. Another probable convergence of Sino-American interests relates to Soviet attempts to debouch into the general area of the Indian Ocean —a thrust which both Washington and Peking cannot help but wish to block, whether at the Suez Canal or farther east.

It is only when expanded along such lines that studies of this topic may be regarded as more than one-dimensional, gaining breadth as well as length by relating the interplay between two of the protagonists to their policies toward the third power. However, to achieve full perspective, even this is not sufficient; to come up with a truly three-dimensional picture, the observer has to allow for the fact that, in analyzing their behavior in the international arena, none of the three powers can be regarded as entirely monolithic.

This, to be sure, has always been true of the US; however, detailed studies of Chinese and Soviet policy formation, utilizing some of the techniques of content analysis, reveal internal differences hardly less profound than in the West (albeit of a factional type), especially with regard to the line to be adopted by Peking or Moscow toward the other two powers.

As this reviewer has attempted to demonstrate elsewhere,[1] Mao's Great Cultural Revolution was immediately preceded, if not actually precipitated, by a semi-public "debate" between competing factions in Peking over Chinese strategy toward the US and the USSR. In the light of documentation now available concerning this episode, as well as similar developments in the recent history of

[1] In his paper, "Peking's Foreign Policy 'Debate' 1965-66," in *China in Crisis,* ed. by Prof. Tang Tsou, Vol. II, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968.

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the Soviet Union,[2] it may not be unreasonable to regard relations between the three states, to some extent at least, as a function of their internal conflicts. Admittedly, factions within a Communist party leadership tend to be essentially "feudal" entities—based on links of personal allegiance between chieftains and retainers, in a descending pyramid of fealties and dependencies—rather than issue-oriented groups, as in the West. However, in periods of uneasy internal balance, Communist factions often utilize specific policy slogans as battle cries, so to speak, with which to rally supporters and intimidate opponents. In this respect, the problem of the strategy to be implemented toward the other two major powers has played a particularly significant role in certain of the conflicts within both the CCP and the CPSU.

Thus, a satisfactory study of any of these apparently straightforward and "bilateral" relationships, whether Sino-Soviet, Sino-American or Soviet-American, in fact requires highly "orchestrated" and correspondingly complex treatment. This factor alone, not to speak of considerations of research, would seem to call for analyses in depth, focusing upon a relatively brief span of history or on one primary topic, rather than cosmic attempts à la Toynbee. Developments under the Ming and the Grand Dukes of Muscovy, for instance, are undoubtedly of historic interest and provide scope for an author's display of encyclopedic knowledge, but they may not be entirely essential to the reader's understanding of the state of contemporary Sino-Soviet relations; such coverage can even be counterproductive if it preempts the space required for study of the significant factors that have been enumerated here. After all, the Sino-Soviet confrontation is basically the result of a rift with ideological overtones between two Communist parties and states, even if there are certain historic memories in both countries that help to exacerbate the problem.

It is this aspect, rather than any niggardly desire to carp at a generally erudite and interesting book, that compels the reviewer to voice some reservations about O. Edmund Clubb's latest work. The author's breadth of knowledge is unquestionable, and his many years of immersion in the subject are evident. Moreover, his treatment of local foci of tension, especially in the chapters dealing with Sinkiang, is most competent and informative. However, apart from an epilogue of some 11 pages, under the heading "Chinese, Russians and Americans," the book never really comes to grips with the underlying issues; essentially, it remains a compendium of events in Chinese and Russian history, lacking a basic, coherent theme—other than the obvious fact that geographic propinquity has forced the two states, over a period of several centuries, to pay considerable attention to each other. The absence of a *Leitmotif* may not be the author's fault, since the topic may be too unwieldy to allow for one, but it does raise the question of what lasting contribution can be made by books with vast sweep but without real focus.

Prof. William E. Griffith's brief but useful survey of the triangular relationship has set itself a far less ambitious target. It is aimed primarily at a college audience; as such, of course, it is not intended to be judged on a par with Professor Griffith's earlier, major works of scholarship, which have profoundly affected the study of inter-Communist relations.[3] Nevertheless, it is a lucid outline, marked by flashes of insight into the policy options available to Moscow, Peking and Washington.

A study in depth of the tripolar relationships that have emerged during the last decade remains to be written. In all probability, it will have to be a cooperative enterprise, involving scholars, journalists, and ex-practitioners of international affairs.

[2] Cf. Robert Conquest, *Power and Policy in the USSR*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1961; David J. Dallin, *Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin*, Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co., 1961; John M. Mackintosh, *Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy*, London, Oxford University Press, 1962; Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, New York, F. A. Praeger, 1958; Arnold L. Horelik and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy*, University of Chicago Press, 1966; and this reviewer's *The USSR Arms the Third World*, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1969, Chapters 4 and 5.

[3] His major studies are *The Sino-Soviet Rift*, 1964; *Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift*, 1963; *Sino-Soviet Relations*, 1967; and William E. Griffith, Ed., *Communism in Europe*, 1966 (all published by the MIT Press, Cambridge).

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East European Economies

By Alan A. Brown and Egon Neuberger

US CONGRESS, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE: *Economic Developments in Countries of Eastern Europe—A Compendium of Papers.* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1970.

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS of the development of the countries of Eastern Europe is coming of age in the United States. As the dominance of the USSR over the political and economic affairs of the East European states comes under challenge, so too does the dominance of Soviet studies over East European studies. When the countries under observation were still satellites of the Soviet Union, slavishly imitating Big Brother, the attention of academic and government scholars—as well as research support—was chiefly concentrated on Soviet developments. But since ripples of independence have begun to surface and merge with successive waves of economic reform in Eastern Europe, the tide of Western research has begun to turn toward a greater interest in the economics of these states.*

Of course, study of East European economies cannot be totally divorced from the study of the Soviet economy. In fact, the real interest in analyzing the former lies in the fact that Eastern Europe has served—for better or for worse—as a testing ground for application of the Soviet model of economic development under very different conditions from those prevailing in the Soviet Union. The analyst of East European economic happenings could also reasonably be expected to benefit from the experience of earlier studies of the Soviet economy, or to borrow a phrase from Alexander Gerschenkron, to enjoy "the advantages of relative backwardness." Scholars of Soviet economics have long since hammered out many thorny issues of theory and statistical methodology. Furthermore, today's researcher may also apply the "technological improvements" of econometric analysis to the accumulating store of East European statistical data. Whether they do or not is another question, to which we shall return presently.

There are a variety of complementary approaches the researcher may take toward analysis of the economy of one or more East European countries, and it would be useful at this point to briefly outline the most salient. The first approach or step should probably be the construction of a model—either quantitative or qualitative. One must select appropriate criteria from which to evaluate performance (*e.g.*, the goals of the system's directors, to use Abram Bergson's phrase [1]) and must also choose the sets of variables to explain a given performance. In operational models, these variables are connected according to given functional relationships. Even if construction of a full-fledged econometric model is not feasible, there should at least be a clear statement of the hypothesis to be investigated and presentation of a conceptual framework of the economic process which identifies key variables and describes their relationships qualitatively. Once the theoretic framework is presented, the next step is to evaluate the available statistical data (input and output series). If the data are not sufficiently comprehensive or reliable, one may find it necessary to construct independent series.[2]

Having constructed a frame-

*An expanded version of this article is available in A. A. Brown and E. Neuberger, "Economic Analysis of Eastern Europe—A Review Essay," Stony Brook Working Paper No. 24, State University of New York, Stony Brook, February 1971.

[1] "The system's directors in the USSR seek diverse goals, but a cardinal concern is to assure the rapid growth of the economy." Bergson, *The Economics of Soviet Planning,* New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964, p. 7.

[2] The classic example of independently calculated Western series is Abram Bergson's "Adjusted Factor Cost Standard" (AFCS). Professor Bergson makes two kinds of adjustments for distortions in ruble prices in his calculation of Soviet real national income: 1) to assess the production potential, he recalculates national income on the basis of factor cost; and 2) to evaluate consumers' welfare, he recalculates household consumption by means of adjusted market prices. See his *The Real National Income of Soviet Russia Since 1928,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1961, Chapters 8-11.

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work, one has specified performance criteria; having solved the measurement problem, one has obtained appropriate data on inputs and outputs. The third step is to evaluate performance. This may be based on comparison with the given country's past performance (by means of a time series) or on comparison with the performance of other countries (by cross-sectional analysis). In the latter case, one must select an appropriate control group, *e.g.*, other countries at similar levels of development but with different economic systems, or countries at different levels of development with similar systems.

The comments which follow will concentrate (like the papers in the reviewed volume) on these three questions of models, measurements, and performance analysis. However, there are several other approaches which deserve mention in passing, even though their extensive application at this point of time may be precluded by the state of the art of Eastern-Europe-watching. For example, one may seek

to assess the quantitative significance of a given event in a differential fashion, that is to say, by comparing it with a situation that would have obtained in the absence of that event. . . . Asking such questions has come to be known as "counterfactual history." [3]

An example would be to analyze the hypothetical performance of Soviet agriculture assuming collectivization never occurred. Still another technique is to utilize abstract econometric models to simulate the hypothetical sensitivity of performance to certain changes in variables. When applied to historical data, this becomes "counterfactual history."

Finally, economists often go beyond description and analysis to attempt the prediction of future events. Unlike "counterfactual" history," which posits a radical change in one key variable, forecasting assumes that the model remains basically intact. The forecaster attempts to foresee the small, marginal changes likely to occur in key economic variables, if the underlying functional relationships remain unchanged.

WITH THESE methodological considerations in mind, we can now turn to examination of *Economic Developments in Countries of Eastern Europe: A Compendium of Papers,* published in 1970 by the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) of the US Congress. This ambitious undertaking, conceived by the late Leon Herman, examines key aspects of economic development in all East European countries, except Albania. The sixteen contributors to the *Compendium* address such topics as economic growth and productivity; demography and manpower; industry, energy, and agriculture; consumption and military spending; the utilization of computers; and the incipient growth of the automobile industry in Eastern Europe. There is also a brief treatment of the developments in Comecon (the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance), the two Germany's, and Yugoslavia.

The JEC collection is based in part on published and unpublished work of the Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe, formerly affiliated with Columbia University.[4] (Before long, analysts of East European economics should be able to sample the fruits of two other major research projects: (1) Papers and monographs sponsored by the project on East European economic development and systemic changes at Indiana University's International Development Research Center; and (2) Proceedings of the Research Conference on Economic Reform in Eastern Europe, sponsored by the Comparative Economic Program and the Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Michigan.)

Any one accustomed to the increasing sophistication of the JEC's earlier studies on the Soviet economy will doubtless be disappointed by this present collection on Eastern Europe.[5] First, the *Compendium* suffers from the lack of a unifying conceptual framework such as we discussed above. Second, the quality of the contributions is uneven, and too many of the underlying data are unfortunately omitted. Nor is there any apparent consistency in the methodology of calculations. Third, none of the recalculations of official East European data series appears to have been submitted to the critical comments of those who pioneered in research on Soviet output and input indexes. Likewise, there is a not-

[3] Alexander Gerschenkron, "Economic History and Economics," in Alan A. Brown, Egon Neuberger, and Malcolm A. Palmatier, Eds., *Perspectives in Economics,* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1971, p. 8.

[4] The list of monographs and Occasional Papers, published and unpublished, appears in the *Compendium,* pp. 65-66. Other "manuscripts will be published as Occasional Papers in due course" (p. 65).

[5] The earlier JEC studies included: *Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies,* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1959; *Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power,* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1962; and *New Directions in the Soviet Economy,* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1966.

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able lack of reference to seminal works on recalculations of Soviet data.

As for other methodological approaches to the study of East European economies, most of the papers do include time series, and many make cross-sectional comparisons. The papers on demography, the labor force, and energy also make projections into the future. The contributors generally eschewed techniques such as counterfactual history and sensitivity analysis, probably wisely leaving these sophisticated games to future economic historians, who will be able to operate on firmer ground.

Turning to some specific observations on the papers in the JEC's *Compendium,* we find it logical to start with John Hardt's study which, alone among the papers, constructs a model, based on the following premise:

An overarching factor guiding and limiting East European economic development has been the sovereignty asserted by the Soviet Union (p. 6).

He argues that this Soviet dominance resulted in a common pattern of development for the East European states, and in foreign economic relations geared to Soviet needs. Controlled by a Soviet-type central planning system, the development pattern stressed heavy industry and relegated light industry, foodstuffs, transportation, and housing services to the status of buffer, or low-priority, sectors. The pattern of the foreign trade of Eastern Europe during the Stalinist period (late 1940's and early 1950's) provided substantial gains to the USSR in relieving production bottlenecks, but at a very high cost to the East European economies. Incidentally, Hardt contends that "economically the Soviets gained *less* than the East Europeans lost" (p. 14), a very provocative statement which, while not unreasonable on the face of it, is not supported anywhere in this or any other essay of the *Compendium.*

Hardt suggests that East European economic development, while similar in many respects to that of the Soviet Union, has differed from that model in three important aspects: first, the external influence of the Soviet Union; second, the national-ethnic and institutional characteristics of the various countries (historical legacies); and third, the small size of the countries involved. There is a fourth difference that is implicit in the paper—the differential level of economic development (*e.g.,* in Czechoslovakia and East Germany the Soviet model was applied to countries in many ways more developed than the USSR).

According to Hardt, application of the Soviet development model in Eastern Europe achieved short-term successes, such as the building of an industrial base in each country, the improvement and modernization of military forces, the providing of assistance to Soviet economic development, and the generation of increased economic dynamism in Eastern Europe (compared to the general stagnation of the interwar period, particularly the 1930's). He also lists many failures, notably the lag in agriculture that changed Eastern Europe from a net exporter to a net importer of foodstuffs, the inability to sustain a high rate of growth over the long run, Stalin's inability to achieve bloc-wide economic integration (which might have provided Eastern Europe the benefits of a large, unified market), and various systemic legacies which impede necessary economic reforms today.

It is to the need for and the problems attendant to achieving economic reform in Eastern Europe that Hardt devotes the second part of his paper. He tentatively concludes that the reforms necessary to solve the critical discrepancy between failing performance and rising popular expectations (we might think of this as a new type of "scissors crisis") would have to be of a more fundamental nature than Soviet and East European leaders are likely to accept.

THE HARDT PAPER might have served as a frame of reference or an initial model for the other studies in the *Compendium,* but the remaining papers fail to discuss this model or even to outline such elementary matters as the overall goals of the individual economies studied or individual policy objectives—*e.g.,* economic stability, external equilibrium, or "equitable" distribution of income. The articles concentrate heavily on measurement of the traditional performance variables—growth of output, of productivity, and of per capita consumption, as in Thad P. Alton's "Economic Structure and Growth in Eastern Europe," Edwin M. Snell's "Economic Efficiency in Eastern Europe," Terence E. Byrne's "Levels of Consumption in Eastern Europe," Imogene Edward's "The Passenger Car Industries of Eastern Europe," J.G. Polach's "The Development of Energy in East Europe," Laszlo Czirjak's "Industrial Structure, Growth and Productivity in Eastern Europe," and Gregor Lazarcik's "Growth of Output, Expenses, and Gross and Net Output in Eastern European Agriculture." Measurement of labor inputs is also treated

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in a number of papers; however, with the exception of a brief discussion of education and health in the Snell study, the question of investment in human capital is ignored (*i.e.*, the volume concentrates on the quantitative, not the qualitative, aspects of labor inputs).

The majority of the articles dealing with the measurement problem and the evaluation of performance are based on the results of arduous labor by members of the Project on National Income in East Central Europe, mentioned above. They report series on gross national product (GNP) and on the output of various industrial branches and of agriculture, based on diverse official time series which have been adjusted through a complicated multistage aggregation process. As the authors themselves warn the reader, there are many problems connected with this approach.

In light of these problems, it is unfortunate that no alternative series, using different weighting specifications, are presented. The series presented generally employ weights based on mid-1950's data, despite significant structural changes in East European economies since that period. In countries with rapidly changing structures, the "index-number problem"—*i.e.*, the selection of base years for pricing inputs and output—is particularly critical, as noted by students of the Soviet experience, as well as by Alton and other contributors to the *Compendium*. Given the more uneven development of economic sectors in Eastern than in Western Europe, the choice of earlier prices for weighting rather than later prices tends to favor Eastern Europe in terms of growth-rate comparisons. One is also surprised by the use of a single rate of return on capital (10 percent) for recalculations instead of the customary two alternatives used in similar Western estimates of Soviet aggregate output series.[6] It is a pity that contributors to this collection passed up the opportunity to test whether the rate of growth is sensitive to alternative assumptions about the rate of return on capital.

There are other aspects of the GNP measurements which are disturbing. For example, Alton reports a stable pattern of growth for the Hungarian economy in the 1950's (p. 46). Official statistics show absolute declines in 1952, 1954 and 1956, with a particularly sharp drop in 1956. Alton's series shows only one very mild dip in 1956. The reader is particularly puzzled by this divergence when he learns that Alton's recalculated index gives a much larger weight to agriculture than does the official Hungarian index. Both 1952 and 1954 were bad years for Hungarian agriculture, and one would have expected Alton's GNP figures for those years to reflect the agricultural setbacks. The question should be pursued further, since a thorough analysis of growth ought to consider cyclical fluctuations.

It is a pity that the obvious wealth of available data on inputs and outputs was not used for a systematic analysis of the factors behind the growth of output.[7] Only Snell attempts to assess various aspects of comparative economic efficiency, but, despite his citation of the *New Directions* studies,[8] he fails to utilize the excellent methodological foundation developed therein.

Czirjak also examines the problem of productivity, but his method of measurement is outdated and his analysis confused. To address the latter point: we are told that "the real restraint of growth . . . is likely to be the short supply of capital. The declining productivities observed for Eastern Europe reflect these considerations" (p. 443). In fact, capital-output ratios have been increasing in Eastern Europe, while the growth rate of output has declined, a situation which suggests a relative abundance of capital. Although Czirjak does at one point acknowledge that "the declining productivity of capital may be a sign of capital substitution for labor, among other things" (p. 439), he fails to draw the logical conclusion that East European economies probably have found it increasingly difficult to digest massive infusions of capital. In effect, capital is becoming a less and less suitable substitute for labor as a spur to increased production.[9]

A final comment should be made concerning the method employed in the *Compendium* for calculating the average annual rates of growth reported in the various

[6] For example, on p. 303 of *New Directions . . .*, alternative rates of 8 and 13 percent were used.

[7] See for example the measurement of the contribution of technological change to growth in Edward F. Denison, *The Sources of Economic Growth in the United States and the Alternatives Before Us*, Supplementary Paper No. 13, New York, Committee for Economic Development, 1962, and also his *Why Growth Rates Differ*, Washington, Brookings Institution, 1967.

[8] He cites, *e.g.*, Michael Boretsky, "Comparative Progress in Technology, Productivity, and Economic Efficiency: USSR vs USA," *New Directions . . .*, pp. 133-256.

[9] In fact, preliminary calculations show that in Hungary the elasticity of substitution has approached zero. See A.A. Brown, "CES Production Function Estimates in Postwar Hungary," IDRC Internal Research Memorandum, MS, Bloomington, Indiana, International Development Research Center, Indiana University, May, 1970.

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papers. The only clue we find to the methodology utilized is a footnote to Alton's paper (p. 63), which states that the average annual rates were calculated by the "least-squares" method. Would that this were true; in fact, a check reveals that the growth rates reported by Alton are based on averages between beginning and end years. Similar averaging seems to have been employed in the other papers as well. Such an approach runs the risk of introducing distortion, because of possible unusual circumstances in either one of the terminal years. The least-squares method, a widely accepted statistical approach, takes *all* observed years into account and thereby eliminates terminal-year distortions.[10] Indeed, the effort to fit a least-square estimate to the Hungarian data would have been worth the effort. While Alton shows (p. 62) Hungarian GNP growing at 5.4 percent annually between 1950 and 1955 and at 3.9 percent annually between 1955 and 1960 (*i.e.*, the growth of GNP apparently decelerated markedly in the later period), the least-square estimate fitted to his own series of data on annual growth rates would have given nearly identical rates for both five-year periods (4.7 and 4.6 percent, respectively).[11]

We have highlighted some of the problems raised by the material presented in the JEC's *Compendium* not as a condemnation of the volume but as a warning that caution should be exercised in using the valuable statistical data presented therein. This collection has initiated a movement in the analysis of East European economics from the stage of underdevelopment to one in which the preconditions for sustained growth (hopefully in quality even more than in quantity) will have been established. The Indiana and Michigan projects mentioned earlier should complete this preparation for the takeoff.

[10] For a thorough discussion of alternative rate-of-growth calculations, see Boris P. Pesek, "Economic Growth and Its Measurement," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* (Chicago), April 1961, pp. 295-315.

[11] The least-square estimates come from the IDRC Data Bank, Indiana University.

Revisiting Russia

By Robert F. Byrnes

RUSSIA OBSERVED: Series I and II (91 reprints of eyewitness accounts of travelers to Russia from Tsarist times to the Second World War, selected by Harry W. Nerhood and Harmon Tupper). New York, Arno Press, 1970 and 1971.

RUSSIA HAS LONG been a source of fascination for Western scholars—a fascination which, in the postwar decades, has blossomed into a broad effort to study comprehensively this enormous and diverse country. This intensification of interest in Russia has occurred within the context of a general explosion of scholarship on all areas of the world located outside the traditional bounds of Western Europe and the United States. The broadening of horizons has also taken place during a period of unprecedented challenges to American institutions of higher learning—a time of rapidly growing enrollments and of shifting perceptions of the proper role of education in preparing students for participation in a world full of revolutionary political, social and cultural changes. Thus, those administrators and faculty members who have responded to the challenge of expanding the range of studies to include major non-Western areas have had to surmount enormous difficulties. Nevertheless, through the dedicated efforts of many people, they have been able to marshal adequate funds and organizational resources to find or train scholar-teachers capable of teaching and writing with discernment on many of the areas concerned.

But this solved only part of the problem: there remained a serious bibliographic gap concerning world affairs prior to the post-World-War-II explosion of knowledge. Fifty years ago or, even more so, a century ago, few libraries, even those of our greatest universities, had librarians with the foresight or with the available funds to acquire on a current basis the books and journals needed as primary sources for

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undergraduate instruction concerning the neglected non-Western areas of the world. Today one can easily identify for prompt acquisition the current publications of value on a given area with the assistance of book review columns in the professional journals or the annotated bibliographies published periodically by such organizations as the Council on Foreign Relations or the American Universities Field Staff. However, identification of the most useful and important volumes published in the decades and centuries before World War II on each of the non-Western areas is a more demanding proposition—one which requires a broad interdisciplinary knowledge of a given area spanning many centuries. Even when the volumes have been selected, there remains the problem of access and reproduction. In order to make these rare, out-of-print volumes available to a broad range of students, one must find a publisher willing to trust the judgment of the historian-bibliographer and to invest large sums of money in full knowledge that he will probably have to wait a long time to garner his return.

Such a combination of scholarship and entrepreneurship has occurred in the field of Russian history. The Arno Press, a publishing and library service of The New York Times Company, has recently released, under the title *Russia Observed,* reproductions of 91 out-of-print works written by travelers, diplomats, and others who journeyed in Russia as early as the mid-17th century and as recently as the early days of World War II.[1] The volumes were selected by Professor Harry Nerhood, author of *To Russia and Return: An Annotated Bibliography of Travelers' English-Language Accounts of Russia from the Ninth Century to the Present* (Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1970), and Harmon Tupper, a renowned traveler and author of *To the Great Ocean: Siberia and the Trans-Siberian Railway* (Boston, Little Brown, 1965).

This series is a most useful service to libraries in particular, but also to teachers and anyone else interested in Russia and the Soviet Union. It includes a group of primary sources, all previously out of print, largely memoirs or travel accounts, but occasionally studies written by men and women who had spent long periods of time in Russia and whose volumes are analyses or guides to particular areas. In every case, the volume is reproduced exactly as it was originally published, with only an additional new title page, which—in most cases—identifies the American library from which the original copy was obtained for reproduction. Almost all of the volumes were originally written in English, although a few, including some of the most important (such as Théophile Gautier's account of his visit to Russia, published in French in 1867 and in English in 1905) are translations from French or German. Nearly half of the volumes were written by Englishmen (or women), and about a third were by Americans. European Russia, especially Moscow and St. Petersburg, naturally attracted the most attention, and the nineteenth century, particularly the 1850's and 1860's, is more heavily represented than earlier periods, in part because that was the great age of travel by Englishmen. Central Asia and Siberia are well represented, but the Caucasus hardly at all. The First World War and the Allied intervention receive a great deal of attention because of the number of diplomatic and military memoirs concerning these exciting developments, which were published in the 1920's and soon went out of print. There are surprisingly few volumes on the 1920's and the 1930's.

The range and variety of matters covered in this series is quite impressive, although the quality of the observations varies widely. Take, for example, several of the books dealing with the demise of the Tsarist regime. Pierre Gilliard's *Thirteen Years at the Russian Court: A Personal Record of the Last Years and Death of the Czar Nicholas II and His Family* offers a remarkable firsthand picture of Nicholas II, his family, and their life from 1905 until death at Ekaterinburg in 1918. This intensely personal account, written by the French tutor of Tsarevich Alexis, gives the now familiar picture of Nicholas II as a patriotic, loyal, simple,. but essentially stupid ruler, completely unable to comprehend the domestic issues Russia faced and totally unpolitical in his judgments. One wonders again how an empire ruled by Nicholas, Alexandra, and Rasputin survived as long as it did.

Another interesting volume on the period is Ambassador David R. Francis' memoirs, *Russia from the American Embassy, April 1916-November 1918.* A man much criticized by historians (though not by one as knowledgeable as George Kennan), Francis had been a successful businessman, onetime mayor of St. Louis and Governor of Missouri, and Secretary of the Interior under President Grover Cleveland. One

[1] Arno has also published a 56-volume East European Collection.

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wonders why President Woodrow Wilson chose this 65-year-old man to represent the US in the capital of one of the World War I belligerents. Nevertheless, Ambassador Francis applied himself with considerable patriotism, diligence, and ability to interpreting the Russian scene from his apartment in the heart of revolutionary Petrograd. He was quickly persuaded that Lenin was a German agent—in fact a sensible conclusion at the time—and left Russia a bitter enemy of the Bolsheviks and an eager supporter of intervention. His memoirs provide considerable information concerning the 1917 Revolution, even if from a limited perspective.

This brings us to a third volume on this tumultuous period—Sir George Buchanan's *My Mission to Russia*. This volume, written by the British Ambassador to Russia from 1910 to 1918 and drawing on Foreign Office documents, deserves a central position in the Arno series and is enlightening to anyone interested in Russia's relations with the West, both then and now. The son of a British ambassador to such important posts as Vienna, Buchanan grew up in the foreign service and at the center of the establishment. Accustomed to long visits at Windsor Castle, he had the confidence and poise necessary to establish close personal relationships with Nicholas II, the Tsar's foreign ministers, and other leading Russian officials. He also benefited from considerable knowledge of the Balkans and the tangled relations there involving Austria, Germany, and Russia—knowledge derived from two tours of duty in Sofia before going to St. Petersburg.

It is true that the Arno series includes a number of slight but entertaining travel volumes which historians would consider of marginal importance. Yet some are classics: Baron Franz August Maria von Haxthausen's, *The Russian Empire, Its People, Institutions and Resources,* published in French in three volumes between 1847 and 1853 and translated into English in 1856; William Henry Chamberlin's, *Russia's Iron Age,* first published in 1934; John Scott's, *Behind the Urals,* published in 1942 (the most recent date of any in the series); and two of Auguste Vambéry's great accounts, *Travels in Central Asia* and *Sketches of Central Asia,* published originally in 1865 and 1868, respectively. However, probably the most fascinating volume of this genre is the Baedeker on Russia, Karl Baedeker's *Baedeker's Handbook for Travellers: Russia,* published originally in 1914, almost a monument and still a guide to prerevolutionary Russia. Many American scholars of the old regime have used rare copies of the original Baedeker in their explorations of the old sections of Moscow and St. Petersburg and have increased their understanding of Russian letters and arts by identifying the building in which Tolstoy and Dostoevsky lived and wrote, in which Repin painted, Tchaikovsky composed, Chaliapin sang, and the Decembrists plotted.

The series, of course, does not include all of the most important accounts in English by Western travelers, diplomats, soldiers, and long-term residents in Russia. Understandably, it does not reproduce the appropriate volumes in the Hakluyt series or classics such as George Brandes' 1899 *Impressions of Russia,* which was reprinted by the Harvard University Press in 1966. It does not include the Marquis de Custine's *Russia in 1839,* which has been published in numerous abbreviated editions in the last two decades and which has just been the subject of a fascinating study by Kennan. Unfortunately, it also omits a number of out-of-print books which should have been included, such as Arthur Ransome's *Russia in 1919* (New York and London, 1919), an account by the well-informed *Manchester Guardian* correspondent, and Paul Scheffer's *Seven Years in Russia,* a translation published in New York in 1931 of an account of the 1920's by the *Berliner Tageblatt* correspondent in Moscow from 1921 to 1929. The heavy emphasis of the series on travel accounts is disappointing. Libraries, teachers, students, and the general public would benefit enormously from a series which reproduced some of the important out-of-print studies of Russian history, broadly defined, including translations of some of the most important such books originally written in languages other than English.

Inevitably, many of these reproduced volumes are expensive. The Baedeker, for example, costs $30 (it *is* 730 pages), and the Haxthausen $30.25 (934 pages). In fact, the cost of the entire set of 91 volumes is $1699, or $16.80 per volume. It is to be hoped that Arno and the editors of this series might identify those volumes which would be most useful for teaching and most interesting to the general public and produce these volumes in inexpensive paperbacks.

All cavil and caveats aside, this series is a most welcome publishing event. If only a Soviet publisher would issue a similar set of volumes on *The West Observed!*

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The Dead Hand of Censorship

By Sidney Monas

MICHAEL SCAMMELL, Ed.: *Russia's Other Writers: Selections from Samizdat Literature.* Foreword by Max Hayward. New York, F. A. Praeger, 1971.
A. ANATOLI (KUZNETSOV): *Babi Yar—A Document in the Form of a Novel.* New York, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1970.
ANDREI SINIAVSKY: *For Freedom of Imagination.* New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971.

LACKING THAT "Religious Purpose" with which Abram Tertz credited Stalinism, Soviet literary censorship, by reason of its very scale and intricacy, tends to be self-defeating.

The first of the volumes under review is an anthology of miscellaneous prose unpublished in the USSR but read there—by how many people, and with what assumptions, nobody knows. The two things these pieces have in common is that they violate the politically imposed structure of what is permissible for a Soviet writer and that they have as their common reference point, explicitly or implicitly, the quality and nature of Soviet life.

Curiously, the only outright cry of rebellion arises in Osip Mandelshtam's "Fourth Prose," written in 1929. It is a diatribe, and very strong. At the time he wrote it, Mandelshtam (who died in a Soviet concentration camp around 1938) had considerable prestige as a poet and also enjoyed the protection of Bukharin. Yet even by then, he had been harassed and impoverished, and he felt the threat of arrest constantly hanging over him. Poor and afraid, his nerves worn to a shred, he suffered a long period of being unable to write, a block which he finally overcame by pouring his sense of outrage into "Fourth Prose." His title was chosen in part because he saw this vehement fragment as a rebellious fourth estate of words that had risen up in him to overthrow discretion and restraint, a Luciferian *non serviam:* "I divide all the works of world literature into those written with and without permission. The first are trash, the second—stolen air."

By contrast, Vladimir Maximov's "House in the Clouds" is a gentle, sad morality tale about an ordinary man whose failure to act against authority in defense of his personal human commitments corrupts and paralyzes him and undermines his sense of himself. The story is wistful and lyrical. Its details are homey. At points, the author comes close to sentimentality or banality. Yet in the very ordinariness of its details, in the common history it rehearses of the past fifty years (capsulized here in the viewpoint of a building superintendent staring out into his courtyard), the novella acquires a large sense of generality, and the semi-articulate self-reproaches of the superintendent Lashkov achieve a close-to-classic lyrical intensity.

There are morality tales, too, of a different stamp—a pair of Varlam Shalamov's very short stories of concentration-camp life, for instance, which have, along with their grimness, a certain gaiety and zest and energy. Shalamov, whose poems are officially published, is the author of a whole volume of such presently unpublished camp "fables." The collection also includes half [1] of an interesting document, Victor Velsky's "My Apologia," which might be taken for direct autobiography if it did not so closely resemble in structure and tone Dostoevsky's *Notes from Underground.* Like Dostoevsky's underground man, Velsky's feels himself isolated from his society by a sense of his own superiority. Certainly, he does not stalk the infinite with the same candor or brilliance, yet he sounds much like his counterpart when he argues that in some instances a sincere affirmation of one's own perversity may bring one closer to the eternal than the practice of a confining rationality, undermined by hypocrisy.

[1] The other half is printed separately in *Russia's Underground Intellectuals,* edited by Peter Reddaway, New York, Praeger, 1971. It seems unfortunate that the document was thus split.

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IN THE SECOND volume under review, Anatoli Kuznetsov, who since his defection to England calls himself A. Anatoli, gives us an elaboration of his work, *Babi Yar,* now called "a document in the form of a novel." I suppose that what it is meant to document is the practice of Soviet censorship. The novel first appeared in the Soviet Union in 1966. It managed to speak out directly on the events at Babi Yar [2] which Yevtushenko, in his famous poem of 1961, had only been able to allude to (at least in the version published). Kuznetsov's work was the first to acknowledge in print the murder of 70,000 Jews by German and Ukrainian Nazis, and its appearance led him to be identified generally with the liberal writers of the thaw. The book was indignant, but basically its indignation was directed against the Nazis and their Ukrainian collaborators.

The present volume is set up so that the novel as originally published appears in ordinary type; what was deleted or altered in the course of several censorship operations before publication—about a fourth of the book—appears in boldface; and afterthoughts, written by the author between 1966 and his arrival in England in 1969, appear in brackets. The emotional center of gravity of the novel shifts perceptibly, if not very subtly. (On the whole there is little that is subtle about this book in any of its versions!) In the boldface passages, Soviet atrocities and mistakes figure prominently, as does the considerable extent of Ukrainian defection. Also, some of the more horrifying aspects of suffering and deprivation in occupied wartime Kiev—cases of cannibalism, for instance—were suppressed by the Soviet censor, who could not, apparently, afford to admit that "Soviet" people did or would do such things, even in the most extreme circumstances.

It is only in brackets that something of a vaguely anti-Soviet ideological stance begins to take shape. This shape consists of little more than the author's stated determination to oppose as best he can all attempts to impose a Utopian future on mankind at the expense of the present—not, I think, a really formidable formulation of opposition to the Soviet regime, however appealing. Anatoli would like us to view his attitude as an anti-Soviet stance directly produced by censorship. Of this I am not quite convinced; I would rather argue that had it not been for censorship—in short, had his work been printed as written in the first place—his somewhat rudimentary ideological notions would not have gained significance as expressions of anti-Soviet sentiment.

For the rest, *Babi Yar* is neither a document nor a novel. The materials themselves—the author's reminiscences of his and his family's experiences in wartime Kiev, which he insists were symbolized by Babi Yar—these are convincing and harrowing enough. Yet they are presented in the frame of every hoary rhetorical trick in the propagandist's trade: from the repeated insistence that "this book contains nothing but the truth" to rhetorical questions like, "Is there more justice in the world today? Is there more goodness?" and outright declarations that the author is now on the side of justice and right—"That's the task I set myself in my life: to fight against the evil ones who are turning the world into a prison and a stone-crusher. Do you hear that, evil ones?" The Western reader who has a certain built-in resistance to such rhetorical assaults might well ask, in the course of reading Kuznetsov, whether anti-Utopians would be likely to caress mankind more tenderly than Utopians. For the same reason that credence comes hard for this book as a document, it comes hard for it as a novel: quite apart, it would seem, from the regime's practice of censorship, *Babi Yar* lacks an authentic style.

AN AUTHENTIC STYLE need not necessarily be a brilliant one. For instance, the essays that Andrei Siniavsky published in the USSR under his own name lack the flare and verve that marked "On Socialist Realism" and some of the stories he published abroad as Abram Tertz. They were undoubtedly written with the censor very much in mind. They are cautious, gentle, often a little circuitous, perhaps even a little long-winded and repetitious, above all restrained and impersonal. There are flashes of wit, and here and there (with hindsight perhaps) one can see a trace of the famous Tertzian irony. But on the whole the essays tend to be a bit heavy and awkward, more like Belinsky than, say, the early Shklovsky, or for that matter the Tertz of "On Socialist Realism."

Not that that essay was written with the intention of publication abroad. Apparently Siniavsky wrote it in 1956, under the first full impact of destalinization, and the precautionary censor that every Soviet writer builds into his typewriter simply disintegrated under the force of inspiration. It

[2] The great ravine on the outskirts of the city used by the Nazis and their Ukrainian collaborators as a mass grave for their victims.

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was some three years later that Siniavsky decided to send the essay abroad, and only after that did "Abram Tertz" come into existence.

By contrast, the essays carefully collected here were written with the censor, or rather with a whole complex system of censorship, very much in mind. Uncertainty as to the limits of the permissible, along with uncertainty over the problem of being understood by an audience long plagued by censorship, take much of the verve and dash from the writing, as though Siniavsky were at once unsure of being heard and half afraid he might be.

Yet the title of this volume of essays—chosen by the editors and not by Siniavsky—is nevertheless appropriate. Freedom of the imagination is exactly what every one of the essays attempts to enhance. Nor is their purpose separate from the stylistic means used to achieve it. In dealing negatively with such party hack-writers as Sofronov and Shevtsov, Siniavsky is always careful to avoid the kind of personal polemic for which such writers are themselves notorious. He focuses on their writing and demonstrates through close textual analysis (that remains nevertheless fair to the overall context) where the crudity, colorlessness, and degree of abstraction of their writing impinge on problems of theme, ideology and outlook, without calling these latter directly into question. The fashionably dissident poet Yevtushenko, on the other hand, is chided (gently) for his assumption of a greater moral authority than he has in fact earned, but again in specific connection with the quality and texture of his verse. The moral thrust of a work of literature is never directly questioned but rather examined and explored by means of the literary devices, the linguistic tone and texture, which are necessarily its substance. The reader is led into the depths by a painstaking, disinterested and judicious analysis of the surface. In this way, Siniavsky pays homage to the high moral calling of literature as a craft.

This is not to say that his imagination is completely free or even that the inhibiting effects of censorship on his work are slight. In his essay on Robert Frost, revealingly I think, Siniavsky tends to equate Frost with Pasternak, especially in their perception of nature. It is a curious mistake. For Pasternak, nature has a human perspective: it responds to human hopes and passions, almost to the point of what used to be known as the "pathetic fallacy." In Frost's work, nothing is perceived more dramatically than man's solitude—and nature's indifference to those human moods that wish otherwise. (See, for instance, "The Most of It.") It was undoubtedly Siniavsky's own need for metaphysical companionship in the direction of a mystical, religious, partly Christian, partly pagan celebration of "Doctor Life" à la Pasternak, his master, that prompted him to assimilate Frost to his own world-view.[3] Insofar as censorship isolated the writer from other writers as well as from his audience, it may perhaps be held responsible for that great solitude which tempts even a gifted critic to warp his judgment in the direction of his wish.

There is no clear line between Soviet literature published at home legally and *samizdat* circulated at home and printed abroad. In a sense, Siniavsky's essays are "freer" than Anatoli's bracketed prose. The vast censorship system leaks, also vastly. Yet even what leaks carries a certain taste of repression. What is, for Soviet society, self-defeating is surely in the repression and not in the leak. If artists are, as Ezra Pound writes, the antennae of the race, censorship cuts off the body politic from what it needs to know.

[3] The excellent Russian translations of Frost, which nevertheless tended to select Frost's more amiable, more celebrative poems, may have led him in this direction.

Reviewers in This Issue

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Notes & Views

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NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, *Problems of Communism,* US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC, 20547.

METHODENSTREIT

TO THE EDITORS: John W. Burton's review of Chalmers Johnson, Ed., *Change in Communist Systems,* and Samuel P. Huntington and Clement Moore, Eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society* (September-October 1971 issue) warrants a number of criticisms.

First, Mr. Burton seems to argue that all (26) authors contributing to these volumes "think basically in terms of the Western political environment in which they live," hence that they, like their ideology-bound Communist colleagues in China or Russia, "accept their own system . . . as the norm." As a result, the "differences between systems tend to be overstated and similarities unobserved."

Mr. Burton also maintains that the phenomenon of change in Communist systems cannot, even for purposes of case-study-based tentative analyses, be treated separately from comparable happenings in Western societies or studied without the extensive use of the relevant methodologies of Deutsch, Etzioni, Lipset and like-minded social scientists.

Mr. Burton feels that none of the 29 studies in these two volumes seems "to relate to the growing body of theoretical and empirical literature on systems analysis" and also that they "offer no basis for a transnational dialogue."

Finally, Mr. Burton recommends that in order to avoid the pitfalls of "strongly subjective . . . conventional Sino-Soviet studies, area specialists and students of comparative politics" should learn more from "political scientists" (note the distinction!) who are interested in "recurrent and universal patterns of behavior" such as "general systems theory."

Although any careful reader of these studies would be tempted simply to dismiss the reviewer's comments as inaccurate and unduly opinionated, some of Mr. Burton's points are worth a brief rejoinder. The first three contentions may be disposed of rather quickly by noting that (a) scholars with the intellectual credentials of Chalmers Johnson, Carl Friedrich, Gordon Skilling, Dankwart Rustow, Alfred Meyer, Richard Burks, Juan Linz, and Douglas Price may be accused of some things but certainly not of cultural insularity, ideological orthodoxy or intellectual ethnocentrism of any kind; (b) several contributors did, in fact, make full use of the works of Deutsch, Etzioni, Lipset (ethnocentrism anyone?) and those of other authorities in presenting their respective cases; and (c) even systems analysis—without the semantic atrocities of that particular approach—has been utilized by Johnson, Montias, Skilling, Burks, Huntington and Price, just to mention a few of the more empirically-oriented contributors.

Now, unless I have completely misunderstood the purposes of the Johnson and the Huntington-Moore enterprises, neither volume was intended to promote a "transnational dialogue" of any kind. Rather, studies in the Johnson book sought to analyze various aspects of socio-political *change* in Communist systems and to test the salience of hypotheses derived from contemporary sociology, economics, psychology, and, indeed, systems analysis against the evidence offered by the example of the rapidly changing system of Communist party-states. On the other hand, the Huntington-Moore volume focused—to quote the book's subtitle—on the "dynamics of established one-party systems," touching on such themes as legitimacy, organization, mobilization, participation, socialization, modernization, institutional adaptability — in short, on the very issues that Burton claims had not been investigated by these alleged "area specialists."

It is true that a gap exists between political scientists and those of their professional brethren who have yet to be convinced of the overwhelming superiority of the behavioral over the more conventional, normative, historical and institutional approaches to the study of politics. The trouble is that in real life—and certainly in the case of these studies—this kind of neat empirical-normative dichotomy rarely exists, and when it does, works of either persuasion still have a great deal to offer to believer and skeptic alike.

The fact of the matter is that these two books are outstanding examples of highly original, often brilliantly argued studies which successfully combine the virtues of the traditional and modern approaches to comparative politics. While one can sympathize with Professor Burton's bewilderment (he is a student of international relations) over the dazzling methodological eclecticism of the recent American literature of comparative politics, his confusion is no excuse for the intellectual insularity he seems to reveal in his hasty review.

To be sure, "the systems approach," or more specifi-

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cally the Almond school of structural-functional analysis that Mr. Burton appears to champion in his critical remarks, is quite useful for a variety of heuristic purposes, including the creation of typologies and models for the study of international relations and comparative politics. However, to demand of scholars working in the data-poor Communist field the same kind of precision that a solid systems model requires, or to call them "area specialists" for failing to construct such models, betrays a regrettably narrow outlook.

For the reasons stated, I believe that *Problems of Communism* and its reviewer have failed to do justice to the two most important books on comparative communism that have appeared in the last five years.

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MR. BURTON REPLIES: I appreciate the response of Rudolf Tőkés. He places my criticisms in the context of an academic battle which raged in the USA until recently, labeled somewhat misleadingly "traditionalist vs. behavioralist" or "descriptive vs. analytical" or "inductive vs. deductive"—according to taste. That battle is really over; we are already well into a post-behavioral or micro-macro phase in which political-sociological approaches have been adopted: theoretical and empirical analyses of political socialization, political participation, political recruitment and political communication. My argument was that comparative politics and area studies have not yet absorbed much of the conceptual and empirical work of the last decade in the wide field of international relations. Some lack of familiarity with this literature seems to be reflected in Tőkés reference to the "semantic atrocities" of a systems analysis approach. The move from journalism to a more precise language is no easier than the shift from language to mathematics, and encounters the same resistances. Sino-Soviet studies are, in my view, particularly inadequate. There may be some special reasons for this in addition to lack of data, to which Tokés refers. Indeed, lack of data, one would think, would promote deductive studies.

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